THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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Junior Faculty Research Grant Program

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The Peace Process at Sea

The Karine-A *Affair and the War on Terrorism*

Robert Satloff

ON JANUARY 3, in the clouds high above the waters of the Red Sea, Lt. General Shaul Mofaz, chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, peered anxiously through a specially designed telescopic lens at an old, rusty, blue freighter several kilometers below. For the previous three months, Israeli intelligence had tracked the boat from its purchase in Lebanon to its current position in international waters between Saudi Arabia and Sudan, heading toward the Suez Canal. Operation "Noah's Ark"—the plan to intercept the ship on the high seas—was given the go-ahead. But so nervous was Mofaz that he might authorize an unwarranted attack hundreds of kilometers from his country's territorial waters, he himself needed to confirm the letters hand-painted on the side of the ship. It was, as intelligence had said it would be, the *Karine-A*. Within minutes, Israeli naval commandos operating from both sea and air boarded the ship, surprised the crew, and took control without firing a shot.

What they found in the cargo hold, beneath crates of cheap textiles, sunglasses and other freight, was stunning: scores of professionally manufactured submersible containers that held enough weapons and explosives to supply a small army. The fifty-ton arsenal included dozens of 122 mm and 107 mm Katyusha rockets with ranges of twenty and eight kilometers respectively; hundreds of shorter-range 81 mm rockets; numerous mortars, SAGGER and RPG 18 anti-tank missiles, sniper rifles, AK-47 assault rifles and mines. The rockets and mortars were of Russian, Chinese, North Korean and Iranian origin. Some were advanced munitions, such as the VR7 anti-tank warhead, capable of penetrating the armor of main-battle tanks. Perhaps most ominously, the boat held about 3,000 pounds of C4 explosive, enough for about 300 suicide bombs—three times more than all the suicide bombers Israel has faced in its entire history.

The magnitude of the weapons cache notwithstanding, the strategic implication of the *Karine-A* lies less in the lethality of its cargo than in the identity of the unlikely partnership that implemented the smuggling scheme. As Israeli, American and even European officials confirmed,[1] the *Karine-A* was a joint undertaking of Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran, facilitated through the good offices of the

Robert Satloff is executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

[1]Javier Solana, the EU official responsible for foreign and security policy, told European parliamentarians that the *Karine-A* was "the link between Iran and the PA." *Haaretz*, February 7, 2002.

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Lebanese terrorist organization Hizballah.

The facts are these: On August 31, the head of the PA's procurement department, one Adel Awadallah (a.k.a. Adel al-Mughrabi), purchased a 4,000-ton freighter in Lebanon with $400,000 provided by a man named Fuad Shobaki. With the rank of brigadier general in the Palestinian military, Shobaki held the title of director of the Military Financial Administration; in practice, he was widely considered to be Arafat's closest financial advisor. The acquisition itself was supervised by two PA naval police officials, Fathi Razam and Omar Akawi. On September 12, the day after the World Trade Center/Pentagon terrorist attacks, the boat was registered with the Kingdom of Tonga and renamed the *Karine-A*. After steaming to Aden, Akawi took over as captain, with a crew of nine Egyptians and Jordanians—who evidently did not know about the arms smuggling plan—plus four armed and well-trained Palestinians. The ship proceeded to waters off the Iranian island of Kish. There, under the watchful eye of a chief aide to Imad Mughniyah—Hizballah's operations commander and the man thought responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon and the bombings of the Israeli embassy and Jewish community center in Argentina—the boat was loaded with eighty crates of weapons. Though the weapons were not an outright gift from the ayatollahs to Arafat, they were sold at steep discount—$30–50 million of goods for just $10 million.

On December 12, the boat departed for Dubai, where it was loaded with innocent cargo as camouflage. In mid-December, just as Arafat was taking to the airwaves under intense U.S. pressure to announce a ceasefire in the 15-month old intifada-*cum*-guerilla war, the boat was chugging around the Arabian peninsula. Evidently, the plan was to pass through the Suez Canal, with Palestinian agents poised to bribe canal inspectors to avoid detection, and then unload the weapons in floating containers off the coast of Gaza and el-Arish, where local fishing boats would pick them up for transshipment to the Palestinian authorities. "They told me it was weapons for Palestine and I am a Palestinian officer merely doing what he has to", admitted the ship's captain in a remarkably candid interview given after his capture.[2]

At the start, Arafat and his PA colleagues denied any connection to the *Karine-A*, but after catching the first wave of American outrage, Arafat established an "investigative committee" to look into the matter. The membership of the committee, however, consisted of three men who themselves could have been in on the scheme—the PA military chiefs in the West Bank and Gaza and Arafat's own head of military intelligence, his cousin Musa Arafat. Shobaki and his accomplices were subsequently "detained" and "interrogated." Still, despite overwhelming evidence, neither Arafat nor the PA took responsibility for the smuggling effort. In late January, under additional pressure from Washington, Arafat wrote a letter to the Bush Administration accepting "responsibility" for the affair, though not actually admitting that he or the PA had anything to do with it. In public, he continued to reject all assertions of PA complicity. "Regarding the armed ship, the leadership re-iterates that it has no knowledge of the issue", declared an official PA communiqué on February 8. Finally, on February 20, the PA Military Prosecutor issued indictments against four of the *Karine-A* conspirators, including the captain, but not against key players like Shobaki whose participation would link the episode to Arafat.

On the supply side, Iran too denied

[2]Quoted in the *New York Times*, January 7, 2002.

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any part of the *Karine-A*. "The Islamic Republic of Iran has had no military relations with Yasir Arafat and no steps have been taken by any Iranian organization for the shipment of arms to the mentioned lands", Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani told Iran's official news agency. Though Iranian leaders, both moderate and hard-line, publicly deny Israel's right to exist, they rejected accusations of cooperation with Arafat. Interestingly, of the three partners in the arms deal, only Hizballah did not issue a categorical denial. In an official statement, it only noted that what "is surprising is that the U.S. administration provoked such a fuss over the arms ship while it provides unlimited military support to . . . Israel."[3]

Broken Assumptions

THAT ARAFAT would truck with the ayatollahs—and vice versa—was a strategic shock. Since the Islamic revolution in 1979, a cardinal principle of regional politics has been Iranian opposition to any diplomatic recognition of Israel and hostility toward any negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence Iran's condemnation of the Egypt-Israel and Jordan-Israel peace treaties, of the October 1991 Madrid peace conference, and of all Israel-PLO agreements from the September 1993 Declaration of Principles onward. Unlike some armchair critics of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, Iran has a long history of backing up its words with deeds, especially the provision of hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of training, arms and logistical support for Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and, more recently, Hamas. (Indeed, Tehran founded PIJ because it believed that Hamas, with its social welfare wing and political aspirations, was too moderate and insufficiently committed to the speedy establishment of an Islamic state in all of Palestine.)

Withering Iranian criticism of the peace process did not always mean that Yasir Arafat and the ayatollahs were enemies. On February 17, 1979, just 16 days after Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from exile, Arafat was the first international leader to visit Tehran to offer his personal support. At the time, the Palestinian-Iranian entente was based on common antipathy toward Israel. However, that relationship was eclipsed by the Iraq-Iran War when Arafat (and most Arab leaders) sided with Saddam Hussein. Since then, Iranian-Palestinian relations have been in a deep freeze, with Arafat even accusing the Iranians of fomenting assassination plots against him.

Despite the early friendship between Arafat and the ayatollahs, mutual antagonism has long been a fixture of the accepted analytical framework for U.S. Middle East policy. This flowed in part from Arafat's long-term alignment with Saddam, even when it cost the Palestinian leader substantial goodwill in the West. But as Palestinian Islamist organizations grew in popularity and brazenness, it was taken for granted, too, that Arafat would want to keep the patron of his leading political competitors at arm's length.

This assumption of PLO-Iranian antagonism has long been reflected in U.S. policy. The imposition of the U.S. trade embargo on Iran (1995) and the passage of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (1996) were largely prompted by the danger to the peace process posed by Iranian-backed terrorism. In all these developments, Israel and the Palestinian Authority were both viewed as targets of Iranian-backed terrorism. Indeed, American, Israeli and even some Arab leaders argued throughout the 1990s that pursuit of the peace process was one of the best defenses against the spread of Iranian-supported

[3]Cited in the *Daily Star* (Beirut), January 14, 2002.

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religious fundamentalism throughout the Arab world.

All these assumptions have been called into question by the *Karine-A* affair. The biggest unanswered question is "why?" Given the high likelihood of failure—Israel had foiled a previous seaborne smuggling effort by anti-Arafat groups last May and was on the lookout for other attempts—why would Arafat take the risk? Why risk the international and regional diplomatic gains he had earned from his participation in a peace process (even one that had, by autumn 2001, collapsed)? Why risk losing his relationship with Washington, so carefully cultivated since 1988, by colluding with a country so inimical to U.S. interests? Why risk legitimizing Ariel Sharon and driving the final stake into the heart of the Israeli peace camp by behaving as a warmonger committed to military escalation? No less important, why jeopardize the patronage of Arab leaders, especially Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, who would not take kindly to an insolent Palestinian effort to give Iran entry into the eastern Mediterranean by sneaking weapons through the Suez Canal, endangering Egypt's security and key source of hard currency?

A likely answer, given Arafat's *modus operandi*, is that he jumped at the opportunity to buy the weapons because they were cheap and available; i.e., he could do it, so he did. That fits nicely with the widely-held assessment of Arafat as an awkward tactician but keen survivalist and opportunist. But such an explanation does not contradict what may have been a strategic decision to collude with Iran. Just as Gamal Abdel Nasser turned to the Soviet Union for arms in 1955 after exhausting efforts to wring political, military and economic concessions from Britain and the United States, so too may Arafat have turned to Iran for arms because he concluded that the "peace strategy" that had animated Palestinian politics since at least the Madrid conference had outlived its usefulness. Specifically, he may have determined that the "peace process" had effectively run its course, in the sense that an Israel traumatized first by the rejection of Ehud Barak's magnanimous Camp David offer and then by months of uprising, terrorism and violence would never again willingly turn over more territory to the Palestinians. He may have reasoned that the warm ties between the Bush Administration and the Sharon government, coming in the wake of the failed (and, in some circles, embarrassing) effort of President Clinton to broker a late-inning peace deal, meant that the United States was no longer useful in helping Arafat achieve his territorial objectives. And, based on Mubarak's public rejection of lending military assistance to the Palestinians, complemented by the insouciance toward the Palestinian cause evinced by many Arab kings, potentates and emirs, Arafat may have concluded that the Arab states would never be enlisted in any operational sense in support of the Palestinians.

With few equities left in Israel, the United States or Arab capitals, the option of a sharply escalated military conflict with Israel (or at least arming in preparation for such an option) made sense. Iran was probably not a necessary strategic partner, only an available one. If Iraq had made the weapons available at a reasonable price and helped provide a means of transport, Saddam Hussein would have qualified as a partner, too. It is important to note that Arafat has kept up relations with both Iraq and Iran over the course of many years. Just as the *Karine-A* affair was unfolding, for example, Arafat sent a personal emissary—Izzam al-Ahmad, the Palestinian Public Works Minister—to Baghdad to relay to Saddam "President Arafat's greetings as well as his urgent call on the Iraqi President for speedy Arab

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movement to meet Israeli threats."[4] The same financial guru—Fuad Shobaki—who played a central role in the purchase of the *Karine-A* was also reported to have paid a recent secret visit to senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad.[5] Arafat's contacts with the Iranians, however, have increased since the so-called second *intifada* was launched in September 2000. As Lebanon-based journalist Nicholas Blanford points out, this included official Palestinian Authority participation in an April 2001 Tehran conference that constituted a "who's who" of radical, anti-peace organizations.[6] And as for Hizballah-Palestinian contacts, it is no coincidence that Mughniyah—a charter member of the FBI's "most wanted foreign terrorist" list—started his career as a foot soldier in Arafat's Fatah organization. The fact that Iranian arms supplies for Hizballah have also increased in quality and quantity in recent months at least suggests planning for a simultaneous two-front missile attack against Israel.

On Iran's part, there were also strong motivations that alleviated any ideological hesitancy the mullahs may have had in aiding Arafat. Strategically, the opportunity to catapult over the entire Arab East to launch a new military front against Israel—and in the process steal a public-relations march on Egypt, Jordan and other Arab states—must have been very attractive. A confrontationalist foreign policy also advances the interests of hard-line elements in the Iranian regime—the office of Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards, the *bonyads* (foundations)—who hold power in Tehran even if they lack popular support. After all, there is no better way to undermine President Khatami's reformist credentials abroad and embarrass him at home than by waving the red flag of Israel and daring him to respond. As events since the *Karine-A* revelation have shown, when the topic is Israel, Khatami walks in lock-step with the conservatives.

To be sure, Iranian-Palestinian collusion does not necessarily mean that Arafat shares the maximalist strategic aims espoused by Iranian leaders—the destruction of Israel. It is clear, however, that their tactical goals overlap enough for the two parties to work together. The none-too-heartening best-case scenario represented by the *Karine-A* is that the Palestinian Authority only sought Iranian military assistance to help win a military campaign for Palestinian independence in the 1967 borders. Grander common objectives cannot be ruled out, however.

Washington's Response

WHEN ISRAEL announced the interception of the *Karine-A*, official U.S. reaction ranged between denial and disbelief, with unnamed U.S. intelligence officials suggesting that the boat was really heading to Lebanon to re-stock Hizballah. Within days, that pose was dropped when Israeli intelligence provided what U.S. officials accepted as "compelling evidence" that the weapons originated in Iran and were destined for the Palestinian Authority. Israeli intelligence also provided proof that Mughniyah was a key middleman for the operation. Of course, much of this Washington already knew, because its own agencies had tracked the *Karine-A* and had even assisted Israel with tactical intelligence about it.

The administration's original reluctance to deal with the strategic implications of Iranian-PLO collusion is not surprising. The *Karine-A* affair represents

[4] *Voice of Palestine* Radio, January 23, 2002.

[5] *Maariv*, January 16, 2002, cited in "Arafat's Iraqi Connection", *Jerusalem Issue Brief*, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, February 6, 2002.

[6] Blanford, *Christian Science Monitor*, January 18, 2002.

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the worst nightmare of the Arab-Israeli peace process; namely, that well-meaning diplomacy could have morphed from a means to make peace irreversible into a tool to make war possible. Even before September 11, it would not have been easy for the Bush Administration—or any U.S. administration—to recognize the upheaval represented by the *Karine-A* and respond accordingly. After September 11, it was especially difficult. That is because one of the great diplomatic achievements of the "war on terror" has been the Bush team's success in fighting Arab terrorists in Afghanistan while maintaining reasonably positive relations with most Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. One key element in this success has been the administration's renewed engagement in the peace process, manifested in the President's unprecedented public commitment to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, first uttered on October 2 but declared in full fashion—using the word "Palestine"—from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly on November 10. Secretary of State Colin Powell's November 19 Louisville speech on a "vision" for Middle East peace, and the subsequent dispatch of a new peace envoy, retired Marine General Anthony Zinni—immediate past commander of the U.S. Central Command, the regional military structure that includes virtually all the Middle East except Israel—rounded out the administration's new activism.

After having succeeded in limiting Israeli-Palestinian violence to the Israeli-Palestinian arena, and in preventing it from infecting wider U.S. regional concerns in the war on terror, the *Karine-A* must have felt like a full body blow. After all, here was Arafat regionalizing the Palestinian conflict with Israel in a way designed to inject Iran into the Arab-Israeli arena, threaten massive escalation in Israeli-Palestinian violence, and embarrass America's Arab friends all at the same time. Dealing with the implications of the *Karine-A* meant confronting Arafat. And while virtually all Arab leaders have derided and displayed utter contempt for Arafat in private, the administration feared that a *public* collision with Arafat, possibly culminating in the severance of ties with him, might threaten the tranquil U.S.-Arab relations it had so assiduously fought to preserve.

To its credit, the administration overcame its anxiety and began to talk candidly about the uncomfortable reality posed by the *Karine-A*. "I am disappointed in Yasir Arafat", President Bush said on January 25, during a visit to the Coast Guard cutter *Tahoma*. Vice President Cheney was even more direct. When asked in a January 27 Fox News interview whether Arafat's role in the *Karine-A* constituted participating in a "terrorist mission", Cheney responded: "That's correct." He added: "In my mind and based on the intelligence we've seen, the people that were involved were so close to him it's hard to believe he wasn't." These unusually harsh, personalized comments reflect the sea-change in the administration's approach to Israeli-Palestinian difficulties from what it had been just four months earlier. The journey is worth a brief review.

From Inauguration Day through Labor Day, Bush Administration policy on Arab-Israeli issues was to avoid the entanglements of the Clinton era while doing the minimum possible to appear engaged in efforts to end the violence and resume diplomacy. With a natural strategic affinity for Israel, cold realism about the prospects for diplomatic success, and no Carteresque messianism about the urgency of bringing peace to the Holy Land, the Bush team replaced Clinton's "conflict resolution" strategy with a "conflict management" approach. Diplomatic engagement, such as it was, was largely viewed within the context of relations with a country that did occupy strategic space in the administra-

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tion's worldview—Saudi Arabia. Efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute therefore became primarily a function of the broader strategic imperative to maintain warm relations with Riyadh.

In late summer, this policy ran out of steam. By this past August, Crown Prince Abdallah was greatly displeased that, in his view, the Americans were overly solicitous of Israeli security interests at the expense of Palestinians. Despite Riyadh's own half-hearted support for the Palestinian cause—where are the billions of dollars worth of aid or the thousands of jobs when the Palestinians really need them?—Abdallah wrote Bush and reportedly threatened a strategic re-assessment of U.S.-Saudi ties. In Washington, the response was electric. Within days, the administration fashioned a new approach to Middle East diplomacy based on an unprecedented Presidential commitment to a free and independent "Palestine."[7]

September 11 intervened before the policy could be implemented, but even before the launching of the Saudi-friendly peace initiative, considerable unease arose in the U.S.-Israel relationship: U.S. diplomats demanded Israeli "restraint" in retaliating for terrorist acts; administration officials dithered over whether to label terrorist groups like Hizballah and Hamas as legitimate targets of the war on terrorism; and Ariel Sharon delivered his ill-conceived "Munich" speech warning Bush against appeasing the Arabs at Israel's expense.

But the brewing U.S.-Israeli crisis never happened. By the time the administration implemented the various components of its new initiative in November, much had changed: America's Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy was annexed to the war on terrorism. First, in Washington, the fog that surrounded early post-9/11 terms like "terrorism of global reach" disappeared and clarity prevailed. Through strong public statements by senior officials, new designations of foreign terrorist organizations, the creation of a new foreign terrorist "most wanted list", and the closing of domestic front groups for foreign terrorists, the administration left no doubt that anti-Israel and anti-peace process groups were full-fledged targets of the anti-terror effort.

Second, in the American heartland, Arab states that had heretofore been viewed as valued allies—especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt—came under a blizzard of criticism for their perceived reluctance to help the September 11 investigation, their refusal to take responsibility for their citizens' participation in the attacks, and what many viewed as their culture of permissiveness toward the radicalism that nourished the hearts and minds of the terrorists. And third, in the Middle East itself, Palestinian attacks against Israeli civilians persisted with numbing frequency. With America having claimed for itself the right to retaliate against Al-Qaeda's terrorism with overwhelming force—and with the President striking a popular nerve by calling for U.S. forces to capture Osama bin Laden "dead or alive"—it was both illogical and impolitic to counsel restraint on a beleaguered democracy facing a no less immediate and deadly threat.

On account of these three developments, by the time General Zinni inaugurated his peace mission to the Middle East on November 25, the Saudis were no longer in a position to threaten Washington with a strategic re-assessment. As it happened, Zinni's trip was punctuated by a series of suicide bombs that caused no fewer than 26 Israeli deaths, attacks that Arafat did little to prevent. To long-time Middle East observers, the Palestinian leader had achieved the unimaginable: He had transformed Sharon, unelectable just 18 months before, into a middle-of-the-

[7]See the three-part *Washington Post* series on U.S.-Saudi relations, February 10–12, 2002.

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road statesman heralded for fighting both the ultra-hawkish views of Benyamin Netanyahu and the indefatigable naivete of Shimon Peres. Arafat's double-game performance throughout the Zinni mission infuriated the Bush Administration. But the *pièce de resistance* was the *Karine-A*.

Hard-line v. Harder-line

THE REVELATION of the *Karine-A* affair, with its strategic consequences for U.S. interests and those of America's Arab and Israeli regional allies, triggered a fundamental re-assessment of U.S. policy. This process produced analytical consensus regarding Arafat's unsavory character, his untrustworthiness, his collusion with Iran, and his lack of fitness to serve as a partner for peace. But debate raged over what to do.

This was not a typical policy debate on Arab-Israeli issues, however. The conventional diplomatic approach, which premised any concessions from Arafat on a mix of pressure on or incentives from Israel to make those concessions palatable, had no advocates at all. Instead, the internal administration debate throughout January is best characterized as having pitted "hardliners" against even "harder-liners." The former believed the best route forward was to place Arafat in a political straitjacket from which he could only emerge by meeting a set of stringent security requirements without timetables or deadlines that he could manipulate to advantage. The latter argued for cutting off relations with Arafat altogether, on the grounds that the *Karine-A* had revealed his true colors and that it would only risk further damage to U.S. interests to assist Arafat in any way.

As is usual when differences emerge at the top, the principals muddled through with a compromise. In this instance, with Secretary Powell traveling in South Asia, the decision was taken to dispatch stern letters to the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan outlining the case for Palestinian complicity in the *Karine-A*, underscoring the President's personal disgust with Arafat, and sending the not-so-oblique message that unless they managed to elicit swift action from Arafat to fix the problem, further U.S. engagement in the peace process would be difficult to contemplate. Of course, the letters produced the expected mixed result—ridicule of and disdain for Arafat but plaintive pleas from each of the Arab leaders not to disengage from Middle East diplomacy just because of the foibles of the Palestinian leader.

During this period, the administration also heard first-hand from a trio of high-level Israelis—the prime minister, foreign minister and defense minister. Each of these leaders, for both strategic and political reasons, offered different views about the wisdom of isolating Arafat, their own commitment to maintaining such an approach over the long term, and the likelihood that boycotting Arafat in favor of other Palestinian interlocutors might lead to a long-sought ceasefire. Though Americans are used to hearing multiple voices from a single Israeli government, the absence of a coherent posture on such a critical issue, when the administration itself was weighing alternatives, did little to strengthen the arguments of the "harder-liners."

As of late February, the administration appeared to have settled on a policy that can be termed "hard-line-plus." Five elements define the policy.

First, the President has personally signaled his lack of confidence in Arafat through public statements registering his disappointment in the Palestinian leader.

Second, declarations by senior officials, especially Secretary Powell, that Arafat remains the legitimate Palestinian leader and therefore the principal interlocutor with the United States, constitute

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a public rejection of the "Arafat-is-irrelevant" strategy advocated by Sharon. However, withholding personal contact between the White House and Arafat, and having Powell meet with other Palestinian officials (Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council Ahmed Qurei and Arafat's Chief Economic Advisor Muhammad Rashid), is a *de facto* step in that direction.

Third, the administration has outlined a set of security demands that the PA must fulfill before a resumption of U.S. diplomatic engagement can occur. This effectively amounts to a change in the sequence of requirements outlined in the "security work plan" negotiated by CIA Director George Tenet in June of last year that places additional demands on the PA.

Fourth, the administration also signaled that the timetable laid down in that work plan is fluid—performance, not deadlines, will determine the pace of diplomacy. This will have the effect of limiting Arafat's room for maneuver.

And fifth, until Arafat takes those necessary measures, the administration will give Israel wide berth to take any security measures it sees fit.

That the administration has opted not to break ties with Arafat is unsurprising. In the first place, it is hard to argue that the United States should go further in that direction than Israel, and even Israel has not broken completely with Arafat. Moreover, just at the moment when the President, in his January 29 State of the Union address, expanded the strategic objectives of his post-9/11 foreign policy from a war on terrorists and their state sponsors to a war against evil states that could threaten America and its allies through the use of weapons of mass destruction, a sensationalist public row with Arafat would have been an unwelcome distraction. A formal break in ties with the PLO leader might have provoked reactions from Arab leaders, or their citizens, that could have undermined the anti-terror campaign. (Ironically, as Crown Prince Abdallah's revealing January 29 interviews in the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* underscore, Saudi Arabia today is keen *not* to permit disagreements over Palestine to infect the wider web of U.S.-Saudi bilateral ties, a marked shift from its pre-September 11 position.) In a strange way, there is a confluence of interests among the United States, Israel and the Arab states to let Israel take the lead in pressuring Arafat militarily, rather than having Washington assume the burden of pressuring him politically: this approach does not complicate America's war on terror, does not undermine Israel's coalition government, and does not implicate Riyadh, Cairo and Amman.

This is, in other words, the path of least resistance, the usually preferred diplomatic approach. Without certainty of success at limited cost, it may have been too much to expect even this administration—which has so far displayed remarkable strategic acuity in its response to September 11—to adopt the "harder-line" strategy. Indeed, in historical terms, it is stunning that the internal U.S. policy debate toward Arafat has turned out as severe as it has.

A Post-Arafat U.S. Strategy

SADLY, HOWEVER, the current approach probably will not work—at least not for long. After eight years of the Oslo process, Arafat has mastered the game of "incremental toughness" that remains at the heart of the new U.S. policy. With patience, ingenuity and an uncanny ability to exploit tactical opportunity, Arafat knows from experience that, with time, U.S. yardsticks fall away and Washington's pique at his outrages dissipates.

Moreover, a policy based on giving Israel an amber light to pursue tough

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security measures—because the alternative of real U.S. pressure on Arafat is itself too problematic—raises problems of its own. On the one hand, there are limits beyond which Israel will not go; from its first day in office, the national unity government signaled that it would neither destroy the PA nor seek Arafat's ouster. While both positions make sense (for now), they also let Arafat know that despite his collusion with Iran to escalate the military confrontation to new heights, he himself is ultimately secure. The tanks that have encircled his compound in Ramallah do not really frighten him; he knows their utility as tools of intimidation diminish when the likelihood of their use is so low. On the other hand, Washington's ceding to Israel the task of dealing with Arafat invites the possibility of an Israeli mishap that could change the strategic equation, a Palestinian equivalent of the errant shell that fell on the Lebanese village of Qana during Israel's April 1996 Grapes of Wrath campaign, killing scores of innocents and triggering a diplomatic chain of events that compelled Israel to accept an unsatisfactory security regime in south Lebanon. Given the military ambitions that fueled the drive for the weaponry carried aboard the *Karine-A*, such an outcome in the Palestinian case could be catastrophic.

Arafat almost surely will provide Washington with another opportunity to re-think policy. Having paid a relatively small strategic price for the *Karine-A*, Arafat is likely to try again, perhaps through a different vendor or route, to acquire the weaponry necessary to change the nature of the Palestinian conflict with Israel. Before that happens—and certainly when that happens—the administration should be ready with the details of the harder-line approach as part of a post-Arafat American strategy. That approach, too, ought to have five parts:

First, diplomatically, the United States should be ready to formally suspend relations with the PLO (and the PA), just as President George H.W. Bush did in 1990 when Arafat broke his commitment to renounce terrorism. The United States should at that time also suspend all efforts to advance Palestinian self-determination and independence pending the advent of a new Palestinian leadership committed irrevocably to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. After all, to assist in the creation of a Palestinian state whose leadership has colluded with Iran, and is seeking to escalate conflict with Israel, would be manifestly inimical to U.S. interests. In that same declaration, the administration should list the steps it is willing to take to help the Palestinians achieve independence—within the context of a negotiated settlement with Israel—once a suitable leadership has come to power.

Second, operationally, the United States should suspend all contact with the entire senior Palestinian Authority political leadership, not just Arafat. While U.S. emissaries might facilitate security talks among local commanders, they should not engage in political negotiations or host PA ministers in Washington. The purpose of this tactic is to encourage internal transition in the Palestinian leadership. While some of Arafat's associates may eventually emerge as moderate members of a successor leadership, one way to hasten that emergence is to convince them that they will suffer collectively for continued association with Arafat.

Third, militarily, the United States should adjust its posture from a "conflict management" approach to a full "alliance-based" relationship with Israel in recognition of the threat posed to a U.S. ally by Palestinian collusion with an outside power. A top order of business should be a coordinated U.S.-Israeli military assessment, in the context of the Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG), of the Palestinian Authority's potential to make war on Israel.

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Fourth, Washington should address the economic, social and humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people. This could include: a substantial increase in support for UNRWA and relevant NGOs; U.S. leadership in securing international donor assistance for humanitarian efforts; public-private partnerships to resuscitate the Palestinian economy; and special security assistance to Israel to facilitate movement of goods that would enable a resumption of economic activity in the West Bank and Gaza (and between the West Bank and Jordan). Much of this money will be wasted and none of the recipients are likely to be free of PLO influence and corruption, but it is still worth the risk to facilitate aid to needy Palestinians while other steps are taken to trigger the process of transition to a new Palestinian leadership.

Fifth, regionally, the United States must market the "post-Arafat" strategy and convince key Arab states that U.S. expectations have changed. Egypt, for example, has operated for years on the assumption that its ability to play a bridging role in the region is one of its strategic assets. One such bridging effort has been Egypt's two decades-old project to make Arafat palatable to America and to detect points of U.S.-PLO consensus. In a post-Arafat strategy, Cairo needs to understand that its bridging role is defined as aiding the transition to a new Palestinian leadership. All of America's Arab friends need to be disabused of the idea that America will be grateful if they deliver a rehabilitated Arafat.

Just as U.S. resolve to hasten the demise of Saddam Hussein's regime will be the key determinant of Arab support for U.S. strategy, so U.S. resolve to hasten the transition to a new Palestinian leadership will be the key determinant of Arab support for that U.S. strategy. If the administration simply consults with Arab leaders, they will invariably demur—despite their anger over the *Karine-A* episode and other of Arafat's exploits that have jeopardized their interests. But if the administration presents them with a *fait accompli*, they will accommodate themselves to it. Indeed, the relative silence from Arab capitals that accompanied the unprecedented Israeli encirclement of Arafat's Ramallah compound further suggests that Arab leaders will do their part in a post-Arafat U.S. strategy, especially one that looks toward a negotiated independent Palestinian state.

PURSUING a post-Arafat strategy does not mean that the United States should be party to any specific effort to change the Palestinian leadership. Americans do not engineer other countries' politics very well; even making the attempt with Palestinians would be foolish and almost surely counterproductive. Nor should the United States have a particular view as to who should constitute a successor leadership. That is something for the Palestinians to decide—or, as has been the case for every PLO leader since its founding in 1964, for Arab leaders to decide. Nor should Washington assume that Arafat's successors will prove suddenly more pliant than he is on key issues; on the contrary, they are likely to prove their nationalist *bona fides* by hewing closely to conventional negotiating positions, at least for a while. But if they are committed to diplomacy as the route to solve the conflict, they are deserving of America's friendship even if a negotiated peace is not imminent.

In the meantime, the United States should make clear its view that, as with our own elected presidents, no one is indispensable or eternal, and that the Near Eastern sky will not fall when a new leadership replaces the current one. (How such an argument could be made after the revelation of the *Karine-A*—though it has been made—is itself

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astounding.) It is also appropriate for the United States to make clear that it will support Palestinian independence only if Palestinians have a leadership worthy of U.S. support.

Implementing this policy will not be easy. Arafat will not conveniently fade into the sunset, and ushering in a new Palestinian leadership will require the American equivalent of what Palestinians call *sumud*, steadfastness. But the *Karine-A* affair cannot just be dismissed as another of Arafat's eccentricities. Like the Czech arms deal of 1955 and the expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt in 1972, this was an initiative with far-reaching strategic consequences. In light of what the *Karine-A* says about Arafat's intentions, pursuing a post-Arafat strategy has the added value of being the right thing to do—for Americans, Israelis and Palestinians alike. □

Doppleganger

As Yasir Arafat's leadership of the Palestinians enters its terminal phase, it might be illuminating to address the remarkable parallels between his career and that of an earlier Palestinian leader. The life and career of Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, the Palestinian leader of the 1920s and '30s, shares such an uncanny resemblance to Arafat's that it cannot be dismissed as mere coincidence. . . .

Much like Arafat, the Mufti won great acclaim in his early years as a charismatic leader whom many foreign leaders believed would lead his people into statehood. . . . But the more impressive comparison is in the staggering strategic mistakes made by the two men. As early as 1929 it was evident that British policy was swinging firmly against establishment of a Jewish homeland and in favor of Palestinian nationalism. As the Second World War approached, the British desperately attempted to curry favor with the Arabs by severely restricting further Jewish immigration while recommending the creation of a Palestinian Arab state within ten years. The Mufti would have none of it. He rejected all overtures and even took up residence in Berlin from 1941–45.

Arafat's downward trajectory has been no less spectacular. Rejecting Ehud Barak's wide ranging offers at Camp David in July 2000, he chose instead to launch an insurrection that brought down the most favorable Israeli government to Palestinians in history. He then alienated his admirers on the Israeli Left and aligned himself with terrorists, just as the acts of Islamic fundamentalists galvanized the Western world into a united front against terrorism. Subsequent collusion with Hizballah and Iran and sympathy for Saddam Hussein has only brought more grievous comparisons with the Mufti's cultivation of Hitler.

Cursed with such vainglorious, ineffective leadership, the Palestinians' true tragedy will be if they are unable to winnow vital historical lessons from their defeats. . . . If Santayana could declare those who forget the past as doomed to repeat it, surely it is just as accurate to state that a people unable to candidly record their own history will forever remain its prisoner.

—Avi Davis, "The Prisoners of History", February 2002

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Law in Order

Reconstructing U.S. National Security

William Wechsler

FEW TOOLS of U.S. foreign policy are as vitally important *and* as consistently overlooked as law enforcement. Terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, sanctions busting and foreign corruption are serious challenges confronting American policymakers, and law enforcement has an important—sometimes central—role in combating each of these threats. That role suffers, however, from two fatal flaws. First, differences in bureaucratic culture and viewpoints between the law enforcement and national security communities make coordination difficult. Law enforcement agencies generally refuse to see themselves as components of U.S. foreign policy. Nor does the traditional foreign policy establishment adequately appreciate the distinct culture, capabilities and constraints that characterize U.S. law enforcement agencies. Second, there are structural impediments to effective coordination, both among the various law enforcement agencies and between such bodies and the traditional national security agencies. Federal law enforcement agencies, themselves riven by turf battles, lack proper civilian oversight and are organizationally ill-suited for integration into the wider foreign policy community.

Previous administrations have tried, but failed, to solve these problems. Too many important actors prefer things as they are, most significantly the various Federal law enforcement agencies themselves. In the past, the need to fix the systematic inefficiencies bedeviling Federal law enforcement seemed less pressing. But the world has changed, and U.S. law enforcement must change with it. Just as war is too important to be left to the generals, law enforcement reform is too important to be left to FBI directors and Customs commissioners.

International Crime: A Threat to U.S. National Security

FOR MOST of American history, there has been a bright line on the Federal level between national security threats on the one hand and criminal threats on the other. The former were international, the latter domestic. The international side was the purview of the military and intelligence agencies; the domestic side that of the law enforcement agencies. This separation was primarily intended to prevent military encroachments on

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civilian authorities and civil liberties. The fear of militarism in American civil society remains deeply embedded in the national consciousness and has long been incorporated into American governance. U.S. government actions are still defined by the Posse Comitatus Act, passed in 1878 to prohibit the military from performing certain domestic police functions.

In recent decades this bright line has blurred. Traditional crimes in the United States have increasingly been found to have links to criminal networks overseas. Narcotics trafficking, most obviously, cannot possibly be combated by domestic law enforcement operations alone. A bipartisan consensus also has emerged that the threat from foreign narcotics trafficking is not just a law enforcement concern but a matter of national security as well. Thus in 1987 did President Reagan overrule his Secretary of Defense and instruct the military to go abroad to help fight the war on drugs.

As technology advanced and borders became increasingly porous after the Cold War, it became increasingly evident that international crime in *all* of its various forms threatened U.S. national security interests. Sometimes the threats were direct. Terrorists groups like Al-Qaeda, no longer as dependent on state sponsorship, began targeting Americans at home and abroad. They also engaged in a host of criminal activities apart from terrorism, from arms trafficking to people smuggling to securities fraud. Vast networks of criminals based in Russia, Nigeria, Latin America, East Asia and elsewhere went global, infiltrating the United States as one of the world's most lucrative targets. Hackers halfway around the world broke into U.S. computer systems, including sensitive systems belonging to the military and intelligence agencies.

International crime also poses indirect threats to U.S. national security. Criminal syndicates have corrupted government officials, undermined democratic governance, and hindered economic development in many countries. This has been well documented in post-communist states like Russia, developing countries like Nigeria, post-conflict societies like Bosnia and countries of particular concern to the United States like Mexico. In Colombia, groups engaged in drug trafficking, terrorist activity and other serious crimes even challenge the government itself for control over territory and the population, just as typical communist insurgencies did a few decades ago.

Criminal syndicates have also helped to undermine regional stability. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the illegal smuggling of "conflict" diamonds helped finance a brutal civil war. Elsewhere in Africa and around the world, arms trafficking by organized criminal networks has stoked regional conflicts that might otherwise have died down. Criminal syndicates have been instrumental in violating U.S. and international sanctions regimes in such places as Iraq and Serbia. Russian criminal organizations are reportedly involved in smuggling materials for weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological and nuclear. In other places, such as in Albania, criminal organizations have driven regime change, as when the collapse of a pyramid scheme precipitated anarchy and flooded next-door Kosovo with small weapons. Financial crimes such as money laundering and counterfeiting have the potential to undermine national banking systems and thereby to destabalize the global financial system. Economic crimes such as piracy—both physical and intellectual—affect U.S. companies' competitiveness in foreign markets.

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What We Have Here Is a Failure to Communicate

GIVEN THESE considerable stakes, all appropriate foreign policy tools should be employed to combat criminal threats to U.S. security interests, and those tools should be employed in a coordinated process according to a comprehensive strategy. Unfortunately, this commonsense view is far too uncommon in Federal law enforcement agencies today.

As to the direct threats to this country—terrorism, drug trafficking and international organized crime—nobody denies that Federal law enforcement has a critical and even a predominant role to play. But other tools of U.S. foreign policy also need to be deployed to combat international crime, including bilateral diplomacy, cooperation in multilateral forums, financial sanctions, and in some cases covert operations and overt military campaigns. In these cases, obviously, law enforcement activities must be integrated into the overall strategies, even in those instances when law enforcement has the lead. Sometimes this works well. When it comes to the rendition of terrorists from abroad, for instance, U.S. law enforcement agencies have developed excellent working relationships with the military and intelligence agencies. But law enforcement officials who are accustomed to the considerable freedom of action and limited civilian oversight that domestic operations afford often chafe when confronted with the need to coordinate with others when operating abroad.

Americans are proud that nobody in the United States, not even the president, is above the law. This principle is drilled into the consciousness of every law enforcement officer. Since the abuses of Federal law enforcement by the Nixon Administration, Federal agents have taken refuge in the axiom that criminal trails should be followed to their conclusion by non-political technical experts, no matter what the wider consequences may be. Law enforcement officers remain suspicious that requests for "coordination" with other government agencies, even on matters of foreign policy, are subterfuges for political interference. Even worse from the point of view of many Federal law enforcement agents is the argument that law enforcement objectives—putting individual criminals behind bars—should sometimes be subordinate to other objectives, such as disrupting a terrorist network, winning a military campaign, or "merely" maintaining positive bilateral relations with certain other countries. Some law enforcement agencies have become especially adept at using the media and the Congress to draw attention to allegations of "political interference" in such cases.

This viewpoint is extremely shortsighted. First, the isolation of law enforcement agencies from other agencies and from the interagency process harms the effectiveness of law enforcement operations themselves. U.S. diplomacy is too often unable to assist law enforcement efforts because ambassadors are not informed about specific cases or are not asked to secure cooperation from foreign governments. Yet such diplomatic efforts can be extremely valuable, not least because many foreign governments are more comfortable speaking with U.S. diplomatic (or intelligence) agencies than with U.S. law enforcement agencies. Diplomats sometimes possess additional leverage to use on behalf of the national interest, as well.

One example: for years U.S. law enforcement strained hard and usually failed to trace criminal money trails overseas to countries with strict bank secrecy laws. Then, in 2000, a multilateral diplomatic initiative to "name and shame" certain money laundering havens successfully coerced several countries to change their

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laws and adopt stronger international anti-money laundering standards.[1] Now, U.S. law enforcement can track money in ways it never could before. In recent months, Liechtenstein and the Bahamas—two countries "named and shamed"—have provided important information to the United States about elements of Al-Qaeda's financial network. It is inconceivable that the United States would have had access to this same information two years ago, before diplomacy was brought to bear on this problem.

Second, the lack of coordination with law enforcement agencies can harm U.S. foreign policy. Sometimes U.S. foreign law enforcement operations anger foreign heads of government when they are kept out of the loop. Not that foreign governments should be allowed to halt or hinder U.S. investigations; their anger and irritation is often a price we must pay to enforce U.S. laws. But law enforcement objectives can often be achieved without harming bilateral diplomatic relations—if only law enforcement personnel would stop intentionally hiding their activities from the State Department and the National Security Council.

Information as well as activities relevant to U.S. national security that come from law enforcement sources also often go unshared with the national security community. There are complicated, painstaking and heavily-scrutinized methods for disseminating intelligence information to law enforcement agencies, always scrubbed so it can be used in court without revealing intelligence sources and methods. But there are no similar procedures for information gathered by law enforcement agencies to routinely make its way into intelligence agencies and thereby into the wider national security community. It is up to law enforcement officials themselves to decide when information they have is relevant to national security, but such decisions often require expertise that law enforcement officials, through no fault of their own, do not possess. Nonetheless, for many years during the Clinton Administration, the Justice Department and the associated law enforcement agencies refused to agree to a basic memorandum of understanding to establish even first principles as to how information should be shared.

The problems that have arisen from this state of affairs are not merely hypothetical. Former CIA Director James Woolsey has publicly complained that he was unable to obtain terrorist-related information once the Justice Department decided to bring the 1993 World Trade Center bombing case to court. In another situation during the Clinton Administration, the FBI discovered that the wife of the former Russian delegate to the International Monetary Fund might have been involved in illegally moving $7 billion in Russian money of unknown origin through the Bank of New York. Not until this case was reported in the *New York Times* did the Justice Department and the FBI think to brief the National Security Advisor or the Secretary of State on the matter. More recently, when on February 11 the FBI announced a terror alert concerning a 23-year old Yemeni named Fawaz Yahya Al-Rabeei and his cell, it did not even bother to inform the U.S. embassy in Sanaa, or to share with it obviously relevant information that led the FBI to declare the alert.

Third, law enforcement objectives often differ from wider U.S. objectives, and that is natural. The FBI's job is to arrest criminals in such a way that a court case against them will result in a conviction that can stand the test of an appeal. But law enforcement goals should not be presumed pre-eminent by definition. Even when U.S. laws have clearly been broken, other objectives may be more

[1] See my "Follow the Money", *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2001).

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important to the nation. One such case is President Bush's wise decision to treat Al-Qaeda primarily as a military adversary rather than a law enforcement concern. Another example: During the Clinton Administration, the Justice Department repeatedly objected to the use of economic sanctions against foreign drug cartels as proposed by the national security agencies, preferring that efforts be restricted to building cases in U.S. courts. This view was held by the law enforcement agencies despite the success of President Clinton's 1995 order, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to disrupt the Cali cartel's financial network. Not until 1999 were additional sanctions imposed, and then only after the Congress, frustrated by the lack of similar actions against other cartels, passed the Foreign Drug Kingpin Designation Act.

Problems of the Indirect

WHEN IT comes to direct threats to the United States from international crime, U.S. law enforcement agencies generally object to the involvement of national security agencies, believing that the latter may curtail or otherwise interfere with their operations. But this dynamic is reversed when it comes to indirect threats. In these cases, law enforcement agencies generally refuse to become substantially involved, notwithstanding pleas from the State Department. The reason is that many in U.S. law enforcement simply do not care if foreign countries and their governments are being harmed by international crime, unless there is a clear connection to a case that can be brought to trial in U.S. courts. As they see it, it is not their job to worry about damage to U.S. national security interests or regional stability abroad. That is also why law enforcement agencies give low priority to foreign law enforcement training and technical assistance efforts, administration of justice development programs, post-conflict governance initiatives, and the civilian policing components of UN peacekeeping operations. This reluctance has even carried over with respect to places such as the Balkans and Haiti, where conditions had previously deteriorated to the point that U.S. military forces had to be called into action. State Department officials are therefore left more or less on their own to deal with international arms trafficking, sanctions busting, alien smuggling, trafficking in women, corruption and all the rest of the dark side of globalization.

The costs of this abnegation are huge. The transformation of Russia into a functioning, market democracy was one of the primary objectives of U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s. Yet U.S. law enforcement took no serious interest in combating Russian organized crime, unless it set foot on U.S. soil. Moreover, Russian organized crime gained strength and influence in Hungary, a new NATO member and an important ally for U.S. efforts in the Balkans. This was of great concern to Hungary's President and had been identified as one of the primary threats to Hungary's economic and political development by the U.S. ambassador. Yet the FBI refused for years to assign even one agent to the U.S. embassy in Budapest, much less actively assist the Hungarian National Police in combating Russian organized crime. It took a meeting between President Clinton and the Hungarian President, and then a personal request from the National Security Advisor to the FBI Director, before even this small step could be taken.

The traditional national security agencies also share blame for the lack of integration of the law enforcement agencies into U.S. foreign policy. Most foreign policy experts know little and care less about the capabilities and limitations of

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U.S. law enforcement. As a result, unfair expectations are sometimes set or improper requests are made. International law enforcement issues are too often a secondary concern of the foreign policy establishment, and sometimes they are ignored entirely. Particularly when foreign governments themselves are implicated in crimes, U.S. diplomats can be reflexively unwilling to press issues that might result in a deterioration of bilateral relations. The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, despite relatively strong leadership in recent years, is still considered a bureaucratic backwater. It only rarely attracts the most capable civil servants and foreign service officers, and has historically been marginalized by the leadership of the department.

Structural Impediments

SOME OF these problems might be solved by changes in leadership, but structural changes will be necessary as well. In 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 42 which, for the first time, defined international crime as a national security threat. An NSC-chaired interagency working group was established to coordinate the government's efforts to combat this threat. And in 1998 President Clinton released the first-ever International Crime Control Strategy, describing the goals and objectives of this new effort.

It paid off. Achievements include the aforementioned "naming and shaming" of money laundering havens, a series of multilateral treaties negotiated by the State Department on subjects such as small arms trafficking, a series of bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties negotiated by the Justice Department, greater efforts to combat trafficking in women, and the financial sanctions on the Cali drug cartel (the first time this tool was used against a non-state actor). There were also some successes in the wars on drugs and terrorism, and new initiatives to protect critical infrastructures from information warfare and cyber crime. But overall, despite President Clinton's personal interest and strong pushes from the National Security Council and the State Department, the effort left too much undone. Part of the problem flowed from the differing viewpoints and failures of coordination between law enforcement agencies and national security agencies, but other difficulties stemmed from structural flaws in the law enforcement community. These flaws deserve special attention, and remediation.

The very structure of the Justice Department illustrates the low priority assigned to curtailing international crime. Its international training, technical assistance, counter-intelligence and criminal programs are spread out over several different offices and report to a multitude of different Justice Department officials. Most regrettably, a single assistant attorney general oversees both international and domestic criminal investigations. One person who held that post during the Clinton Administration told me he had not spent even ten minutes thinking about international crime before he took the job. While the State Department, Pentagon and CIA are all organized geographically, no one in the Justice Department is responsible for what the department and its subordinate agencies are doing with regard to, say, Russia.

Even if there were such a position, the Justice Department would *still* suffer from its institutional inability to oversee its subordinate law enforcement agencies. During the Clinton Administration FBI Director Louis Freeh was rarely if ever held accountable by Attorney General Janet Reno. In keeping with the legacy of J. Edgar Hoover, Freeh functioned with-

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out effective civilian oversight, a pattern that was replicated down the chain of authority. The law enforcement agencies that fall under the Treasury Department's jurisdiction, too, operate more or less independently from the civilians to whom they are allegedly accountable. This became evident in 1997 when Ray Kelly, then the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, took what seemed to be a demotion to become the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service—one of many law enforcement agencies that he *already supposedly oversaw*. The move only made sense upon recognition that Customs operates with little effective civilian oversight.

Even if the problem of civilian oversight were somehow fixed, the massive problems stemming from the sheer number of Federal law enforcement agencies would still exist, as would the lack of coordination among them, the lack of cooperation with state and local authorities, and the vast operational inefficiencies that result. In 1991 the General Accounting Office identified an astonishing 148 different Federal agencies with some law enforcement functions.[2] On far too many issues jurisdictional confusion hampers investigations. The various law enforcement agencies are notoriously turf-conscious, regularly refusing to share information with each other, always focused on securing "credit" for convictions.

The mission statements of many law enforcement agencies reflect this focus; to an outsider (and even to many insiders) they seem oddly centered on ensuring institutional primacy with regard to specific crimes, particularly ones where legal jurisdictions are unclear. "Interagency" offices and task forces are established to great fanfare and then become ineffective because key law enforcement agencies refuse to join or to genuinely participate, fearing "subordination" to others. Databases are therefore rarely combined between agencies and equipment is often not interoperable. Basic data on the number and types of crimes are often incomplete and are tracked according to differing methodologies in different agencies. Standardized procedures do not even exist across the law enforcement community in such areas as recruitment, selection and training; surveillance; rules of engagement; forensic laboratory management and classification and use of forensic data. In the course of virtually every high-profile case, state and local law enforcement officials complain that Federal law enforcement agencies refuse to share information, making it harder for them to function.

These are not new insights. Every decade or so an outside group of experts examines the structure of Federal law enforcement, and they all come to virtually the same conclusion: it's a dysfunctional mess. Sadly, these conclusions have all been ignored. In 1996, for instance, after the public outcry over law enforcement actions in Waco and Ruby Ridge, the Congress asked Judge William H. Webster, a former director of both the FBI and the CIA, to chair a commission to examine the state of Federal law enforcement. Its admirable final report was published four years later and, alas, promptly shelved. This was a shame. The Webster report is as comprehensive a review of the structure of Federal law enforcement as has ever been written, and includes a number of far-reaching recommendations. It is still not too late to adopt some of them.[3]

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[2] *Federal Criminal Justice System—A Model to Estimate System Workload*, U.S. General Accounting Office, April 1991.

[3] *Law Enforcement in a New Century and a Changing World: Improving the Administration of Federal Law Enforcement*, Report of the Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement, January 2000.

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Time for Change

THE WEBSTER report's overall conclusion was that "the current organization of Federal law enforcement needs to be changed." While that call went unheeded during the final year of the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration can and should take up the challenge now, and if it does it has good reason to expect success. That is because a rare confluence of events has pushed Federal law enforcement to a crisis.

First, a string of high profile debacles have recently embarrassed the FBI, puncturing its public image and finally allowing criticisms to be voiced in public. Consecutive episodes such as the Robert Hanssen spy case, the botched investigation of Wen Ho Lee, the media leaks attacking Richard Jewell, the cover-up of deficiencies in its crime lab, its improper withholding of documents in the Timothy McVeigh case, and the intelligence and operational failures in the domestic war on terrorism have finally put many in Congress in the mood to ask some hard questions.

Second, there is a growing consensus that simply ponying up more resources will not solve the problem. After all, the Clinton Administration tripled the FBI's counter-terrorism budget and the number of its agents, and the FBI still failed utterly to detect the events of September 11 being planned on American soil. Nor had it any knowledge that Al-Qaeda was planning to attack Los Angeles International Airport during the millennium celebrations, something that came to light only after a terrorist was caught with explosives by an alert Customs agent at the Canadian border.

And third, now that the United States is at war with terrorism, questions about law enforcement reform have taken on a new urgency. The continuing investigation into Al-Qaeda's operations in the United States makes clear how much was missed and has highlighted the need for various law enforcement agencies to better share information concerning suspected terrorists. On September 11, as the public has now learned, the FBI had no computer system to centralize its intelligence and share it with other agencies. Tom Ridge, the director of the new White House Office of Homeland Security, is undoubtedly confronting the same coordination problems that beset the Clinton Administration after 1998, when it issued Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63 and first established government-wide initiatives to defend against cyber- and bioterrorism. The Bush Administration—wisely, in my opinion—batted down suggestions that Ridge's office be made a separate agency; its real challenge will be to find ways to make the other agencies of government, including the law enforcement agencies, do their own jobs better.

Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller have already taken initial steps that show cognizance of the need for structural change. Mueller has overhauled the bureau's top management to place more emphasis on counter-terrorism and cybercrime. Ashcroft has rightly taken control of the terrorism investigation from the Southern District of New York, begun to separate the service and enforcement functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and, at long last, given the Justice Department's inspector general jurisdiction over allegations of FBI misconduct—a fundamental step if the FBI is to be accountable to civilian oversight. In recent months, too, Congress has passed legislation to encourage law enforcement to share more information with national security agencies.

President Bush should now take the

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next step and call for a comprehensive review of law enforcement, with the intention of producing lasting, systemic reform. Politically, such an effort is more likely to succeed if sponsored by a Republican administration, because the GOP has stronger traditional ties to law enforcement than the Democrats. President Bush will also benefit from the absence of the adversarial relationship that existed between some law enforcement agency heads and the Clinton White House, in part due to the several investigations of the President.

A New Vision for Law Enforcement

BEFORE THE administration sets forth to fix this problem, it would do well to recognize that the structural deficiencies facing Federal law enforcement are not without precedent. The reform of the U.S. military after World War II, which led ultimately to the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, is a salutary model for study. This is not the place to review what has already been widely analyzed and well appreciated, except to stress three principal lessons. The first and most important lesson to be drawn is that the incrementalist approach does not work; the entrenched interests that oppose reform can be overcome only when leaders at the highest levels of the Executive and Legislative Branches work in a bipartisan spirit to seek comprehensive changes. The second lesson is that unification is the goal, "jointness" is the means, and clear lines of authority are the prerequisite. And the third lesson is that it is possible to ensure professionalism and even independence among career officers while still guaranteeing effective civilian oversight and wider integration into the foreign policymaking process.

So, then, what would a reformed Federal law enforcement community look like? There are four necessary components of reform: *consolidation* of proliferating law enforcement agencies; *coordination* among the remaining agencies; *centralization* of both civilian and agency accountability; and *integration* into the wider foreign policy community.

First, consolidation. If the Federal law enforcement community were organized functionally as the military services are, the multitude of its agencies could be consolidated into three.

(1) A *Federal Investigative Agency* would have as its primary mission the investigation of Federal crimes, both at home and abroad. It would combine the law enforcement functions of the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the investigatory elements of the Secret Service. This step alone would eliminate much friction among existing agencies, eliminate duplicative efforts, remove barriers to coordination, and save money in the long run. This idea is not new, and it has been supported in the past by leaders of both parties. In the 1980s, then-Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani oversaw a study that proposed combining the DEA and the FBI. In 1993 Vice President Al Gore's "re-inventing government" initiative recommended that the DEA, ATF and FBI be merged.[4] And the Webster Commission also recommended that ATF and DEA become part of a larger FBI.

(2) A *Border Enforcement Agency* would be constituted of uniformed federal officers and focus on defending the borders of the United States. It would combine the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Coast

[4] *From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less*, Report of the National Performance Review, September 7, 1993.

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Guard, and the planned Bureau of Immigration Enforcement, including the U.S. Border Patrol, the uniformed arm of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Neither is this a new idea. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (a.k.a. the Hart-Rudman Commission), which at the start of the Bush Administration—eight months *before* September 11, 2001—called for a new effort to defend the U.S. homeland against terrorist threats, also recommended combining the Customs Service, the Border Patrol and the Coast Guard.[5] And shortly after taking office, Tom Ridge called a series of cabinet-level meetings to push this idea, which he intended to make a centerpiece of President Bush's most recent State of the Union address. Unfortunately, he soon learned how difficult it is in Washington to overcome bureaucracies intent on defending their turf, so the plan was sent back for "further study." So far, President Bush has followed the same path as his predecessors: increased budgets, but no serious re-organization.

(3) A *Federal Protective Agency* would be charged with protecting the physical security of U.S. government officials, buildings, properties and persons under government control. It would combine the protective division and uniformed service of the Secret Service with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Federal Protective Service (the law enforcement and security arm of the General Services Administration), the U.S. Marshals Service, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (which employs one-third of all Federal personnel authorized to carry firearms), newly federalized airport security personnel, and the U.S. Park Police. It would be operationally efficient, though perhaps political unrealistic, also to include the numerous independent federal police forces that primarily operate in and around Washington, DC. (Most Americans have no idea, of course, that the Congress, the Supreme Court and the Library of Congress, which are located right next to one another, each have their own police force.)

Why not go all the way and create just one law enforcement super-agency? Three reasons. Some degree of competition is healthy. Distinct functional missions—investigations, border enforcement, physical protection—may require distinct institutional cultures. Perhaps most important, though, is the traditional and sensible American reluctance to concentrate police powers in the hands of one person or institution. The protection of our civil rights requires strong law enforcement; the protection of our civil liberties requires separated law enforcement institutions.

Second, coordination. As with the military, all three of these restructured Federal law enforcement agencies would coordinate their planning and operations across all levels, starting with the top. A joint committee of agency directors, modeled after the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be established, and a joint staff made up of some of the strongest law enforcement officers in the land would be created to aid its work. Similarly-designed joint organizations would be placed in the field to manage at the local level. Special Federal law enforcement regional agents would be responsible for coordinating the local operations of the special agents in charge from all three Federal law enforcement agencies in any given geographic area.

Third, centralization of accountability. Reform of law enforcement should avoid the mistakes made in 1947 by military reformers. A chairman of the joint com-

[5] *Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change*, the Phase III Report of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, February 2001.

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mittee of agency directors should be named, and that chairman should function as the principal career law enforcement advisor to the president and attorney general. To promote professionalism, the practice of installing political appointees at the top of law enforcement agencies should end. Career law enforcement officials should be promoted to lead their agencies, as is done in the military. To promote civilian control, the military model should again be followed: the chairman should hold office for a two-year term, renewable by the president only once. Similar term limits should be placed on the directors of the three law enforcement agencies.

Centralization should also take place on the civilian side. Only by an accident of American history does the U.S. Treasury Department have significant law enforcement responsibilities. No other modern state has placed bodies like Customs, ATF and the Secret Service in its finance ministry. As argued above, these functions should be removed from the Treasury, leaving it with its primary missions intact. (No president has chosen his Secretary of the Treasury on the basis of his knowledge of law enforcement issues.) Similarly, the Coast Guard, as a military and law enforcement agency, does not belong in the Transportation Department, whose secretary cannot be expected to have expertise on either military or law enforcement matters.

All of these agencies, in their new structure as described above, should come under the civilian authority of an expanded Department of Justice, where they belong. The Webster Commission usefully pointed out Executive Order No. 11396, signed by President Lyndon Johnson in February 1968, which charged the attorney general with coordinating the law enforcement and crime prevention activities of all Federal departments and agencies. Now, more than thirty years after the order was issued, it is high time to implement it.

Admittedly, this will not be easy. Historically, the attorney general has been unable to effectively oversee even the FBI, much less a host of other Federal agencies. A new position should be established, therefore, with a title perhaps of deputy attorney general for law enforcement, the holder of which will focus only on the oversight of law enforcement programs, plans and operations. The Justice Department staff will need to employ more civilians with experience in law enforcement—which the department's present cadre of predominantly civilian lawyers lacks. A stronger Justice Department committed to effective oversight could also centrally administer the sixty different Offices of the Inspector General, which have in recent decades taken on wider law enforcement functions. Most importantly, the Justice Department should directly oversee the inspectors general of the law enforcement agencies.

Strengthened oversight by Congress is also necessary to guard against abuse. Arrangements that ensure the General Accounting Office access to information on the one hand, and congressional oversight committees on the other, are essential to ensure that structural reform efforts produce true operational reforms.

Fourth, integration. The attorney general should formally be made part of the National Security Council through a change in the law, and the chairman of the joint committee of agency directors should hold the same formal observer position at the NSC as does the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They should each have a top official—an assistant attorney general at Justice—whose responsibilities are focused solely on international and national security affairs. Those officials, and their subordinates responsible for foreign geographic regions, should participate in all the relevant interagency working groups to develop and implement U.S. foreign policy.

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In addition, a new international division of the Department of Justice should be created to oversee all international law enforcement investigations and prosecutions, ending the dangerous near-autonomy that some Federal law enforcement officials now wield when they operate overseas. At present, despite the placement of more than 2,000 U.S. law enforcement agents and support personnel abroad, law enforcement agencies' foreign staffing planning documents are not well coordinated, either within the law enforcement community or with other Federal agencies. Foreign law enforcement activities too often take place without the full knowledge of the embassy chief of mission, the local representative of the president. Agents stationed in the same embassy that represent different law enforcement agencies bring their habits with them, competing for foreign sources, often refusing to share information. This must stop. Once again, the model should be that of the U.S. military, where different services rotate in the role of embassy military liaison officers, and only one of them at any given time reports to the chief of mission.

THIS VISION of reformed Federal law enforcement will not be realized anytime soon. But it can be done more quickly than the decades it took to reform the military. The key question is, will President Bush take advantage of the rare opportunity to push reform?

Perhaps he will. The President certainly understands the importance of terrorism and other international criminal threats to U.S. national security. His national security team is undoubtedly confronting the lack of integration between the law enforcement and the foreign policy communities. His homeland security director has already made important—albeit stillborn—proposals on law enforcement reform. He may find that, in the current post-September 11 environment, there are members of Congress on both sides of the aisle who are ready to tackle the tough issues if the President is willing to lead the way. Conditions are propitious for change, and President Bush has clearly proven that he can lead. Let us, then, hope that he decides to do so. □

Godsend

Webster was a godsend to the Agency and to me. He had a huge reputation for integrity, honesty, and fidelity to the Constitution. After some twenty years as a federal judge, and as FBI director, just as he was preparing to return to private life and a deserved opportunity to prosper, he put his reputation on the line for CIA. He agreed, with CIA still under a shadow, to do another public service for his country and his President. Bill would later be criticized from time to time for his lack of expertise in foreign affairs and more—but none of that, in my view, amounted to a hill of beans compared to what he brought to CIA that May: leadership, the respect of Congress, and a sterling character.

—Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (1996)

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The Higher Police

Vladimir Putin and His Predecessors

Laurent Murawiec and Clifford C. Gaddy

SO MUCH HAS changed in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union that it is easy to overlook some things that have not changed. One of the most significant of these constants is the continued importance of an intelligence elite that has existed within the Russian state for nearly 200 years, both as a corporate body and, more importantly, as a current of thought endowed with a distinctive identity and self-assured sense of national mission. This elite calls itself "the Higher Police" and, as things have turned out, it is largely in charge in today's Russia.

As it happens, the historical continuity of this elite can be traced, its self-conception can be charted, and its impact on the actions of the Russian state, yesterday as well as today, can be assessed. Such tasks are critical to understanding contemporary Russia and Russian foreign policy. It is to such labors, at least in their preliminary stage, that this essay is directed.

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Grafting the Roots

IN 1997, the FSB (*Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti*, or Federal Security Service), the contemporary incarnation of the Russian intelligence service—most popularly known as the KGB[1]—convened the first in a series of annual seminars on the history of the intelligence craft and intelligence organizations in Russia. Dubbed the "Historical Lectures at the Lubyanka"—since they were held at the old headquarters of the KGB—the seminars took place under the auspices of the Andropov Institute. In-house KGB historians and invited outside academics gave presentations on such subjects as "The Founding of the *Cheka*: A New View", "On the Intelligence Activity of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Beginning of the 20th Century", and "The Department of Police and Secret Agents (1902–1917)." Remarkably, KGB historians have been focusing on pre-1917 intelligence work and organizations. While they do not ignore entirely 80 years of Soviet intelligence history—that of the *Cheka*, the GPU, the NKVD,

[1]This article uses "KGB" as shorthand for all post-1917 Soviet intelligence organizations, including their post-1991 incarnations; while *Chekisty* is used as the generic term for members of these organizations.

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and the KGB[2]—their focus points to a continuous corporate identity harking back to pre-revolutionary predecessor organizations that defined themselves as a "Higher Police" transcending ideology itself.

The history of the Higher Police dates back to the early 19th century. After the Decembrist *putsch* of 1825 failed to overthrow the newly enthroned Nicholas I, the Czar established a new organization that soon "became the most powerful force in the country", the Third Section of His Majesty's Own Chancellery.[3] Designed not merely as a command center for repression of subversive machinations, it was also tasked with "the study of Russia's condition." Gathering the best and the brightest of the nobility, its brief was virtually unlimited. It was subordinate to the monarch alone. Such was the *vysshaya politsiya*, or, in the French preferred by the aristocracy of the time, *la haute police*. Its chief was General Count Alexander Khristoforovich Benckendorff (1783–1844), a soldier who rose from the ranks of the Baltic-German nobility that had provided so many of the Czars' servants.

Under Benckendorff's stewardship, which stretched from 1825 through 1844, the Third Section devoted itself to social engineering on a grand scale. Far from being merely a political police, it conceived of its role as "eradicating abuse" wherever it might be found in Russian society. Its 1839 report to the Czar boldly stated: "All Russia impatiently awaits changes. . . . The machine requires to be reworked afresh. The keys to this necessity are to be found in Justice and Industry. . . . [The Section is] convinced of the necessity, even of the inevitability, of the liberation of the serfs."[4] One could barely cite so explosive and sensitive an issue in the Russia of the time. Had such words been published in a journal, uttered in public, or even whispered in private—by anyone other than a member of the Third Section—it would have been cause for instant imprisonment or exile. Yet the Third Section regularly issued such reformist policy recommendations without fear. The 1838 report advocated the development of railways in Russia; the 1841 report called for special attention to public health; the 1842 report advocated lowering tariffs to foster economic development. The Section's Annual Reports on the State of Public Opinion were the Czar's eyes and ears. (While these extraordinary reports have in general been available to historians, their import has not been properly understood; as "police" reports, they are only of passing interest, but as traces of the Higher Police's social engineering ambitions, they are of primordial importance.)

The Third Section represented the emergence of a technocratic elite that pursued its mission of serving the Russian state from within and with the use of "enlightened" methods of social control and engineering. They were not a gaggle of thugs, or the jackbooted shock troops of autocratic repression. They conceived of themselves as the best, purest and most loyal servants of "a certain idea of Russia", and it is a concept that set deep roots.

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[2]The "Cheka" was created in 1917 and stands for the Russian initials for the term "Extraordinary Commission." The GPU (*Glavnoe Politicheskoe Upravleniie*, or the Main Political Administration) was created in 1922. In 1934 its functions were assigned to the NKVD (*Narodnyi Kommisariyat Vnutrenikh Del*, or the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs). In 1954 the KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*, or Committee for State Security) was created. It was dissolved in 1991.

[3]P.S. Squire, *The Third Department: The Establishment and Practices of the Political Police in the Russia of Nicholas I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 2.

[4]Ibid., p. 205.

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Indeed, it recurred several decades later in the 1870s, when the reformist course followed by the "czar-liberator" Alexander II faltered and terrorists besieged the regime. In a desperate bid to regroup, reorganize and streamline the forces of counter-revolution to defend the tottering regime, the Czar chose General Prince Mikhail T. Loris-Melikov as head of the Third Section.

The prince, an Armenian warlord who had met signal success as commander of the Army of the Caucasus, applied liberal "techniques" to a difficult situation. He enlarged public liberties in the hope of rallying the enlightened segments of public opinion to the regime's side. The slogan that inspired and symbolized Loris-Melikov's policy was a call for a "dictatorship of the heart." (It seems that even in matters of the heart, Russians cannot do without dictatorship.) Loris-Melikov soon acquired and exercised sweeping powers, virtually controlling all aspects of government except foreign policy, to the point of being nicknamed the "vice-czar" by Russian society.[5] But he still could not save the Czar's life: Alexander II was brutally assassinated on March 1, 1881 and the short-lived "liberal era" came to an end. The Third Section was soon replaced by the "security section", the *okhrannoye otdeleniye*, or *Okhrana*.

In sharp contradistinction to the "enlightened" rule of Loris-Melikov, a powerful group of aristocrats advocating instead a regime of brutal repression organized their own form of support for the threatened autocracy, now in the person of Czar Alexander III. Representing a temporary abandonment of the social engineering ethos, and organized as a secret society, these families formed a quasi-military "volunteer guard" of more than 10,000 in the name of and for the sake of protecting the Czar. They called themselves the "Sacred Brotherhood" (*svyashchennaya druzhina*), an allusion to the medieval Russian lords' and princes' elite guards, or bands of companions, the *druzhina*. The Sacred Brotherhood also operated an international intelligence apparatus that later became the seed-crystal for the *Okhrana*'s own foreign department.

In a way, the Brotherhood was too successful for its own good. The ferocious policies it advocated were adopted in full by Czar Alexander III and his influential adviser, the Procurator of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, who has been called, not without reason, the most influential reactionary in Russian history. But the Brotherhood's independent strength bothered Pobedonostsev as the ideologue of a supreme Czardom, and as a result, the Czar dissolved it. The Sacred Brotherhood's heritage nevertheless lived on in the later establishment of the violent, militantly anti-Semitic "Black Hundred" organization (the *Chernaya Sotnya*)—the forerunner of modern Russian fascism.

If the Sacred Brotherhood represents both the high nobility and the brutality of the Russian intelligence elite, the figure of Colonel Sergei Zubatov (1863–1917) stands for the return of social engineering of the highest sophistication. Himself originally a revolutionary student who was "turned", Zubatov rose meteorically to the head of the Moscow *Okhrana* where he applied refined methods comparable to "brainwashing" for turning younger revolutionists into *Okhrana* agents. In the end, his police apparatus controlled much of the Russian Left's political organizations, even up to the leadership level. Father Georgi Gapon, the priest and labor organizer who led the early phases of the 1905 Revolution, was originally Zubatov's agent.

Zubatov not only suborned the Left, he also strove to deflate its appeal. He sin-

[5]Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A Short History* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 309.

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gle-handedly created Russia's trade-union movement. As his biographer put it, "The idea of a pure monarchy . . . [as] the sole force working for the common good" guided him, the aim being the "taming of the bourgeoisie. . . [and] gaining the favors of the workers and the peasants." What mattered was "not so much the statics of autocracy as its dynamics." Zubatov's inspiration in his effort to "re-educate Russian society"—re-engineer it, that is—was that "the free Russian people do not wish their country to become another France or United States." The innate desire of the Russians, he believed, was the fulfillment of "the Russian Idea." To that end, Zubatov advocated paternalistic governance over the working masses, to include better working conditions, healthcare, social security benefits, and so on—all to be gouged out of the industrialists. His doctrine, though not explicitly socialist, was strongly anti-capitalist.[6] It was, in a way, a kind of coerced *noblesse obligé*.

World War I derailed Zubatov's plan. It changed not only the rules of the game but the game itself. Once again, history overwhelmed the careful design of the enlightened intelligence elite. No amount of social engineering could contain Russia's chaotic transformation. When news of the February 1917 Revolution reached the retired Zubatov in his Petersburg home, he committed suicide.

The Higher Police under Bolshevism

THE NEW ERA posed the strongest challenge yet to the very survival of the upper-nobility elite notion of the Higher Police. How could their self-conception as the best and the brightest, the servants of Russia according to the *druzhina* ideal, the social engineers and master manipulators, endure under Bolshevik rule? Of course, many creatures of the old *Okhrana* did survive and prosper under the new regime. Many former agents—Stalin being most probably one of them—were now to be found in leadership positions in the Soviet Communist Party and the state apparatus. In addition, members of the "Black Hundreds" flocked into the Bolshevik Party; the anti-capitalist, anti-Western, anti-liberal outlook of proto-fascist mass movements easily accommodated itself to Bolshevik ideology, while the Bolsheviks welcomed the aroused masses into their ranks. As a result, the newly established Bolshevik secret police, the "Extraordinary Commission" (*Cheka*), was comprised of a mixed and motley crew.

It was clear that the functions ascribed by Lenin to the new *Cheka* had less to do with social engineering than with social deconstruction by means of the extermination of non-approved social categories. The *Cheka's* incentive structure emphasized murder, torture, brutality and atrocities of all stripes, not sociological investigation. The Higher Police thus yielded to another current, which has also recurred throughout Russian history: the sheer violence exerted by the state against all, the war by government against society. Just as Ivan the Terrible's personal guard, the *oprichniki*, had visited unspeakable brutality upon nobles and the general populace during the 16th century, Lenin's *oprichniki* slaughtered millions of Russians with little regard for higher-police methods. "Cruelty is the Russians' principal trait", Maxim Gorky once wrote.

Still, even in this most brutal chapter of the history of the Russian secret services, there is evidence of the less coercive, social-engineering approach to the intelligence function. Interestingly, the founder of the first Bolshevik security

[6]Jeremiah Schneiderman, *Sergei Zubatov and Revolutionary Marxism: The Struggle for the Working Class in Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970).

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organization after Lenin's putsch of October-November 1917 was not, as is often assumed, Feliks Dzerzhinsky, the Savonarola of mass-murder—it was rather Lenin's old friend and confidante, V. I. Bonch-Bruyevich, a professional anthropologist.[7] Although a shroud of secrecy still surrounds the inner workings of Soviet intelligence in its initial period (from 1917 through 1939), there was a full-fledged social science research department inside the NKVD, at least in the 1930s. Staffed by sociologists, economists, anthropologists and others, it was tasked to study and report independently—independently of both party and NKVD hierarchies—on the state of affairs in the Soviet Union, including the morale of the population. A very unusual freedom of thought reportedly prevailed within the unit.[8]

A more critical development in the historical continuity of the Russian intelligence services took place in the 1940s. Dzerzhinsky and his ferocious successors, Genrikh Yagoda and Nikolai Yezhov, who organized the purges of the 1930s that resulted in the death of millions, were primarily concerned with terror as the principal means of government. This changed when Stalin appointed his fellow Georgian, Lavrentii Beria, to head the NKVD in 1939.

Beria was no boy scout, to be sure, but neither was he the monster of Cold War lore. Indeed, his once execrable reputation has been thoroughly revised in Russia in recent times. The traditional portrayal of a bloodthirsty psychopath and monstrous sex maniac has been replaced by a "new Beria." The new narrative relies in large part on the memoir of Beria written by his son, missile engineer Sergo Beria. It is an extraordinary book whose center stage is the inner recesses of Soviet power under Stalin.[9] The version of the elder Beria displayed there portrays a Georgian who is not a Communist, a senior party leader who loathes Communist ideology and a planner who places efficiency and rationality above all other values.

In truth, too, Beria did rescue many top Soviet scientists and technologists from Stalin's crass repression. These included the nuclear scientist Igor Kurchatov, the aircraft designer Andrei Tupolev, and many others who were often employed in the jail-laboratories—the "luxury" gulag for scientists, the famed *sharaga*. During World War II, Stalin entrusted Beria with leading the Soviet crash program to develop nuclear weapons. Beria delivered. He rallied the scientific and technological intelligentsia in part by effectively protecting it. Further, he created within his Ministry of the Interior (MVD) a string of research institutes. The mission of these think tanks was to elaborate full sets of policies, both domestic and international. As was later claimed, Beria wanted supreme power, and to that end he prepared alternative policies. A foreign policy proposing a neutralized Germany as the

[7]Bonch-Bruyevich was Russia's premier authority on the religious schismatics, the Old Believers, who comprised about 20 percent of the Russian population at the time. The legacy of government persecution, the role played by Old Believers in rebellions against czarist rule, and the secretive, conspiratorial nature of some Old Believer sects fascinated Leninist revolutionaries.

[8]A new source documenting the work of this unit has started appearing in Moscow as a book series, *Top Secret: The Lubyanka to Stalin on the Situation in the Country (1922–1934)*. Publication is jointly sponsored by the Russian Academy of Science's Institute for Russian History and the Central Archives of the FSB. The foreword to the entire series, by G. N. Sevast'yanov, is available on the FSB website, http://www.fsb.ru.

[9]Sergo Beria, *Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin*, Françoise Thom, ed., translated by Brian Pearce (London: Duckworth, 2001).

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first step to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States is one of the best-known planks in Beria's program.

"Enlightened" and pragmatic though he was, Beria lost out in the power struggles that followed Stalin's death, and was executed by the Politburo. In all likelihood, Beria, who terrified all the other Soviet leaders, fell victim to a coalition of the frightened. Nikita Khrushchev, who ended up as the head of the coalition that eliminated Beria, reduced the size of the "organs"—the secret police in Soviet parlance—lest they threaten again to take over the system as a whole. But the ideas, plans, and programs that had been associated with Beria kept resurfacing in the Soviet Union for thirty years and more after his death: the debate over economic decentralization identified with economists Yevsei Liberman and Vadim Trapeznikov; the Kosygin policy of giving more power to enterprise directors; and the liberation of political prisoners (Beria had halved the number of concentration camp inmates, *zeks*, in the late 1940s). Beria protégés kept on rising, too; Dimitri Ustinov as defense minister was but one example.

The rise of KGB head Yuri Andropov under Khrushchev's successor, Leonid Brezhnev, heralded a new era in the history of the Higher Police. Early in his reign, Andropov summoned Sergo Beria to his office and, according to the latter, told him: "Sergo, I've studied your father's file, the materials and the policy: they're good and I'm going to implement them." It was Andropov who turned to the Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences, to the prestigious research institutes associated with it, and thus to some of the country's brightest minds: Tatiyana Zaslavskaya of the Institute of Sociology in Novosibirsk, Abel Aganbegyan and his Institute for the Study of Industrial Organization, Leonid Abalkin and the Institute of Economics.[10] He asked them, often personally, to devise new policies and new strategies to save the Soviet system. In effect, Andropov asked these scientists (who were generally not members of the KGB themselves) to do the think-tanking for the new course he was plotting—*perestroika*. The top-down transformation envisioned by Andropov was perhaps the apex of Russian hubris in matters of social engineering; not only was the country going to be turned upside down and its economy thoroughly restructured by a self-appointed leadership, but the country was not even going to be told about the plan.

Only Andropov's unexpected death and the premature elevation of a leader who commanded little following and loyalty forced the matter into the open. Mikhail Gorbachev appended *glasnost* to *perestroika* as a substitute means to gain the authority Andropov could have wielded through the intelligence and security apparatus. The rest is, as they say, history.

The Post-Communist Higher Police

THE SOVIET Union crashed as soon as the regime center's coercive resolve failed it. The Communist Party, which revealed itself as nothing but a coalition of rent-seekers leveraging power for its members' own ends, crashed too. The once almighty State Planning Commission, *Gosplan*—that monument to artificial, arbitrary mismanagement—vanished. Deprived of their right to claim a permanent blood transfusion from the economy, the armed forces faltered. What survived amid all this wreckage, despite the shrinking of its perimeter and the escape and removal of

[10]The "Siberian Academy", established in Novosibirsk, was created to provide scientists a degree of breathing space and relative freedom from Communist Party inquisitors and ideologues. It played a crucial role in the advancement of both the natural and the social sciences in the former USSR.

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whole areas of national life from its brief, was the intelligence service. Overcoming a brief initial period of shock and disarray from the old regime's collapse, the intelligence elite has by all indications steadily regrouped throughout the 1990s, both within government and the newly-formed private sector.

By 1998, the intelligence elite emerged openly into positions of authority, especially in the presidential apparatus. To mention but a few examples, Sergey Ivanov, Putin's Minister of Defense, spent 18 years in the KGB-FSB. Oleg Chernov (Deputy Secretary of the Security Council), Aleksandr Manzhosin (First Deputy Head of the President's Directorate for Foreign Policy), Igor Sechin (Putin's chief secretary and deputy chief of the Kremlin administration) and Viktor Ivanov (deputy head of the Kremlin administration in charge of personnel) are all long-time senior veterans of the KGB. In their view, the current circumstance is the fulfillment of their historical destiny. Listen to how it is explained by one of these proud contemporary upholders of the "true" Russia. Nikolai Leonov, a former deputy head of the KGB's First Main Directorate (foreign intelligence), was for years the controller of all KGB terror and subversion networks in the Americas. In a recent interview he was asked why so many former and current KGB operatives have assumed positions of power in Russia today. Leonov replied:

> First of all, the demand today is precisely for such tough, pragmatically thinking politicians. They are in command of operative information, they have a broad field of view, and they're open to new ideas. But at the same time, they are patriots and proponents of a strong state grounded in centuries-old tradition. *History recruited them* [emphasis in original] to carry out a special operation for the resurrection of our Great Power [*Derzhava*], because there has to be balance in the world, and without a strong Russia the geopolitical turbulence will begin. Second, it was only representatives of the System that were prepared to carry out that task. It turned out to be too much for the others. But then again, what is a KGB officer? He is, above all, a servant of the state. . . . Experience, loyalty to the state, strong intellectual capabilities, an iron will—where else are you going to find cadres? So there's nothing surprising about the fact that representatives of the System were demanded by Russia. The only people that can bring order to the state are state people [*gosudarstvennyye lyudi*].[11]

With these remarks as the immediate background, the figure of Russian President Vladimir Putin acquires an interesting relief. Putin's hallmark, his signature phraseology, has been associated first and foremost with "the Russian idea" and with notions of efficiency and pragmatism: greatness of the State (*derzhava* in traditional Russian political language) through competent management, but without totalitarianism and a centrally planned economy. But for those who know history, Putin also raises eerie echoes from the past. Prince Loris-Melikov spoke of a "dictatorship of the heart"; Putin talks of a "dictatorship of the law." Colonel Sergei Zubatov explained that "the free Russian people do not wish their country to become another France or United States"; Putin argues that "Russia cannot become the second edition of, say, the U.S. or Britain in which liberal values have deep historic traditions."[12] The Higher Police are in charge.

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[11]Pavel Yevdokimov, "Russkaya pravda generala Leonova" ("General Leonov's Russian Truth"), *Spetsnaz Rossii* (May 2001).

[12]Vladimir V. Putin, "Vystupleniye na zasedanii kollegii Ministerstva yustitsii RF" ("Speech at the Meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation"), January 31, 2000.

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In his landmark "Millennium Message", delivered via the Internet in the final days of 1999, Putin presented a comprehensive program for his administration. To date, it is the most far-reaching programmatic document to have come from the Russian presidency, and is therefore a source of considerable weight. Russians today, he asserted, must again become Servants of the Russian Idea: "The public looks forward to the restoration of the guiding and regulating role of the state to a degree which is necessary, proceeding from the traditions and present state of the country." They must work on behalf of

> the greatness of Russia. Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic, and cultural existence. They determined the mentality of Russians and the policy of the government throughout the history of Russia and they cannot but do so at present.[13]

MANY QUESTIONS remain to be studied. The relationship within the intelligence services between a Higher Police committed to managing Russia by means of social engineering, on the one hand, and those we have labeled the *oprichniki*, who rely on brute force and power, must be better understood. Their rivalry and interplay will shape much of the domestic sources of Russia's future evolution. As crises strike and as key issues become more sharply defined, opposition between these tendencies will likewise become more focused. Diverging agendas will clash, and contending currents will be at daggers drawn.

Further, the version of Russia's polity presented here is a stylized, ideal type. Shades and nuances must be added to bring the model closer to everyday realities in Russia. But there are means to test the validity of the hypothesis we present. For instance, what is the treatment meted out to Beria in documentaries and fiction, in film, television and literature, and the media? What kinds of heroes are presented for the adulation and identification of the masses in thrillers and other popular culture movies? Are the principal tenets of the Higher Police's doctrines spreading in policy circles, among the contemporary manufacturers of ideology? From answers to such questions it may be possible to adduce the directions being taken by Russia's ruling elite. It seems to be firmly on a Higher Police course for the time being. Where exactly that will lead, of course, no one can say. □

[13]Vladimir V. Putin, "Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletiy" ("Russia on the Threshold of a New Millennium"), December 1999, available at www.government.ru.

Funny Guy?

Mr. Putin's rule is full of paradoxes. How to account, say, for that court reprieve for TV6, or for Mr. Putin's sudden embrace of the West after Sept. 11?

'There is nothing inside him, no culture, convictions or principles', said Valeriya Novodvorskaya, a fiercely independent woman who was once a Soviet dissident and now is among the president's most outspoken critics. 'The Chekists', she said, using a Lenin-era term for the secret police, 'are comedians. They will play any role, don any mask. They are what any particular time demands of them.'

—Alison Smale, *New York Times*, January 6, 2002

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The Other Orientalism

China's Islamist Problem

Charles Horner

A GENERATION ago, men of divergent personal appearance, political experience, and cultural inheritance ascended to political leadership in the Third World and decided to embrace a transcendent secular radicalism. Whatever their inherited differences, they hoped to construct a united front against the First World and all its evil works, and thereby gain standing for themselves and power for their countries. This was an ambitious project, for as partisans of a broadly-conceived Third World they would need to submerge intramural rivalries of religion, race, culture and conquest into a vocabulary of left-wing solidarity that had been devised by and intended for Europeans.

China invested heavily in this undertaking, for there seemed to be good possibilities in it. The old China—that is to say, mere Imperial or Republican China—could not have imagined the extension of its influence into so much of this world. The ambitions of Imperial China had certainly been great and its confidence in its own universalism highly developed. It was also long-accustomed to being the richest and most powerful country in the world. Even more, Confucianism, China's homegrown ideology, was integral to the growth and consolidation of China's influence in Korea, Japan and Vietnam. But the New Thinking of New China—Communist and Maoist China—carried even grander ambitions to make China a force in places where it had never before been well-established. Among those were the core countries of that other great non-European center of culture and power, the Islamic world. This was an improbable development, perhaps, but one made at least conceivable by the Cold War's admixture of geopolitics and ideology.

In at least this one respect, China's day-to-day encounters with the Islamic parts of the post-colonial world resembled our own. The representatives of the "new emerging forces" (the term is owed to Sukarno of Indonesia, then and now the most populous Muslim nation in the world) convened conferences, held summit meetings, issued declarations, and established worldwide personal reputations. Their comings, goings and pronouncements were closely scrutinized. A new kind of Great Game was being played in all these regions, and it required the contestants with real power to pretend that their local interlocutors were something more than buffoons.

But there was another part of the play that was neither flamboyant nor ridiculous, but deadly—murderous internal vio-

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lence and protracted cross-border warfare. To stay for a moment with Indonesia—a prominent case study of the day—one can cite the events of 1965, when secular radicalism informed both Chinese strategic ambitions in Southeast Asia and Indonesia's own internal political vocabulary. The Communist Party of Indonesia, made up mostly of local Chinese, attempted a *coup d'état* that, had it succeeded, might have solidified a much-feared Beijing-Jakarta axis. Instead, what we remember about "the year of living dangerously"—aside from the classic motion picture made about it—is that it laid the foundation for decades of anti-Chinese authoritarian government in Indonesia, beginning with the murder of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese Indonesian nationals.

Our worries today, of course, focus on other sources of political energy. The most dangerous plotting in Indonesia now is based in extremist Muslim *madrassas*, not in Maoist cells. ("Mr. Abu Bakar, 63, is the leader of Jemaah Islamiah, a regional terrorist organization whose goal is to create Daulah Islamiah, an Islamic state that would include Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines. Under pressure from its neighbors, Indonesia has agreed to summon him for police questioning." So begins one account.) If we imagine a successful Islamist *coup d'état*, one that does not miscarry as did the Communist one, we do not see Beijing at the other end of the axis but rather some "Islamic" power or person—and with local Chinese again on the receiving end of great brutality in the bargain. Even Indonesia's separatist movements have lost their secular "internationalist" character; the oil-rich enclave of Aceh on Sumatra wants greater independence from Jakarta to give greater sway to local Islamic intensity and to hold on to more of its money. If it succeeds, it will become another statelet too rich for its own good, a financier for Islamic violence and terror, and perhaps a pivot in some kind of international Islamic archipelago in Southeast Asia.

It is a similar story in other countries nearby, where "Islam" is understood to have replaced "Third World Solidarity" as the wellspring of political energy. In Malaya during the 1950s—even before there was a Malaysia—Communist China had bet on an insurgency based on local ethnic Chinese to produce a pro-Chinese regime. In the Philippines, China had comparable hopes for the Huks' "national liberation movement." Today, these episodes are remembered in footnotes, if at all. Now, it is Muslim, not Maoist, malcontents who have achieved worldwide celebrity and, were they to prevail, it would not be a strategic gain for Beijing but an enormous setback. This, then, is one measure of the changing situation on the Islamic side of the Sino-Islamic frontier in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. It is as though China's situation *vis-à-vis* the Islamic world has been turned upside down in the course of a mere quarter century.

There have also been changes on the Chinese side. Twenty-five years ago, China stopped looking to Mao Zedong Thought and its slogans to inspire socialist construction at home or to gain standing in the world. The Chinese know that Mao's grand world design failed as utterly as did his domestic one. The World Countryside did not surround the World City after all. Relieved by China's abandonment of blood-curdling rhetoric and massive subversion, the outside world decided to help this change along. But neither China nor its associates in America, Europe or East Asia thought very much about an Islamist challenge to China as these changes worked their way along. Now we must. Of course, whenever we imagine the Chinese pondering their place in the scheme of things, it is our

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conceit that they are somehow deeper, more introspective, and subtler than we are, that they go about it more incisively and more profoundly. But whatever their level of sophistication, it is clear that the Chinese are thinking about "Islam" today, and that their thought process is colored by history.

China's Islamic Narrative

"ORIENTALISM" is a disdainful term used by some contemporary intellectuals to describe the Western interest in things Islamic (usually in the Near East, but easily extended to Southeast Asia or Inner Asia, too), which actually masks the West's pursuit of imperial grandeur and economic domination. It is said to be a phenomenon of both cultural study and social science, so that even an eccentric's naive infatuation with the exotic becomes, somehow, part of an expansionist design.

A gimlet-eyed Muslim scholar of China's age-old interest in far-flung Islamic places—someone, that is, interested in defending the far corners of the Islamic world against Western *and* Chinese encroachment—might allege the same combination of insouciance and cynicism in China. He might connect the ebb and flow of Chinese political and economic influence in Islamic places, whether in the South Seas or in Central Asia, to a comparable Chinese "orientalist" outlook. Armed with the West's formidable intellectual weapon of "post-colonial studies", and warned by it not to trust the professed friendship of *any* non-believer, such an *engagé* scholar might find an abundance of confirming evidence in a vast Chinese literature.

The rise of Islam is itself closely coincidental to the flourishing of China's great Tang dynasty (618–907), a dynasty renowned through the ages for its many splendors. There are Chinese accounts of Arab traders in Canton offering a dazzling array of goods. There are records of intrepid Chinese pilgrims like Xuanzang, the 7th-century monk who traveled the Silk Road westward. There are Chinese versions of the travels of Hungarian-British archaeologist Aurel Stein (1862–1943; Stein, for good measure, died in Kabul) and the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin (1865–1952), famed travelers in Central Asia once well known to European schoolboys as well as to their Chinese contemporaries. There have also been modern Western political travelers, most of them apologists for the expansion of Communist Chinese influence into historically Islamic domains. Lately, some contemporary Chinese literary travelers have been recovering an older Chinese sense of the "journey to the west" (to Inner Asia, that is) as a route to personal self-discovery and introspective escapism.

China has also produced its own version of a *Chinoiserie* mania in the form of a venerable interest in natural and man-made artifacts from far-off Islamic lands. A generation ago, the aspiring student of Tang-era China learned how the country created part of its sense of wealth, worldliness and conspicuous consumption by reading Edward Schafer's canonical catalogue of wonders, *The Golden Peaches of Samarkand* (1963). In earlier centuries, of course, the cultivated Chinese mandarin had himself come to the topic through books based on this sensibility, "pre-political" in a way, yet celebratory of the great Islamic emirates that provided the Chinese empire and those who ran it with useful and beautiful things from all over the world.

The contemplation of such vaguely-defined and exotic realms far away was, for a very long time, just a pleasure and not a problem for Chinese. But, eventually, it did become a problem when the Empire and its Republican successor con-

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

cluded that vast tracts and large populations of peoples who were palpably not Chinese—including many millions of Muslims of Central Asian origin—nonetheless belonged inside "China." Over time, it became an accepted axiom of Chinese statecraft that these people simply had to stay *in* China.

It remains an axiom still, but the foundation beneath it has shifted over time, and continues to shift today. The Chinese understanding of what "China" is, and why some places belong in it and others do not, is found in many sources: in the writings of scholars and literati across the centuries who romanticized distant realms; in the records of political debate since the mid-18th century about the Empire's ideal boundaries (China's narrative about "imperial overstretch"); in notions of geopolitics and grand strategy (such as "control of the heartland" or "the influence of sea power") that entered China in the 19th and early 20th centuries; in the mantra of "nation" and "race" and "ethnicity" and "culture" that are mid-20th century inventions; in secular radical ideas like "proletarian internationalism" or "solidarity among the peoples"; and, now, in early 21st-century "threat assessment."

These concerns can lead to a kind of meandering. Just as we in the United States shift focus in the war against terrorism from Afghanistan to the Philippines and then to the Near East, so too have the Chinese shifted focus from Southeast Asia to the South Seas to the heart of Asia. At the moment, for example, Beijing's most important preoccupation is drawing the Sino-Islamic boundary in Xinjiang ("New Territories" in Chinese, or Chinese Turkestan or East Turkestan in our gazetteer), a 600,000 square-mile chunk of land that accounts for about 20 percent of the territory of the "People's Republic of China." Perhaps twenty million people live there, of which about 13 million are

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Muslim. Of those, 9 million are Uighurs, and 4 million are a mix of Kazaks, Uzbeks, Tajiks and others.

The region's Muslim presence alone gives the place its heightened relevance right now, though its exotic past is more than enough for some. Even more than the majestic mountain ranges, like the Pamirs or the Tianshan, which virtually surround the territory, Xinjiang's defining topographical feature is the great Taklamakan desert—"a true wilderness . . . intimidating, beautiful, dangerous, that preys on the mind and enslaves the senses."[1] That describes the forbidding spirit of this inland ocean of silicon—50 degrees below zero (centigrade) in the winter, blinding sandstorms in the summer—well-captured by Christopher Tyler, who visited there in 1996 wanting to retrace the route of Sven Hedin, the first European to go to the heart of the great desert a hundred years before. The place is no less harrowing a century later.

But it is not so much *what* the Taklamakan is as *where* it is. Settlements strung out along its northern and southern rims were way stations on the ancient Silk Road. Centuries later, the larger region as a whole, finding itself situated between expanding Romanov and Manchu empires, became a place of rivalry—and this well before anyone had internalized the significance of large oil deposits in Xinjiang's Tarim Basin. Before then, it was only rare jade and fine gold that mesmerized outsiders. As for matters strategic, Owen Lattimore once tagged Xinjiang the "pivot of Asia", the "heartland" view of things at its highest.[2]

One can recite, then, reasons for the region's importance *to* China, but this will not of itself tell us how Chinese came to think of Xinjiang *as* China. To understand that, we need know that in the mid-18th century, Qianlong (1736–96), the greatest of the Manchu emperors, brought Qing imperial rule there. James Millward of Georgetown University has reconstructed for us the debate over this great enterprise and has especially recapitulated the opposition of the Manchu emperor's Han Chinese counselors of state.[3] These men saw no point in wasting the empire's resources on the conquest of barbaric wastelands. The Emperor argued back that the incorporation of the New Territories would prove an economical way of defending the core of the empire in China proper over the longer run. The Emperor's real justification for the huge expeditions, however, lay in his personal understanding of the *meaning* of the great empire he was creating. Qianlong conceived his subjects in their sameness, all equal on account of their loyalty to him, rather than as inferiors or superiors to anyone or anything else. Hence, a place might be a wasteland, but that did not necessarily make it barbaric as long as its inhabitants honored his rule.

As it happened, the decay of the Qing dynasty's power resulted in the loss of Xinjiang to local "rebels" in the mid-19th century. The Manchu rulers were certainly not pleased by this turn of events, but seemed resigned to it, the better to focus on the seaborne threats of the Western

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[1]Tyler, "Life Stripped to its Essentials in the Desert", *Financial Times*, May 18/19, 1996.

[2]Susan Whitfield of the British Library captures these enthusiasms in her book, *Life Along the Silk Road* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999).

[3]Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). The larger movement from discovery to exploration to intellectual absorption to imperial annexation has been addressed by Laura Hostetler in her *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

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maritime powers. Now, however, it was members of the Chinese mandarinate who began to argue for the re-establishment of imperial power in the region, seeing the problems there as the result of prior misunderstandings of how to govern the place. In this view, a re-conquered Xinjiang properly run—that is, run along traditional Chinese, not Manchu, lines—would contribute to the solution of the country's difficulties, not exacerbate them; it would somehow make the country stronger in the face of the seaborne threats, not weaker. The 18th-century approach would thus have to change. These men were advocates, as Millward puts it, of "nothing less than the political, demographic, economic, and even ecological remaking of the Western Regions in China's image."[4] Central to the Manchu view of things was the notion that "China" and "Xinjiang" were separate places, joined only at the head, not at the hip—and certainly not in the heart. But once originally indifferent to this distinction, many high-ranking Chinese officials came to conclude that the two needed to become one and the same.

To be sure, this conclusion was easier to establish in the Chinese mind than on the non-Chinese ground. Over time, it became relatively easy for political figures in the far northwest to exploit imperial weakness and international rivalries to free themselves from Beijing's *de facto* control. Yet, as one might perversely expect, the more this became the reality in Xinjiang, the stronger became the psychological, philosophical and ideological denial of it in Beijing. When the dynasty was strong, sinicization had not been the preferred policy of the empire. But the weaker the central government became and the less able it was to enforce its writ, the more committed to sinicization it became. Indeed, a traveler in Xinjiang today will be told by local Chinese that "Taklamakan" means "you go in, but you don't come out." The quip aptly expresses what they think about Xinjiang's entry into China more than 200 years ago.

Meanwhile, the ancient connections and affinities of Islamic Central Asia overall have been constantly affected by the ebb and flow of politics elsewhere. The Manchu dynasty ended in 1912, the Romanov in 1917. The other empires based in Western Europe either disappeared or were debilitated after World War I. But Xinjiang and its neighbors were too far from Wilsonian influence to be shaped by it. They were to experience instead the effects of the Leninist alternatives to it. First, Russian influence returned in the form of the Soviet Union and its Stalinist mode of governance. East Turkestan thus had good reason to cherish its separateness from its Sovietized neighbors in the adjacent "stans." On the other hand, though the new Chinese Republic may have held legal title to the place in the opinion of international lawyers, the struggles among the warlords and the Nationalists and the Communists were tantamount to a Xinjiang independence movement by default. In fact, between 1944 and 1949, there was even a formally-proclaimed East Turkestan Republic. It was soon brutally crushed by the new People's Republic of China, even as Beijing was enthusiastically offering support to decolonization movements elsewhere. In this convoluted way, the reconquest once envisioned by Chinese strategists in the Manchu court of the 19th century was finally brought about.

In the early 1950s, the regimes in both Stalin's USSR and Mao's PRC were sufficiently synchronized in their debased brutality that a Turkic person on one side of the line had no particular reason to envy his brother on the other. They also shared a roughly similar radioactive peril:

[4]Millward, p. 245.

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while the Soviets were busily contaminating Kazakstan, the Chinese were establishing their nuclear testing site at Lop Nor, in Xinjiang. But with the death of Stalin, the inhabitants of East Turkestan could sense a certain moderating of conditions to the west, contrasting all the more with their own experiences of Maoist madness during the Great Leap Forward and then the Cultural Revolution. In the 1970s and 1980s, the advantage moved again to the east, for the post-Mao reforms could be contrasted favorably to the last-gasp effort to shore up the Soviet Union. But with the end of the USSR, the Turkic peoples of Xinjiang could only envy their brethren who had not only gained independence but, in an astonishing feat of bureaucratic legerdemain, had even become a part of *Europe*—as members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation, and with their "desks" in the Bureau of European Affairs in our own Department of State.

Xinjiang as Imperial Atavism

THE situation in Xinjiang today is anomalous. It is the last place of its kind that is still part of someone else's multi-national empire, in this case, the Chinese one. Contemporary Chinese rule is modern enough in name; Xinjiang is a "self-governing autonomous region of the People's Republic of China." But Beijing is not modern-minded in tolerating "diversity." Like some empires in the 19th century, it promotes a total transformation, a total sameness of "Xinjiang" and "China." Moreover, Xinjiang has no international standing. It has no "decolonization" cachet (unlike, say, tiny East Timor, whose independence advocates received the Nobel Peace Prize.) And because the population of Xinjiang is thought to consist of "militant Muslims", not "gentle Buddhists", it has no pop-culture cachet either (unlike, say, Tibet, whose leader-in-exile has quite a following in Hollywood).

In another sense, though, Xinjiang is thoroughly up-to-date—in the Islamic Internationalist character of its politics. The phenomenon is almost instantly recognizable in its form, content and worldwide connections. The war in Afghanistan in the 1980s is the archetype—local fighters backed by Muslims of every stripe, including Islamic governments such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, who otherwise may be bitter enemies. Whereas a "liberation struggle" of the 1970s had as its objective the creation of a "democratic republic" of Leninoid cast, an "Islamic struggle" has as its objective another kind of regime entirely. Similarly, while one combats a 1970s-type "liberation movement" with a political-*cum*-security program broadly understood, those who wage jihad announce in advance that they are incorrigible, so that the only way to deal with them is to kill them.

As this is a novel problem in the modern world, it is also a novel problem for China. A droll PLA general might describe it as confronting a "People's War with Islamic characteristics." This struggle in Xinjiang has been going on for a number of years now, and the Chinese report to us about it from time to time. Executions are announced and successes against local separatist and terrorist cells are publicized. The "splittists" will occasionally assassinate pro-Beijing collaborators, murder local officials, and set off bombs, not only in Xinjiang but in China proper. Sometimes there are reports of ethnic conflict and communal rioting. People outside the country who support their Xinjiang kinsmen report on Chinese repression beyond that which Beijing itself publicizes, so that Beijing admits to "hundreds" of arrests, while others say "thousands." Beijing admits to "dozens" of executions, while others say "hun-

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dreds." We also know that Beijing has deployed to the territory ever-larger numbers of regular PLA forces as well as so-called People's Armed Police.[5] Reminiscent, too, of that older notion of turning "Xinjiang" into "China" are the government-sponsored migrations of Han Chinese into the area and the promotion of large-scale investment (also intended to help narrow a growing and politically dangerous income gap between the country's hinterland and its far more prosperous coastal areas.)

Thus far, Beijing seems satisfied by its success in quarantining Xinjiang from well-meaning liberal internationalism, or soft-headed trendy internationalism, or "concerned" busybodies generally. Indeed, Beijing's contempt for "world opinion" and the "international community" is empirically well-justified. But "Islamic opinion" and the "community of the faithful" are different. Beijing's insistence on repression in Xinjiang creates a need to disentangle Xinjiang from the Islamic world, and as the repression grows, so does the effort at disentanglement.

But the brutal pursuit of an anachronistic Chinese imperialism at home has as its mirror image abroad a supine Chinese diplomacy in the Islamic world; it is little more than appeasement and payoff on a grand scale. That the policy is undignified should not cause us to be dismissive of it, however, for it has not yet failed—and it may even succeed.

Since China fears, for example, that Iran and Saudi Arabia might stir up and subsidize discontent among Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang as they once did among the Afghans, the Chinese response is to cool proliferation concerns and supply arms and "problem technologies" to them—at generous prices. Since China fears that the now-independent "stans" will harbor sympathizers and supporters of independence for East Turkestan, it subsidizes their trade, overpays for their mineral rights, gives them weapons, and, most of all, provides great ceremonies for their leaders. (In this respect, the theatricality of it resembles the lavish attention paid to Third World leaders of the last generation. It is a fine art in China, honed across the centuries—the host's exquisite politeness as a way of showing contempt for his guest.)

To be sure, these efforts have a history. Long before the world worried about Islamic extremism, China was hard at work building back doors through the Islamic world to the world beyond as, for example, the fabled Karakoram Highway chiseled into forbidding mountains, ultimately designed to connect China's far west to the Pakistani port of Karachi. There is also the need for oil; China is now a major importer and, therefore, a competitor for access to energy in the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, the Indonesian archipelago, and the waters adjacent. Obviously, these projects are advanced by the co-optation and isolation of extremist Islam, not only by China, but also by others.

In the end, though, China's experience of Islam at home and abroad has likely created a kind of cognitive dissonance in the Chinese political mind. Everywhere it encounters Islam it appears at best opaque, more often as irrational and dangerous to China and Chinese. Yet there seems to be an unalterable commitment within the Chinese government to keep millions of such bloody-minded people under Chinese control, with the risk of turning Xinjiang into a Chinese

[5]The national government deploys substantial military forces in the region. In addition to regular PLA formations, there are People's Armed Police, military construction units, and specialized border guards. Since the war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, more forces have been added. The overall total now is certainly well into the hundreds of thousands; dissident sources claim it is far larger.

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Chechnya. Indeed, it is not only kindred Islamist states who may have an interest in doing this. The United States itself, committed though it is to the struggle against international terrorism, may come to see a distinction between "terrorism with a global reach" on the one hand, and a "struggle for human rights among an oppressed Turkic minority" on the other. After all, Beijing cannot but notice that U.S. efforts against terrorist influence in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines also manage to strengthen the American position against China in the contentious South China Sea. The civil and military presence of the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan and the other "stans" is comparably ominous from Beijing's perspective. No wonder, then, that the Chinese government has complained bitterly to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf about his having granted the United States exclusive access to airfields at Jacobabad and Pasni, and to his allegedly having allowed U.S. intelligence agencies to set up listening posts in the north opposite Xinjiang and Tibet.[6]

THE LATE Chairman Mao liked to describe the policies of China's opponents as ultimately self-defeating: "like lifting a rock only to drop it on their own feet", he used to say. Early in 2002, China may have, perhaps unwittingly, reminded us that the rock of its policy in Xinjiang may have become a little heavier to carry. The regime issued an official paper linking heightened disorders in Xinjiang to Osama bin Laden saying, among other things, that "bin Laden has schemed with the heads of Central and West Asian terrorist organizations many times to help the East Turkestan forces in Xinjiang launch a holy war with the aim of setting up a theocratic Islamic state in Xinjiang."[7] The intent of saying such a thing, of course, was to gain international sympathy and acquiescence—a truce, if you like, in the international human rights wars against China—so that China can go about its business in Xinjiang, not only for its own benefit but, presumptively, for ours, too. Yet in so doing, Beijing has underscored the depths of its difficulties, its lack of success thus far, and its potential vulnerabilities in the future.

China's problems in Xinjiang cannot but become a temptation for the United States if a future deterioration in Sino-American relations focuses attention on China's most deeply-seated structural weaknesses. It is of course a dangerous temptation; we will succumb to it only if China itself transforms Muslim militants in and around Ürümqi into our friends—just as the Soviet Union once did to their cousins in and around Kabul. Then, Beijing's great modernization project, however well-launched and energetically consolidated, will fall victim to China's anachronistic imperial pretentions. □

[6] *Pakistan Today*, January 11, 2002.

[7] Quoted in the *South China Morning Post*, January 22, 2002.

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Disraeli's Secret

Harvey Sicherman

QUEEN Victoria's favorite prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli (1803–81), seems at first glance impossibly far removed from our experience. Novelist, wit, orator, arguably the founder of Britain's modern Conservative Party, Disraeli was an exotic to his contemporaries and remains an endless fascination to those who study his life. There were none like him in his time, and not in our time either.

Still, there is good reason to revisit Disraeli's career. He grappled with problems astonishingly similar to those facing the United States today, and in some of the same places, notably the Balkans. Among his legacies was a settlement that conferred peace for thirty years in that tortured region without the posting of a single British soldier. And Disraeli achieved that feat despite a highly popular agitation for a humanitarian intervention that offended his skepticism about moral crusades and that, in his view, would have seriously injured the national interest. This success he owed in no small part to a keenly held concept of that interest. He also possessed rare traits of statesmanship: he knew what he wanted to do, and he persisted in his purpose. To these qualities Disraeli joined a dramatic imagination. His instructive and entertaining career holds relevant lessons even for the dilemmas we face after September 11.

DISRAELI'S ascent to political power was highly improbable. In an age of religious controversy, he was a converted Jew who described himself to Queen Victoria as "the blank page between the Old and the New Testament."[1] To the burden of his origin he added fashionably bad habits. Disraeli bedded many women and borrowed much money; ultimately he was forced to find a respectable and wealthy lady of good standing simply to escape the scandals. His Mary Anne turned out to be not only his rescuer but the love of his life.

Then there was the Disraeli style. A man of medium height and a rather large head surmounted by carefully curled black hair, he dressed like a regency rake in his younger and middle years, sporting highly colored waistcoats and gold chains. Disraeli early exhibited a failing common to gifted men; he could never resist a witticism even if it made him unnecessary enemies. He offended intellectuals by, among other things, dismissing Darwin ("I am on the side of the angels"), and opposing "scientific government." Disraeli thought a large permanent bureaucracy

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[1]Robert Blake, *Disraeli* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), p. 504.

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would be dangerous and able men could be just as easily recruited through the spoils system.

Disraeli also made enemies in high society. His first successful novel, *Vivian Grey*, was a brilliant satire on the political and social life around him. Its characters were thinly disguised; some editions have "keys" at the back for the uninitiated, identifying the real protagonists. It haunted Disraeli's relationships for years. These were qualities that ordinarily took a man out of politics. "Dizzy", as he was universally known, was often his own worst enemy.

"A Spirited Foreign Policy"

DESPITE ALL, Disraeli made it to the top of the "greasy pole" twice. His first premiership in 1868 was brief but succeeded in passing a landmark expansion of the voting franchise. The second, lasting from 1874 to 1880, came near the end of his life but also marked his greatest achievement in foreign affairs.

Although his political program was primarily domestic, Disraeli saw a "spirited foreign policy" as the international dimension of his patriotism. He had entered public life in the 1830s and supported Britain's balance-of-power habit: no continental power or group of powers should become strong enough to threaten Britain or its "permanent" interests. In his view, a superior navy and alliance with at least one substantial land power could best safeguard these interests; sentiment in foreign policy, whether for personal reasons or past services, should be rigorously excluded.

Disraeli was not a professional student of foreign affairs and, notoriously untutored by the facts, imagined many things. European domestic politics, for example, appeared to him merely as a contest between overbearing moneymen and desperate revolutionaries that could be influenced best by Her Majesty's secret service. He thought Louis Napoleon, an old social acquaintance, was a great statesman. Disraeli believed that the aristocratic lords of the American South would win the Civil War. These flirtations with fantasy, however, do not seem to have affected his grasp of reality when it came his turn to conduct the affairs of state.

Throughout a decade in opposition, Disraeli castigated Gladstone's foreign policy for its cant and inactivity. He complained that Britain had sat out the Franco-Prussian War, allowed Russia to violate military restrictions on the Black Sea, and caved to the Union's claims over the Confederate raider *Alabama*. Worse, Gladstone had failed to keep up the navy while wasting millions on a useless army. Sustained by two bottles of white brandy, Disraeli collected these denunciations in a great three-hour speech on April 3, 1872, which also contained this delicious depiction of the Gladstone cabinet:

> . . . their eminent chief alternated between a menace and a sigh. As I sat opposite the Treasury Bench the Ministers reminded me of one of those marine landscapes not very uncommon on the coasts of South America. You behold a range of exhausted volcanoes![2]

Upon becoming Prime Minister with a solid majority in 1874, Disraeli set about to assert neglected British interests. He was already 71 years of age, prone to gout and bronchitis. Never inclined to activist government, he left much of the cabinet's work to his ministers and, Reagan-like, could sometimes be surprised to learn what they had done. But foreign affairs was different. "After rates and taxes and shipping bills, *la haute politique* is refreshing; worth living for", he

[2]Blake, p. 523.

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confided to a lady friend.[3] He had mastered the parliamentary platform and England; now he would take a grander stage. But an obstacle stood before him: Disraeli's activism contrasted oddly with his first Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby. Derby had been Tory Party leader, a sometime rival but consistent friend of Disraeli. But Derby was a determined "Little Englander" who saw in most international issues snares for Britain best avoided. A singular tension thus ran through the cabinet on foreign affairs. Eventually, Disraeli's greatest foreign policy triumph would cost him both Derby's friendship and political support.

The Prime Minister's primary target was the *Dreikaiserbund*. This league of what the British called the "Northern Courts" (St. Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna) supplanted a defeated France after 1871 as the major force in Europe. But the three Emperors were themselves not entirely agreed on every issue. In May 1874, the Russians suspected Bismarck of planning another strike against the embittered French and protested. Disraeli got Derby to associate Britain with the Russian move, all of which greatly irritated Bismarck. The Prime Minister espied an opening to divide Germany and Russia, but Derby was reluctant. "We have been lucky in our foreign policy", he wrote, the implication being that such luck should not be tested.

The Eastern Question and "Humanitarian Intervention"

DISRAELI SAW a fresh opportunity to loosen the *Dreikaiserbund* when in July 1875 the wild Ottoman Balkan province of Herzegovina revolted, raising the Eastern Question to the center of European diplomacy once more. This complex diplomatic, military and political query arose from an indisputable fact: the Ottoman Empire, once feared for its strength, was now feared for its weakness. A vast Muslim military dictatorship that stretched from the Danube to the Persian Gulf at its height and ruled many people, a quarter of whom were not Muslim, the "Grand Turk" had threatened Vienna as late as 1683. More recently, however, the empire had become, as a czar once put it, like a man suffering from a sickness.

Today we might call "the sick man" a "failing state", but in 1875 it was a very large state not yet finally failed, and not lacking diplomatic skill. The Ottomans played off the various Europeans encroaching on their territory, all the while seeking reforms to restore the empire's military strength. Constantinople became a favorite destination for 19th century political reformers, economists, financiers and military experts, few of whom made much impact. Meanwhile, the Eastern Question expanded: Could the Ottomans ever be reformed? How long would it take? If it could not be done, or not done in time, then who would benefit from the Sick Man's terminal illness?

Most British leaders, beginning with Lord Palmerston, greatly feared the death of the Sick Man. To protect India the Sultan must be upheld, even at the cost of war. A British fleet had ended Napoleon's march toward Anatolia at Acre in 1799 and thirty years later another such bombardment from the seas dissuaded the ambitious Egyptian ruler Muhammed Ali's attack up the coast. In 1854, Britain and France made war against Russia in the Crimea; though it halted the Russian advance, the campaign had been otherwise a disaster, symbolized by the charge of the Light Brigade down the wrong valley. "A just but unnecessary war" had been Disraeli's verdict.

The new Balkan revolt and the

[3]Sarah Bradford, *Disraeli* (New York: Stein and Day, 1983), p. 335.

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Sultan's impending bankruptcy (Britons held one third of the debt) inspired Disraeli on November 3, 1875 to write Lady Bradford, one of his lady friends (alas, sighed a French diplomat, they were all at that point *grand-mères*!):

> I really believe the 'Eastern Question' that has haunted Europe for a century and which I thought the Crimean War had adjourned for half another will fall my lot to encounter—dare I say to settle.[4]

Barely three weeks after this letter, Disraeli arranged the secret purchase of Egyptian Khedive Ismail's shares in the Suez Canal. This sensational surprise was fully exploited by the Prime Minister, who added delicious if fanciful details. Britain now had a defensible interest in a vital waterway but, contrary to the views of Gladstone and others, this was not a prelude to the abandonment of Constantinople. Disraeli meant to defeat the *Dreikaiserbund* in Europe; Suez had been a lucky circumstance.



Corbis/Bettman

Disraeli, ca. 1875

His prestige soaring, Disraeli soon took Britain into a defense of the Ottoman Empire even as the Sultan conducted a bloody suppression of the spreading Balkan revolts. Matters began badly when in June 1876 news reached London of Turkish massacres in Bulgaria. Uninformed by a bungling Foreign Office, the old orator had dismissed the reports as "coffee house babble"; he doubted stories of Turkish torture because they "generally terminate their connection with culprits in a more expeditious manner."[5] Disraeli was therefore quite unprepared for Gladstone's famous pamphlet, "The Bulgarian Horror and the Question of the East", issued on September 6.

Gladstone clearly embodied British moral indignation; some 200,000 copies of this striking essay were sold by month's end. "Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible way", he concluded, "namely by carrying off themselves." Britain was now fiercely divided into "Bulgarians" versus "Turks." Partisanship was laced with anti-semitism and personal insult. Gladstone himself believed Disraeli a "crypto Jew" with a "race antipathy" toward the Eastern Christians. Disraeli, for his part, privately called his opponent an "unprincipled maniac . . . never a gentleman!" He regarded the famous pamphlet as "ill-written. Indeed in that respect, of all the Bulgarian horrors, perhaps the greatest."[6]

Disraeli feared the worst. Gladstone's agitation might facilitate a Russian war to seize Constantinople in the guise of rescuing the Ottoman Empire's Christian population while Britain applauded, blinded by a moral rage against the Turks. The Crimean War had come about in part because the Russians did not believe Britain would fight for the Ottomans. Disraeli was determined not to repeat the earlier blunder.

Czar Alexander II, his Chancellor Prince Gortchakoff and his Ambassador Count Shuvalov all hastened to assure the British government that Russia had

[4]Blake, p. 575.
[5]Bradford, p. 336.
[6]Ibid., pp. 336–7.

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no such warlike intentions. But pan-Slavism influenced the Russian Court, and Russian actions often differed markedly from their proclaimed intent. (In 1873, for example, the Russians had annexed Khiva in Central Asia despite promises not to do so. A massacre of the Turcomans at least equal to the Bulgarian atrocity had followed.) For Disraeli, then, the Balkan uprisings meant not freedom for the oppressed but a contained rebellion likely to deliver the region to the Czar, with British interests the main casualty of a Turkish defeat. This would not do.

Meanwhile, to everyone's surprise, the Turks had beaten the Serbs badly after that nominally Ottoman but Christian province declared war on the Ottomans with open Russian sympathy (including a general to run the campaign). Sensing that the Czar would not allow Serbia's defeat, and momentarily deprived by the "humanitarians" of public support for aiding the Ottomans, Disraeli instructed Derby to arrange a Serb-Ottoman armistice. The Czar, however, demanded a full Turkish withdrawal. In Constantinople, Sultan Abdul Hamid accepted Derby's proposal for a conference of the six powers (Britain, France, Austria, Germany, Russia and the Ottomans) to decide the future. But even before the conference convened, in December 1877, the Russians were mobilizing. Disraeli prodded the War Office to prepare a defense of Constantinople while warning in a speech, "She [England] enters into a campaign which she will not terminate till right is done."

Disraeli's conception of what was "right" differed not only from Gladstone's but also from that of many Tories. Propping up the "Sick Man" at the cost of Christian lives looked immoral. Doing so in an exaggerated belief that it would protect India from the Czar seemed a strategic error to many. Leading Conservatives, including Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for India and Disraeli's hand-picked representative to the Conference, discounted any Russian drive overland either toward the Suez Canal or through the Persian Gulf. Disraeli had discovered, too, that the very religious Salisbury favored the Christian cause in the Balkans.

Moreover, Disraeli was accused then (and by later historians) of being totally blind to the new force of the age, namely nationalism. In fact, Disraeli's writings and speeches evince an interest in two nationalisms. The first was English (he hardly ever said British). Exotic and foreign though he may have seemed to his contemporaries, Disraeli had a good grasp of popular aspirations and beliefs, although he preferred aristocratic rule. To us he therefore appears simultaneously ahead of his times and behind them. The second nationalism that interested him was the Jewish sort. Disraeli's novels such as *Tancred* and *Alroy* offer a literary precursor to the secular Zionism that had just begun to develop near the end of his life. Disraeli was immensely proud of his origins and, in general, helpful to the struggle of British Jewry for equal rights. His novels advocate a return to Zion and the re-establishment of ancient glories, the latter infused by his peculiar reading of the Bible and convenient belief that Judaism and Christianity completed each other. He had once told Constance de Rothschild, "All is race, not religion, remember that." She observed, "he believed more in the compelling power of a common ancestry than in that of a common faith."[7]

It was not, then, that Disraeli missed the emergence of nationalisms but that, beyond the English (and the Jewish), he opposed them. Like every English politician, Disraeli knew the Irish problem. As

[7]Bradford, p. 186.

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for the continent, although Disraeli was a worshipper of Byron, the advocate of Greek independence, he was also part of a generation (which included Otto von Bismarck) that soured on the nascent nationalisms of the Balkans. He regarded these movements as sinister, their ambitions insatiable, and their grievances certainly not worth a war.

Disraeli wanted to keep the Russians out of Turkey and he thought this could best be done by mobilizing Britain for conflict while pressing the Sultan to promise yet another set of reforms that would allow the Powers to applaud and go home. But the Ottomans viewed Disraeli's maneuverings as a British pledge to stand behind them; besides, they had beaten the Serbs and were in no mood to take unsolicited advice. The Constantinople Conference thus failed on January 20, 1877, and a subsequent Anglo-Russian effort called the London Protocol was also rejected by the Sultan. Disraeli's only other hope of preventing war, an arrangement with Austria to deter the Russians, also came to naught; St. Petersburg had gotten to Vienna ahead of him, the two powers having reached a secret agreement fixing spheres of interest by mid-March 1877. (Notably, the very able Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Andrassy, had insisted that Russia not set up a greater Bulgaria.)

Thus fortified, on April 24 Russia declared war against the Ottomans on the basis of the London Protocol. Derby replied with a note stressing British neutrality if the war did not jeopardize Britain's vital interests, which included the Persian Gulf, Egypt, the Suez Canal, Constantinople, and the Straits. Gladstone then overreached by supporting Russia to the hilt and, with the switch of focus from suffering Christians to the insufferable Russians, the humanitarian faction in British politics quickly lost ground. Public passion now switched dramatically into an anti-Russian fever that gave birth to a new expression, "jingoism." (The music halls rang with the refrain "we do not want to fight but, by Jingo if we do, we've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too."[8]) Disraeli's policy had outlasted popular indignation against the Turks.

Reassured of public support for protecting Turkey, Disraeli now faced a sudden political and personal crisis. Lord Derby opposed his policy to the point of conveying cabinet dissent to the Russian ambassador, apparently hoping to reassure the Czar that England would not fight. This was the final breach between the two old colleagues, ending a thirty-year relationship. Salisbury was poised to succeed him. Salisbury had been a forthright skeptic of defending the Sick Man but, unlike Derby, he was an internationalist. Meanwhile, though checked temporarily at Plevna in July, the Russians were on the verge of capturing Constantinople by year's end. This turned Salisbury around; he saw great danger to British interests, not so much in India but in the Mediterranean. When Disraeli gained secret cabinet agreement for military action to seize Cyprus or Alexandretta, Derby resigned and Salisbury took his place.

Disraeli and Salisbury made a very odd couple. Salisbury was formal, careful, cool and logical; he counted on skill, not luck. His family, the House of Cecil, had been at the center of government, or consulted by it, since the time of Elizabeth I. Disraeli, by contrast, was theatrical and imaginative; he moved comfortably between fact and fantasy, the way things were and the way he wished them to be. Disraeli knew his skill but he also counted on his star. Supremely self-confident, he considered himself superior to the English lords. He had once rejected an anti-Jewish gibe in the House of Commons by declaring that

[8]Bradford, p. 345.

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his ancestors had been offering "sacrifices to the Most High when London was a marsh." (Accused of being a sexual adventurer above his station on another occasion, he joked: "Me! Whose ancestors may have had personal relations with the Queen of Sheba!") As for Salisbury himself, Disraeli had already seduced an entire aristocracy; the Marquis, who had often been critical of Disraeli, was merely the last to succumb. Both shared a sarcastic wit. Disraeli's enthusiastic visions combined with Salisbury's cynical efficiency made them a formidable team.[9]

Then came disaster. Plevna did fall to the Russians and in desperation the Sultan sought a loose armistice, signed at Adrianople on January 31, 1878. In great alarm, Disraeli dispatched a fleet of six ironclads to Constantinople, which arrived on February 15. A war credit was voted by Parliament and an expeditionary force organized; reserves were mobilized on March 27. Meanwhile, in St. Petersburg, the Czar temporized over whether to seize Constantinople; the local commander, his brother the Grand Duke Nicholas, also hesitated before the British mobilization. A month elapsed while the Czar changed commanders and, at this point, the Austrians, who also thought Russia had gone too far, declared their opposition to the seizure of the Ottoman capital. The Russians then imposed in March 1878 the Treaty of San Stefano on the Ottomans, a punitive peace, but one that saved Constantinople from Russian assault.

Organizing a Coalition

DISRAELI'S threat of war saved Constantinople. He had overcome both severe cabinet dissent and Gladstone's campaign, but the political atmosphere was poisoned and Derby was gone. Still, Disraeli had gotten the focus right: the apparent Russian intention to seize the Straits appeared an intolerable bid to alter the international balance of power, threatening vital British interests.

Buoyed by a united Britain, Disraeli then organized international opposition to the Treaty of San Stefano which, despite the Austrian-Russian agreement of March 1877, would have created a large Bulgaria athwart the Balkans, touching the Aegean to the south and Albania to the west. Other provisions extended Russian control in Asia Minor. Austria, among others, felt betrayed by San Stefano. Disraeli's diplomacy was therefore able to rally a broad coalition against such a drastic change to the Ottoman frontiers, which had been set by the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The Russians recognized that they needed international consent to impose the terms of the treaty; they hoped to get it at the Congress of Berlin, capital of their ally, the German Empire.

The Congress was a coming-out party for the young Reich, and Bismarck, chairman of the Congress, was determined to make it work. The German Chancellor had established Germany's *bona fides* with his famous expression of disinterest, saying on December 5, 1876, that "no German interest worth the bones of a Pomeranian musketeer" was at stake in the Balkans.[10] This meant that Germany saw no reason to go to war, but not that Germany lacked serious reason for diplomatic intervention. Its two allies, Russia and Austria, might collide; England and Russia might fight, putting Berlin on the spot. Nor was Bismarck under any illusions about the motivations of the participants. When the

[9]For an account of their relationship see Andrew Roberts, *Salisbury: Victorian Titan* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1999), pp. 37–8, 198–9.

[10]Quoted in Erich Eyck, *Bismarck and the German Empire* (New York: Norton, 1967), p. 246.

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Russian Chancellor Gortchakoff wrote to him that the crisis was "European", Bismarck noted: "I have always found the word Europe on the lips of those statesmen who want something from a foreign power which they would never venture to ask for in their own name."[11]

The preliminary to Berlin was the Anglo-Russian Convention negotiated by Shuvalov with Disraeli and Salisbury. Allowed leeway by the irresolute Czar, the Russian diplomat focused on two objectives: Besserabia and the Black Sea towns of Batum and Kars. The British held no brief for Besserabia and they had in mind a counter for the extension of Russian influence: a base in the eastern Mediterranean. On May 26, in utmost secrecy, Disraeli offered the Sultan a defensive alliance with Britain; in return the Ottoman Empire ceded Cyprus. Not knowing this, Shuvalov was pleasantly surprised when the British gave way on Batum and Kars. Shuvalov then conceded that Bulgaria would be not "greater" but split, the north to be autonomous, the south under Turkish rule as modified by the Congress. The Austrians were then brought into a "gentlemen's agreement" that would constrain north Bulgaria against expansion. The question of Bosnia-Herzegovina was left open, although Bismarck urged the Austrians to occupy it quickly even before the powers met.

These arrangements allowed Bismarck to schedule the Congress knowing that at least some business would be transacted. In this, the statesmen of the 19th century offer a great lesson to those of the 21st: Summits raise hopes, and the dashing of those hopes superheats an already overheated situation. World leaders should always bring with them edible fruit, ripened ahead of time. (This lesson seems to have been lost, for example, on those who prepared the abortive Camp David Summit in July 2000.)

Toward the end of the Congress of Berlin (June 13–July 13, 1878) Bismarck paid Disraeli a supreme accolade: "*Der alte Jude, das ist der Mann*" (the old Jew is the man!). Bismarck, who had expected to run it, realized that in fact Disraeli had done so. This testified to a simple yet surpassing quality that so few statesmen possess: a well-defined objective persistently pursued. Disraeli knew what he wanted; it was only a matter of which tactic to choose; and here the political novelist's imagination chose the final stroke. As Lord Redesdale, one of his appointees to the Foreign Office wrote, "He was a master of the stage effect!"

Matters did not go so well at first, however. On June 14 a needy foreign office clerk leaked the Anglo-Russian Convention to the British press. This threatened to make the Congress a farce and so Lord Salisbury simply lied about it to assuage the honor of the participants. In late June, another press leak—this time in Germany—revealed the Cyprus deal. This too was denied while, secretly, British diplomats hastened to secure the missing proclamation by the Sultan that would legally cinch the transaction (it took until July 7). But Cyprus excited Bismarck's admiration and respect. "This is progress!" he exclaimed, which prompted Disraeli to write the Queen: "Evidently his idea of progress was to seize something."

In truth, Disraeli and Bismarck had plenty in common: Byron worship; dislike of cant and cliché; a sharp eye for human foibles; love of witty cynicism. Neither Disraeli nor Bismarck had any use for Balkan nationalism and when the Greek delegation secured a half-hour at the Congress to argue for a larger Greece, it was observed that both statesman "slept the sleep of the just."[12] They were both

[11]Eyck, p. 246.

[12]Misha Glenny, *The Balkans* (New York: Penguin, 1999), p. 142.

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

Corbis/Bettman

At the Congress of Berlin, July 17, 1878

supreme realists in politics and, while preferring aristocratic domination, knew a nobly defective brain when they saw one. Naturally, then, they both detested Gladstone. They soon impressed each other and Disraeli wrote the Queen about Bismarck's "piquant" conversations, which included many astonishing utterances, including the German's complaint about the Kaiser's conduct! Bismarck in a later conversation also expressed his appreciation of another Disraeli trait: "It was easy to transact business with him; in a quarter of an hour you knew exactly how you stood with him." Precise objectives and concise transactions, rare enough then, are qualities well worthy of imitation today.

There was a final note of drama in Berlin when the Russians sounded to Disraeli as if they were retreating from the arrangement on Bulgaria. Disraeli let it be known that he had ordered a special train, the better to hasten back to England to prepare for war should the Congress fail. In this he called the Czar's bluff, and with it Bismarck's bluff; Germany could no longer pose as honest broker but had to decide whether it was for or against a Russian effort to seize the Straits of Constantinople. Germany was against, and this re-inforced the Czar's hesitations, already evident to his representatives. (The Russian archives indicate that he had decided to compromise even before the train episode, but Disraeli did not know this and, in any event, the story is too good to dismiss.) As for the final piece of the puzzle, Bosnia-Herzegovina was to remain under Ottoman sovereignty but with Austrian administration, thereby giving Andrassy what he wanted: a strategic piece in the Balkans but without incorporating a Slavic population that would upset the Hungarians in the Dual Monarchy.

Because Disraeli knew what he wanted, he turned the Congress into a triumph despite infirmities that would

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have disabled most men. Salisbury himself (and his nephew, Arthur James Balfour, who assisted his uncle at Berlin) noted that the chief was too deaf and too ignorant of French to follow much of the proceedings. Lord Odo Russell had evidently talked Disraeli out of addressing the Congress in French on the opening day by pointing out that he would thereby deprive the audience of the "greatest living master of English oratory." Dizzy smiled his sphinx smile; Russell was never sure whether he took the compliment or the hint. In the event he spoke English, which offended the Russians.

Peace with Honor

AFTER SIGNING the Treaty of Berlin on July 13, Disraeli returned in triumph to England. He proclaimed "peace with honour" from his office at Downing Street, a phrase that still echoed sixty years later when Chamberlain brought neither peace nor honor from Munich. But then there was Gladstone thundering against yet another deal with the "unspeakable Turk." Disraeli delivered a glorious counter-stroke, calling Gladstone "a sophistical rhetorician inebriated with the exuberance of his own verbosity."[13] In the peals of laughter attending that phrase, Gladstone's pieties had no chance.

It is easy enough to be critical of the Congress of Berlin. Much of it merely ratified decisions already made. Imperial interests overrode the local peoples. There was a surfeit of vanity, arrogance and ignorance. It did not solve the Eastern Question, but only delayed its reckoning. Many have read back the blunders of 1914 into the settlement of 1878, while forgetting that blunders are made by blunderers. Those who stumbled into the Great War were a very different cast from those who avoided a great war at Berlin. When all was said and done, the handiwork of the Congress put off such a conflict for more than thirty years.

Disraeli had managed his part without committing a single English musketeer. Ennobled as Lord Beaconsfield, he closed the chapter in August 1878 with a notable description of the Balkans to the House of Lords:

> No language can describe adequately the condition of that portion of the Balkan Peninsula—Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina. No words can describe the political intrigue, the constant rivalries, a total absence of all public spirit, a hatred of all races, animosities of rival religions, absence of any controlling power. Nothing short of 50,000 of Europe's best troops would produce anything like order in those parts.[14]

How strikingly similar to the Balkans of the 1990s, right down to the number of soldiers deployed by NATO. But Washington has not been so fortunate or skillful as that London of so long ago. American troops are in the region, and some of them, at least, will be there for a long time.

There was a final and curious footnote to the Bismarck-Disraeli relationship, one that bore directly on Disraeli's aim to sink the *Dreikaiserbund*. It took a year to accomplish the always difficult task of keeping the Russians to their word, but by August 1879 they were out of the Balkans. A month later the German Ambassador, Count Munster, came to Disraeli's country home (Hughenden) for dinner. There, on September 26, they discussed what Disraeli described later as Bismarck's proposal for an Anglo-German-Austrian alliance. Historians differ over whether this was a German proposal, or, as the

[13]Blake, p. 650.

[14]Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, Fifth Series, Vol. 24, August 1878, pp. 1759–60.

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Count reported to Bismarck, a British one.[15] Munster apparently asked Disraeli what England would do if Germany and Russia went to war over the Balkan settlement, and Disraeli answered, "We will in that case keep France quiet." To which Bismarck said to Munster: "Is that all?" (In 1914, of course, that would have been more than enough!)

This conversation may simply have been an adjunct to Bismarck's negotiations with Austria-Hungary, which resulted in a military alliance announced on October 7. Bismarck understood that Disraeli's policy at the Congress of Berlin had indeed splintered the *Dreikaiserbund*, and Bismarck's recreation of a *Zweikaiserbund* was a form of protection against the Czar, who had been complaining ominously about the German propensity to side with the British on the international commissions set up to carry out the Congress of Berlin's "peace with honor." Going to London might have been part of Bismarck's tactic to bring the always reluctant Viennese to a conclusion. In any event, it seems highly unlikely that Disraeli would have fallen in with a permanent plan to isolate the French.

This story, of course, had another significance. It reflects the fact that England and Disraeli in particular were being taken seriously in Europe. But Disraeli's satisfaction with his achievements was short-lived. Britain was soon involved in distant wars to punish Afghanistan and subdue the Zulus, both campaigns begun by imperial officials disinclined to inform London of their plans. A sour economy completed Disraeli's undoing. In the general election of 1880, the Tories were badly defeated by Gladstone's Liberals, and Gladstone lost no time in repudiating his predecessor's politics. Disraeli (now Lord Beaconsfield) watched helplessly from the House of Lords where, as he put it, "I am dead; dead but in the Elyssian fields."[16]

Before long, the Russians, sensing Britain's retirement from continental engagement, browbeat the Sultan into forbidding the passage of warships into the Black Sea. The Sultan, in turn, never carried out the reforms promised to the Western powers. It was Gladstone, the anti-imperialist and little Englander, who occupied Egypt in 1882. In Europe, freed of Disraeli, Bismarck went back to his imperial knitting. The *Dreikaiserbund* never entirely recovered, but England ceased to matter much in continental calculations until Lord Salisbury reasserted British power in the 1890s. Disraeli himself was spared all of this, dying peacefully at home on April 19, 1881, already a legend.

Constancy of Purpose

HISTORICAL comparison between our time and Disraeli's requires a leap of the imagination. The differences are stark: Disraeli's world was Eurocentric, ours arguably centered on America. The United States is far more powerful relative to other powers than was Britain at its imperial zenith. And instead of having to manage a shifting balance of power, America counts on NATO and Japan as the linchpins of stable alliances west and east.

Still, let us take a leap. Might not Russia and China form a kind of *Zweikaiserbund*, their objective to diminish American influence in their respective spheres? If and when the United States decides to act against Iraq or, better yet, Iran, could we find our European allies, Bismarck-like, proposing an international conference to avoid a conflict? One smiles, of course, to imagine Bush as Disraeli, Putin and Jiang Zemin as the

[15]Blake, pp. 676–9. Compare Eyck, pp. 265–7, and Roberts, pp. 233–5.

[16]Bradford, p. 384.

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Czar and Franz Josef, and Javier Solana (or Blair or Chirac or Schröder) as (gasp) Bismarck, not to speak of Saddam or Ayatollah Khamenei as the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Yet, as Marx observed, history may repeat itself as farce.

Even if it doesn't, Disraeli's story still offers obvious and immediate lessons for American statesmen grappling with the aftermath of September 11. Our public opinion, no less than Victorian England's, is volatile and morally aroused; we sympathize with the oppressed, and we suspect foreign autocracies. Americans expect their leaders nonetheless to heed the national interest, to avoid dead ends, and not to spill blood, especially American blood, without good cause. We like to lead coalitions but not to be bound by them. And when the crisis abroad subsides, we want our president to deal with fires at home.

At the dawn of the democratic age, Disraeli dealt successfully with all of these challenges save the last. He advised others that "the secret of success is constancy of purpose", and this was his secret, too. His purpose was to disrupt the *Dreikaiserbund* before it harmed England's security, and he used the Eastern Question to do so despite a ferocious demand for a wrong-headed humanitarian intervention. And he was willing to pay the price, losing a vital political ally in the process. Peace in the Balkans for thirty years was a humane by-product of his single-minded pursuit of Britain's national interest.

For Disraeli, power was either applied to purpose or it was not power at all. He knew how to create an international coalition around a common objective, and how not to lose his way in the warmth of its company. The summits of Disraeli's day, no less than his private conversations, were meals well cooked before they were served. Last and surely not least, Disraeli understood with a novelist's imagination how dreams and color could be used to arrest public attention and train it upon essential issues.

Since September 11, Washington has rediscovered some of these virtues. When George W. Bush proclaimed that "we have found our mission", he and his administration had also found a Disraelian purpose. But will the President be constant? Can he work without as well as with the floating coalition fighting the war against terrorism? Can he keep the American people—and the Congress—attentive to his objectives? Across the divide of history, we can imagine Disraeli's thin smile fixed upon us. He would have understood. □

> Man is not the creature of circumstances,
> circumstances are the creatures of men.
>
> —Benjamin Disraeli

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One Hundred Years of Ambiguity

U.S.-Cuba Relations in the 20th Century

Irving Louis Horowitz

> Double standards are inspiration to men of letters, but they are apt to be fatal to politicians. . . . Modern politics is, at bottom, a struggle not of men but of forces. The men become every year more and more creatures of force, massed about central powerhouses. The conflict is no longer between the men, but between the motors that drive the men, and the men tend to succumb to their own motive forces.
>
> —Henry Adams (*The Education of Henry Adams*, 1905–06, chapter XXVIII)

MUCH INK has been spilled to determine whether Fidel Castro was a Communist before his seizure of power in 1959, or whether he became one at some later date. While the results are inconclusive, what is certain is that Castro was a Cuban nationalist long before the triumph of the July 26th Movement. Understanding Castro's Cuba therefore requires examination of that nationalism—its historical roots and its political consequences—as much or more than examination of Castro's communism. This, in turn, obliges us to study the imperfect origins of independence in Cuba itself. Such study requires a century-long retrospective, not just a look at the 42 years in which the Castro regime has held political power.

Two dates stand out in the American-Cuban relationship: 1898 (the year Spain surrendered Cuba to the United States following the Spanish-American War), and 1959 (the year the Soviet shadow to the Cuban Revolution ended any chance of resolving the contentious issues dividing Havana and Washington). There are other critical dates in Cuban internal political dynamics, such as 1925–33, the period of the Gerardo Machado dictatorship, and 1934–59, the populist-militarist era of the Fulgencio Batista dictatorship. But they do not matter nearly as much as 1898 and 1959, which is a sad reflection of the fact that, unlike most other countries, Cuba's political history has been marked by popular passivity and hence a tendency toward largely undisturbed military and then totalitarian rule.

Despite the importance and drama of the Spanish-American War, 1902 is a better starting date for this narrative than 1898 because it was only after the four years of American colonial hegemony that Cuba could begin to define its status as an independent nation. The four-year inter-

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regnum between 1898 and 1902 demonstrates the simple fact that real liberation, much less democracy, cannot be given—certainly not by the armed forces of an occupying power. National independence must be earned; it must be won against opposition. What the United States was able to provide, and the wisest thing in its power to grant, was schooling in the practices of a free and autonomous society. The Cubans were allowed to act as if they had won and created some of the basic rights and duties of a democratic nation. The immediate consequence of this was to heighten a note of ambiguity in a political situation already less than clear-cut.

As it happened, Cuba has been unable, ever since 1902, to clarify its status *vis-à-vis* the United States. This was not entirely the fault of Cubans. The native Cuban regime in 1902 was established under the ostensible protection of the Platt Amendment, which was terminated only in 1934 as a part of the Good Neighbor Policy. Thus, in 1902 and 1934, not much less than in 1898 and 1959—and, of course, in October 1962—external forces rather than internal actors determined the course of Cuba's national existence. Around these dates one may plot, so to speak, Cuba's one hundred years of ambiguity.

Cuba has never been the master of its own fate in its independence struggles. Without minimizing the bitterness of the Cuban popular classes against Spanish colonial rule—or, for that matter, the bravery of the Cuban guerrillas who fought the best troops of the Spanish empire—the plain fact of the matter is that the United States and Spain set the terms of Cuban independence. Native forms of national struggle were not entirely absent; indeed, by 1897 it became evident that the Spaniards were unable to impose a purely political or legal solution on the island, and that raw military force was required. In such circumstances, the indigenous resistance in Cuba could not hope to achieve more than a military stalemate—at least in the short term—without external intervention, whether the resistance wanted it or not.

In such a vacuum of power, the United States was able to extend as well as to impose its Monroe Doctrine over a Spanish colony. It did so first by insisting on a pacific solution that did not require outright subjugation of the native peoples and then, when it became apparent that Spain did not have a civil administrative infrastructure that could impose such an outcome without using military force, moved to intervene directly. Spain's frailty thus allowed President McKinley to move into the power vacuum in fairly simple fashion—something that his predecessor, Grover Cleveland, resisted doing. But nothing has been simple since. In 1902 Cuba became a *relatively* independent nation, modeled after the United States in its formal apparatus of government. The arguments over the one hundred years since 1902 confirm the use of the term "relative." Radicals argue that "relative" means that Cuba enjoyed little true independence. Conservatives claim that all sovereignty, especially for a small nation with a single-crop economy, is necessarily relative.

One of the few scholars writing on Cuba who deeply appreciated this ambiguous legacy is Hugh Thomas. In an essay focusing on the Batista era, he stated the historical situation frankly:

> Cuba was not China or Nicaragua. It was a state whose independence from Spain in 1898 was in effect secured for it by the United States as a result of the Spanish-American war. As such, Cuba's freedom of action was limited for thirty years (1902–34) under the Platt Amendment, enabling the United States to intervene legally in the island's internal affairs under certain circumstances. Such intervention occurred several times—in 1906,

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1912, 1917 and 1933. Although after 1933 the country's industries and services were increasingly 'Cubanized' by local entrepreneurs, much of the aura of the old days still hung about U.S. Cuban relations in the 1950s.

Thomas goes on to note that "Cuban national history read by students at the University of Havana revived memories of the early part of the century, when U.S. business involvement promoted the rapid economic development of the island and at the same time put a damper on the rhetorical romantic Cuban nationalism articulated by José Martí during two ruthless wars against Spain (1868–78 and 1895–98)."[1] Castro was indoctrinated by this special reductionist reading of Cuban-American history—that U.S. domination repressed Cuban national aspirations.

The problem for Cuba, after securing its independence, was the ambiguity of the outcome. It achieved a result that it desired without devising a method for accomplishing it. The result was that regimes in Cuba from 1902 through 1959 wrestled with a dilemma that they could not resolve. A group of democratic reforms introduced in 1933 was identified with Machado and represented a step toward securing greater autonomy, for on their account the Platt Amendment was soon lifted. But the reforms fell prey to a series of coups and were weakened further by the illegitimacy of the Batista regime. Instead of resolving matters either with regard to Cuba's political culture or relations with the United States, the Batista dictatorship was halfhearted and inconclusive, like so many earlier regimes. Into such a situation Fidel Castro came to power—not as living vindication of Marxism-Leninism, but as part of an effort to move Cuba beyond ambiguity and to nationalist closure, and, in consequence beyond the suffocating sphere of American influence.

The absence of closure before 1959 clearly helps to explain the ferocity of Castro's resentment of the United States. This resentment is not simply a consequence of generic factors (big power versus small power, or Anglo versus Hispanic cultures). Rather it is a result of the specific history of Cuba and its intersection with the United States from 1898 to the present. In a nutshell: the United States invaded Cuban soil and, no less, liberated it from the Spanish empire. Castro's May Day speech of 2001 indicates his unbending hostility toward and suspicion of the United States. He denounces hemispheric trade agreements as "annexation." He says such a free trade "would mean more neo-liberalism, less protection for industry and national interests, and more unemployment and social problems. National currencies would disappear to be replaced by the dollar, and all monetary policy across the region would be dictated by the U.S. Federal Reserve."[2] The distant echo of the Platt Amendment can be heard in his remarks. It is not simply a policy difference, but a psychological distance that is reflected in Castro's words. How this came about is worth reviewing.

Pivotal to any analysis of this history is the fact that in the year 2002—one hundred years after Cuba's acquisition of independence and more than 42 years after the imposition of Communist dictatorship—one can still speak of Cuba in terms of a single-crop economy, although the sugar crop is sweetened by other revenue streams. However one feels, or better said, to whatever one ascribes the causes, the fact is that Cuba is an economy dominated by dollarization, and

[1]Thomas, "Cuba, The United States and Batista, 1952–1958", in Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki, eds., *Cuban Communism* (10th edition) (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 3–12.

[2]Quoted in the *New York Times*, May 2, 2001.

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tourism is a major source of income. The classical situation of small nations of the Caribbean—still extant in Cuba—is indicative of the hard truth that the politics and ideology of Marxism-Leninism comprise a sort of fool's gold, a fantasy land of autonomy. The Castro regime is strong enough to goad the United States but weak enough to require appeals for aid to other Western powers. The writing of this scenario was already on the wall with the Cuban missile crisis, which was precipitated as well as settled by the major contestants in the Cold War. The turf may have been Cuban, but the decision-making had distinctly Russian- and English-speaking voices. Listen to the analysis of Adam B. Ulam, perhaps the sharpest Sovietologist of his time, of the events of October 1962:

> Riding Russian coattails brought quiet rather than solution for the Castro dictatorship. It created a transitional equilibrium that became permanent more through inertia than design. And so it was with the Cuban Revolution of 1959. That cataclysmic event finalized the resentment and focused the animosity toward the United States for its involvement in Cuban affairs. It did not provide a solution in 1902 that satisfied either democrats or autocratic landholders within Cuba, nor did it bring to closure the sense of solitude and isolation that Marxism promises in theory, but that Leninism-Stalinism took away in practice.[3]

Left-wing scholars take the view that if there had been no U.S. invasion or occupation, Cuba would have ridden the coattails of the 1895 uprising toward full autonomy. In this view, the sinking of the U.S.S. *Maine* in Havana Harbor on February 15, 1898, with a heavy loss of American lives, provided President McKinley with a pretext to intervene in the conflict. The demands were for Spain to terminate its concentration camp policy, offer an armistice to Cuban rebels, and accept the United States as a final arbiter between the parties. Cuban independence was not mentioned. Benjamin Keen and Mark Wasserman develop an interesting view—one that parallels Fidelista historiography:

> The ensuing war was short and nasty. American commanders ignored their Cuban counterparts, excluding Cuban generals from decision making and relegating Cuban soldiers to sentry and clean-up duties. Incompetence was the dominant feature of both the Spanish and American war effort. American military actions were incredibly ill prepared and badly led. The only major land battle of the war, the famous charge up San Juan Hill, which helped to catapult Theodore Roosevelt to national prominence, was very nearly a catastrophic defeat for the United States. Spain, to some extent, defeated itself, for its generals believed the war lost from the beginning and sought above all to minimize their losses. Thus, in a bizarre little war, the United States Army, wretchedly led, scandalously provisioned, and ravaged by tropical disease, swiftly defeated a demoralized, dispirited Spanish army and snatched the fruits of victory from the *Mambises*, the Cuban guerrilla fighters who had fought gallantly in a struggle of three years duration. The exclusion of Cuban leaders from both war councils and peace negotiations foreshadowed the course of Cuban-American relations for the next sixty years.[4]

The unspoken assumption in this account of events, in which Spaniards—and especially Americans—marginalize Cubans, is that Castro put an end to such humiliation. But he did no such thing. The negotiations between the United

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[3]Ulam, *The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II* (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), pp. 330–40.

[4]Benjamin Keen and Mark Wasserman, *A Short History of Latin America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1984), pp. 408–9.

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States and the USSR over the missile installations aptly demonstrated that Castro had no more input in the solution than the Cuban guerrilla leader Antonio Maceo had in the settlement between the United States and Spain. The further presumption is that, if left to their own devices, Cubans would have put an end to Spanish rule. Such an outcome was certainly the wish of José Martí, Antonio Maceo and Máximo Gómez, but whether that wish would have become reality is problematic. Under the direction of General Valeriano Weyler, Spanish military policy shifted to anti-guerrilla tactics. The Spaniards then drove back the Cuban revolutionists to the eastern end of the island. All seemed lost until the U.S. military bailout. What we do know for certain is that the interregnum ended in May 1902 with the voluntary departure of the U.S. military and the declaration of a free and sovereign Cuba.

A quite different, conservative reading of the same events comes to us from Milton Eisenhower, the brother of Dwight D. Eisenhower and a diplomat and educator in his own right. Milton Eisenhower viewed the American intervention as an appropriate response to Spanish imposition of taxes and other restrictions on direct trade in sugar and tobacco between Cuba and the United States. He saw this as parallel to the American pre-Revolutionary War slogan of "no taxation without representation." Indeed, Eisenhower goes so far as to declare Spanish cruelties as "forerunners of Hitler's mass executions in World War II." In this situation, Cuba "seemed a natural ally if not a dependency of ours." While there is a big gap between an ally and a dependent state, and while trade irritants hardly seem sufficient cause for an invasion, it is worthwhile listening to this voice of American rationalism:

> For four years following the victory over Spain in 1898, the United States maintained military rule in Cuba. This seemed essential, for the former colonials had had no experience in self-government. Our military control was honorable. Local governments, the courts, and other public agencies were improved. Progress in agriculture, education, health (especially in the campaign to eliminate yellow fever), transportation, trade, and general living standards was noticeable but not notable. There was little if any serious thought given to changing inherited social customs. The Cuban people themselves did not then seek such change. Most of them wanted independence—only large landowners objecting—and they got it, with qualifications in 1902. The limitation on independence was the Platt Amendment to our treaty with Cuba. In the ensuing years of quasi-independence, Cuba suffered the indignity of numerous interventions by the United States, saw most of its own Presidents promise honesty and reform only to fatten their own pockets, lived in fear of slaughter by military and guerrilla leaders, and came to accept betrayal as an inevitable condition of government.[5]

THE RANGE of professional opinion across the political spectrum, then, confirms this uneasy sense of ambiguity in Cuban national life. All recognize that the United States served as both colonial master of the Western Hemisphere and also democratic liberator from colonialism. Fernand Braudel sees this duality as a function of the "degree of isolationism that has been a basic feature of the United States."[6] Carl Becker, while bemoaning the less-than-sterling conduct of American intervention, nonetheless sees such behavior in terms of a defense of "democratic institutions to which America was committed" and oppo-

[5]Eisenhower, *The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1963), pp. 296–7.

[6]Braudel, *A History of Civilizations* (New York: Penguin, 1995), pp. 496–7.

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sition to "the extension of the *European political system* [Becker's italics] to this continent."[7] Raymond Aron considers the United States guilty of "a great power policy, even an imperialist policy in the ordinary sense of the term." This classical colonial policy was followed by a more recent policy of benign, or not so benign, neglect of Latin America. Aron goes on to say that "a sense of geography and memories of the past are at the root of these [American] feelings and this behavior."[8] More recently, Henry Kissinger noted that, by the start of the 20th century, "America found itself commanding the sort of power which made it a major international factor, no matter what its preferences." In short, from the Monroe Doctrine to the Platt Amendment, the United States was pursuing a policy of "national interest" and not just "remaining unentangled" in its immediate neighborhood.[9] Each of these statements is a variation on the same contradictory theme: America simultaneously as dictator and liberator.

Clearly, in these two views the moral glass of American power is seen as half empty on the far Left and more than half full on the conservative Right. Perhaps no one caught the spirit of ambiguity more ably than Hubert Herring, who in his great *History of Latin America* wrote that the Cuban Republic from 1902–34 "was now free—but not free to make her own mistakes."[10] He added philosophically that "a clear lesson on the education of nations, as of children, [is] that none learns to order its life unless granted the privilege of going wrong as well as of going right." Projections of what might have been notwithstanding, it is a fact of history that Cuban independence was granted and not earned. This may be viewed as a bitter fact of island history, or a tribute to a people on a small island navigating colonial forces far larger than itself. What is no less evident is a Cuban Revolution of 1959 that saw itself as settling accounts with the legacy of 1898–1902. Castro's strength is less a function of the authority of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology than of an unrequited nationalism as a mobilization tool.

From the outset, Castro had an image of Cuba as larger than life, certainly larger than the life of the island. From the start, Castro's self-image was that of Simón Bolívar in an era of communism. He sought to bring the future to the entire hemisphere—if not on horseback, like Bolívar, then as a foot soldier in the mountains. Castro was and remains the embodiment of nationalism tinged by a greater, if ultimately counterfeit, internationalism. The fusion of the two was solidified by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism in the form of the tradition of the Comintern—centered in Havana rather than in Moscow. In each decade, from the Tri-continental in the 1960s through a variety of conferences over the next forty years, Castro maintained that his position was properly in the vanguard, not the backwater, of revolutionary consciousness. So while foreign intervention and great-power intrigue pockmarked the history of Cuba from 1898 to 1959, the history of Cuba after 1959 was supposed to turn this around and make Cuba a world political actor—militarily, diplomatically and otherwise (such as through its international medical teams).

This effort has had modest results. On the one side, there was the removal of nuclear warheads from Cuba as a result of

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[7]Becker, *The United States: An Experiment in Democracy* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 134–5.

[8]Aron, *The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945–1973* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1974), p. 185.

[9]Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 37–40.

[10]Herring, *A History of Latin America: From the Beginnings to the Present* (2nd edition) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 401–16.

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a Soviet-American deal, the embarrassment of Cuban troops participating in a losing effort in the Syrian Golan Heights, the humiliating defeat of Cuban troops in Grenada, the routing of the Cuban military presence in Angola and Namibia. These initiatives, aimed at re-inforcing Castro's role in world affairs, failed in frustration and loss of prestige. But on the other hand, Cuba has had a tremendous impact on hemispheric affairs: for example, from the Venezuela of guerrilla Douglas Bravo to the Venezuela of General Hugo Chávez. Castro's impact on the Nicaraguan Left is widely recognized. Alliances have been forged with China for advanced military supplies, replacing those lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Training and arming Palestinians from the PLO forces is ongoing. There is scarcely a dictatorship in the world—from Kim Il Sung's in North Korea to Muammar Qadaffi's in Libya—that has not enjoyed the benefit of Castro's warm embrace. As the late Arthur P. Whitaker predicted as long ago as 1962, "although Cuba's ties with the Communist bloc make it difficult to appraise the difference between the two, Fidelismo is probably a greater potential threat than communism to the interests of the United States in Latin America. This is because Fidelismo expressed so well and for so long the rising Latin American tide of both continental nationalism and populism."[11]

However, what neither Whitaker nor Thomas could have anticipated was that national interests and populism would develop in Central and South America along an autonomous axis different from anything envisioned by Fidel Castro—or, for that matter, by Simón Bolívar. What has actually occurred, to Castro's obvious and public chagrin, is the development of international alliances at the political level, and regional and global market relations that extend far beyond the borders of nations in North or South America. Everything from telephone companies to oil drilling arrangements has changed the old system. Latin America is no longer a decidedly junior partner to North America. It is simply a partner whose size and scope depends upon investment prospects and corporate profits.

What has drastically reduced the significance of Castro as a player in global affairs is not a direct assault on Cuba's shores, but the sheer capacity of nearly every other Latin American nation simply to bypass Cuba on its own road to a new century. Henry Adams' "forces" are indeed at work. While Cuba remains a force to contend with, its xenophobic nationalism has institutionalized an economic backwardness that has in turn created a diplomatic impasse. Cuba is now isolated from the trends sweeping the region. Bolstered by revitalized democracies from Mexico to Brazil, Latin America is undergoing a degree of economic integration unforeseen by the allies of the United States and unnoticed by its enemies. Economic upheaval notwithstanding, the situation in 2002 is profoundly more favorable to the forces of hemispheric democracy than it was in 1961, or for that matter throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This illustrates Fidel's myopia as the century of ambiguity nears its end. Post-Castro Cuba will become part of an extraordinary hemispheric vitalization in which the fabled ogre of U.S. domination is absent. The problem of Cuban nationalism and jealousy for its sovereignty will be bound up in choices concerning hemispheric multilateralism, not obeisance to a new Platt Amendment. The long-term positive future of Cuba is neither utopian nor ideological. Rather, it is normalization in the best sense of politics, and rationalization in the best sense of economics. □

[11]Whitaker, *Nationalism in Latin America: Past and Present* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1962), pp. 69–70.

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The New Cuba Divide

Daniel P. Erikson

THE U.S. embargo of Cuba has been an extraordinarily resilient foreign policy, able to weather diverse political trends and even historical eras without substantial challenge. Change is afoot, however, and the best evidence of that change may be found in Congress. In July 2001, the House of Representatives voted for the second consecutive year to cut off the funds to enforce travel restrictions to Cuba; key Senators pushed for even broader repeal of the sanctions. The September 11 attacks stunted this process, but not, it seems, for very long. On the one hand, a palpable sense of national crisis eclipsed any movement to normalize relations with Cuba, particularly in light of Fidel Castro's public criticism of the U.S.-led "war on terrorism." With the continued support of President Bush, the embargo seemed virtually unassailable. It was no small irony, therefore, that one of the chillier moments in U.S.-Cuban relations was suddenly interrupted by the first direct trade between the two countries in 38 years.

In November 2001, central Cuba was devastated by Hurricane Michelle, the most powerful storm to strike the island since the 1950s. When the United States offered humanitarian assistance, Cuba responded by negotiating an all-cash food purchase, made possible by U.S. legislation passed the previous year. Within a month, several American companies had consummated a deal with Cuba valued at nearly $30 million. The trade included shipments of frozen chicken and corn symbolically selected from nine different states, and, rather odd for the launching of such routine cargo, it shipped off from New Orleans to Havana with the fanfare of a press conference on the dock. In Congress, moreover, the sale breathed new life into the broader debate over U.S. policy toward Cuba. Castro spent the early days of 2002 greeting visitors such as Republican Senators Arlen Specter and Lincoln Chafee and Democrat Maria Cantwell, while a separate delegation from the House of Representatives toured the island. With the impending retirement of Jesse Helms and other anti-communist stalwarts, it has suddenly become possible to ask once again: Can U.S. Cuba policy be refashioned with Fidel Castro still in power?

The simplest, if not especially satisfying, answer to this question is perhaps yes, perhaps no. Congress has tried to take matters into its own hands before. Throughout much of the 1990s, debate was polarized between anti-Castro hardliners who advocated tightening sanctions to hasten the collapse of Cuban communism and "normalizers" who believed that establishing econom-

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ic and diplomatic ties to the United States was the best way to bring about change in Cuba. At first, the hardliners held sway, as illustrated by the two main pieces of legislation dealing with U.S. Cuba policy: the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996. But the failure of these policies to induce substantive change in Cuba has gradually nurtured a search for alternative strategies. At the same time, new political forces have elbowed their way into the Cuba debate. Together, these developments have turned the previously stable world of U.S.-Cuba politics upside down. We have witnessed high-profile defections and unlikely alliances between Democrats and Republicans, humanitarians and free-traders, religious organizations and American farmers. The realignment of these alliances composes the new Cuba divide. To appreciate its novelty, it is worth a moment's reflection on how it has come to be.

The Politics of the Cuban Embargo

THE U.S. trade embargo of Cuba originated when President John F. Kennedy initiated the full embargo in 1962 through a presidential directive issued under the 1917 Trading With the Enemy Act. In 1963, the Treasury Department set forth the Cuban Asset Control Regulations, which further solidified many other aspects of the embargo, prohibiting all unlicensed financial transactions, forbidding direct or indirect imports from Cuba, and imposing a total freeze on Cuban government assets held in the United States. Through these regulatory initiatives, the Executive Branch cemented its power over U.S. Cuba policy, a dynamic that remained in place through the end of the Cold War. However, when the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Cuba of an estimated $3.5 to $4.5 billion in annual subsidies, Cuba's teetering economy prompted congressional hardliners—with support from Cuban Miami—to tighten the screws. Thus, it is only within the last decade that the U.S. Congress has asserted itself as the primary arbiter of U.S. policy toward Cuba.

The signal indication of this shift was the passage of the aforementioned Cuban Democracy Act in 1992. Sponsored by then-Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), who represented a state with a large Cuban-American population, the bill codified the travel ban and extended the embargo to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies operating abroad, affecting approximately $700 million a year in trade with Cuba. The act also legally required democratic elections in Cuba before the embargo could be lifted by the Executive Branch. This jurisdictional transition accelerated with the passage of the Helms-Burton Act in 1996, which further codified the embargo and added provisions for penalizing foreign companies doing business in Cuba.

How did Congress emerge as the preeminent power broker on U.S. Cuba policy? The answer lies in the peculiar political calculus that frames this aspect of American foreign policy. For most of the embargo's existence, the issue of U.S. Cuba policy has been a primary motivator for only one constituency: the exiled Cuban-American community, located predominantly in south Florida. Primarily composed of more affluent Cuban exiles with strong antipathy toward Castro, the Cuban-American contingent has played a brilliant hand, using sophisticated methods of political organization to bend presidential candidates to its views—despite the fact that Cuban Americans represent merely 5 percent of the Florida electorate. In particular, the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF)—under the leadership of Jorge Mas Canosa until his death in 1997—was very effective in advancing an anti-Castro agenda.

Hardliners in Congress have also benefited from fortunate timing. The Cuba

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Democracy Act was passed less than a year after the Soviet Union's demise, when it seemed to some, incorrectly as it turned out, that the fall of Castro was imminent. Helms-Burton sailed through Congress four years later, shortly after the Cuban government shot down two unarmed civilian aircraft manned by pilots from "Brothers to the Rescue", a Cuban-American exile group based in Miami.

It is hardly a coincidence, too, that both major pieces of legislation were passed and signed into law by incumbent presidents seeking re-election: George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. This reflects the fact that Florida has emerged in recent years as a tightly contested swing state in presidential elections, a development that has magnified the influence of the Cuban-American constituency still further. All major presidential candidates since 1992—George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Bob Dole, Al Gore, and George W. Bush—have advocated continuing the sanctions regime against Cuba.

Thus, even as the Clinton Administration made modest moves to ease travel restrictions and promote cultural exchanges between the United States and Cuba, the anti-Castro congressional coalition remained in the driver's seat. Indeed, it even expanded its scope by reaching out to sympathetic Democratic allies such as Senator Joe Lieberman of Connecticut and Congressman Patrick Kennedy of Rhode Island. Such expansion was hindered, however, by the Pope's 1998 visit to Cuba and the Elián Gonzalez spectacle—discussed below—both of which highlighted simultaneously the repressive conditions in Cuba and the potential for an opening.

Elián Gonzalez and the China Syndrome

AS WE ALL know, appearances can be deceiving. While it seemed as though pro-embargo forces were gaining the upper hand, fundamental shifts were already underway that have since eroded the broad—but shallow—political support of anti-Castro hardliners in the Republican-dominated Congress. The media frenzy surrounding six-year old Elián Gonzalez, whose mother died trying to spirit herself and her son away from Cuba and the boy's father, temporarily gripped policymakers and legislators alike. Between January and April of 2000, seven different bills and resolutions were proposed in the House and Senate regarding Elián, with objectives ranging from his immediate naturalization to urging that the boy be returned to his father in Cuba. The cumulative effect of all this was to highlight the awkwardness of U.S.-Cuba relations in the weeks before Congress debated U.S. trade policy with another Communist country: Permanent Normal Trading Relations (PNTR)—what amounted to most-favored nation status—with China.

The high stakes and drama of the PNTR debate marked the most important congressional vote on trade since the 1993 passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and it resonated with themes closely paralleling the debate over the U.S. embargo of Cuba. By granting China permanent most-favored nation status in lieu of an annual review, the PNTR vote raised deeper and divisive issues concerning the relationship of a more open trading order to the evolution of politics in non-democratic states. The Republican leadership in the House worked overtime to ensure the passage of PNTR. On May 24, 2000, the day of the vote, House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-TX) made an impassioned plea to Congress: "Information is the lifeblood of a market. It is also poison to dictators. If we vote 'no' today, we will condemn the people of China to a continued life of despair." The bill was approved by a vote of 237 to 197, with support from 164 Republicans and 73 Democrats. In the

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waning days of 2001, President Bush signed the official proclamation at his ranch in Crawford, Texas.

In retrospect, the PNTR vote—along with the core political argument used to achieve it—was instrumental in redrawing the battle lines in U.S. Cuba policymaking. This decision magnified discontent with the sanctions-oriented approach to U.S. Cuba policy—especially on the Republican side of the aisle—which had already been evidenced by the dissent of prominent conservatives outside of Congress, such as Governor George Ryan of Illinois and former Republican Secretaries of State George Shultz and Lawrence Eagleburger. Not long after the China vote, the House approved the sale of food and medicine to Cuba by a vote of 301 to 116 and restored the right of American travel to Cuba by 232 to 186 (a provision later stripped from a larger bill). As Republican lawmakers increasingly failed to see the rationale for simultaneously trading with China but sanctioning Cuba, an internal party debate erupted into warring *New York Times* op-ed pieces by Congressman George Nethercutt (R-WA) and Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC). The Republican push for normal trade with China continues to reverberate in discussions of U.S. Cuba policy, creating a dynamic that has emboldened pro-trade conservatives while forcing Castro's strongest critics to seek new strategies.

The Farmers' Revolt and the New Alliance

THIS IS ONLY part of the story, however; as suggested above, other players have elbowed their way into the politics of the embargo. Although many religious organizations have opposed the Cuba embargo for years, the American farming lobby has now emerged as the most influential new voice in current policymaking. In Congress, it is led by several senior western Republicans who are being pressed by their constituencies to seek new markets. In Cold War days, these legislators would have supported anti-Castro initiatives as an easy way to accrue political capital within the party at little personal cost. The end of the Soviet Union and the beginning of a new farming crisis in the 1990s have changed all that, allowing a nascent coalition of liberal Democrats and western conservatives to pump new life into congressional momentum to repeal the Cuban embargo.

Support for these initiatives among the rank-and-file has faced strong opposition from Republican leadership, especially in the House. For example, in August 1999, then-Senator John Ashcroft (R-MO) offered an amendment to the Agriculture appropriations bill to allow agricultural and medical exports to rogue states, including Cuba. The amendment was passed in the Senate and then unilaterally stripped by the House leadership in conference, to the dismay of its Senate advocates. Still, evidence suggests that hardliners in the Republican leadership are increasingly isolated from the congressional mainstream. The farm lobby scored an important victory when the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act was signed into law in October 2000, just months after the PNTR vote. This act, sponsored by Nethercutt, finally does allow food and medicine trade with Cuba, and it made possible the all-cash purchases in the aftermath of Hurricane Michelle. It is clearly the most significant legislative initiative passed on Cuba since the 1996 Helms-Burton bill. Nor is congressional pressure against the embargo easing. The October 2000 act still prohibits public financing of food sales to Cuba, and that restriction has now become the focus of subsequent efforts. The American Farming Bureau Federation is seeking

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exemption of U.S. products from all existing embargoes and sanctions, which are estimated to cost U.S. farmers 14 percent of the export market for rice, 10 percent for wheat, 5 percent for vegetable oil and barley, and 4 percent of foreign corn sales.

Nor is that all. The nascent coalition of New England liberals and western conservatives in the 107th Congress has introduced several other anti-embargo bills: the U.S.-Cuba Trade Act, the Free Trade With Cuba Act, the Cuba Humanitarian Trade Act, and the Cuba Food and Medicine Access Act. Most likely to pass, however, is the Bridges to the Cuban People Act, sponsored by Senators Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Lincoln Chafee (R-RI), with a partner bill in the House of Representatives initiated by Congressmen José Serrano (D-NY) and Jim Leach (R-IA). This bill, which has broad bipartisan support among its co-sponsors, would authorize the unrestricted sale of food, farm equipment, agricultural commodities and medicines to Cuba, as well as repeal the central tenets of codification contained in Helms-Burton.

Does this nascent coalition foreshadow the demise of the nearly forty-year old embargo? Well, not quite yet, for pro-embargo forces have also been active. Senators Lieberman and Helms may seem more like a political odd couple than the leading edge of another potential ground shift in U.S. Cuba policy, but this past May they unveiled the first major legislative proposal by anti-Castro hardliners since 1996. Titled the Cuba Solidarity Act of 2001, the bill seeks to send $100 million in U.S. aid to dissidents and independent workers in Cuba over the next four years. Backed by the CANF, the pro-opposition emphasis of the bill marks a major strategic shift in the effort to undermine Castro's dictatorship. The House reflects the new divide as well. Before it are two major proposals—the Bridges to the Cuban People Act of the "normalizers" and the Cuba Internal Opposition Assistance Act of the pro-embargo school—each introduced with approximately eighty co-sponsors. Both bills claim to advance the cause of democratic transition in Cuba, but there is virtually no overlap in their congressional support.

It remains to be seen what Congress will do, but it is clear that the Lieberman-Helms Solidarity Act marks the boldest departure into new territory in U.S. Cuba policy. Modeled after the Solidarity approach that helped to bring about democracy in Poland, the bill seeks to rebut accusations that the isolation approach has done nothing for the Cuban people. By providing $100 million in fax machines, telecommunication equipment and other forms of aid to opponents of dictatorship in Cuba, the hardliners can maintain support for sanctions while claiming a form of political activism focused on Cuba itself.

But aside from the host of logistical questions raised by the proposed legislation, the Solidarity Act may have the unintended effect of undermining the legitimacy of Cuban dissident groups, who today stand falsely accused of being on the U.S. payroll. Unlike the support to Poland in the 1980s, the high level of public scrutiny such a proposal will face within both the United States and Cuba could undermine its purpose. When Castro heard of the proposal on a state visit to Portugal, he reportedly announced that it was "an excellent idea." He should know; it is not the first time, after all, that an act designed to harm him stood to have precisely the opposite effect.

Cuban Americans: A House Divided

THE NEW divide in congressional views on Cuba has been mirrored by a long-simmering tension in the CANF that burst into public view in the summer of 2001.

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Contrary to the accepted image, Cuban Miami has experienced a steady diversification in opinion on U.S. Cuba policy over the last decade. A Florida International University poll taken in October 2000 showed that a majority of this population supports selling food and medicine to Cuba, aiding the activities of human rights groups there, lifting the travel ban, and establishing a national dialogue between Cuba and the United States. Nevertheless, a large majority of Cuban Miami—62.4 percent—favors continuing the embargo, a view perhaps bolstered by the fact that one-third of the Cuban-American community expects major political changes to occur in Cuba within the next two to five years.

These somewhat ambivalent attitudes are now reflected within the CANF. While the CANF has consistently advocated a hard-line anti-Castro position, a rift has emerged between the founding generation and younger Cuban Americans. That rift is illustrated by the controversy caused by members who feel that CANF President Jorge Mas Santos has been softening the foundation's opposition to Castro championed by his late father, Jorge Mas Canosa. What had been a latent conflict became apparent when board member Ninoska Perez Castellon abruptly resigned in late July, accusing Mas Santos of running the foundation as a dictatorship fit for Castro himself. In the following weeks, a score of hard-line board members resigned as well, proclaiming their distaste for the more moderate course being chartered by the foundation.

These resignations may be a harbinger of things to come. Growing dissension in Cuban-American ranks bears special significance for Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) and Bob Menendez (D-NJ), the three Cuban-American members of the House of Representatives. As legislators who have built their congressional careers advocating an uncompromising stance against the Castro government, a tilt toward moderation would represent a dramatic reversal of position. But as the U.S. embargo of Cuba enters its fortieth year, the generational divide between younger and older Cuban Americans may eventually dictate a tilt toward dialogue and away from isolation. The recent emergence of new Cuban-American organizations lobbying for the end of sanctions indicates that the pro-embargo crowd is losing its monopoly on Cuban-American opinion. Will there come a time when the anti-Castro passion of Cuban-American leaders will become a liability, not a strength, in the eyes of their principal constituency?

The Unfinished Business of U.S.-Cuba Relations

THE NEW divide in U.S.-Cuba relations—between western farmers and anti-Castro ideologues, between legislators who favor dialogue with the Cuban regime and those who prefer to subvert it—marks the latest stage in the American relationship with Cuba. Whether this new stage will look much different from the old one, however, is still not clear, at least in the short term. Despite more congressional pressure to relax the embargo, opponents of relaxation have not only been active themselves, but they currently have the support of the White House. This is no small matter.

It is true that President Bush has continued the Clinton Administration's policy of granting (yet another) six-month waiver of the controversial Title III of Helms-Burton (which allows U.S. nationals to sue companies "trafficking" in expropriated property in Cuba). But in almost every other aspect of U.S. Cuba policy, Bush has pushed for measures that must please the harder-line Cuban-American constituents in south Florida. Early in the administra-

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tion, Secretary of State Colin Powell ruled out the possibility of lifting the sanctions while Castro remains in power, and the President ordered the Treasury Department to enhance and expand enforcement of current prohibitions on trade and travel, as well as to strictly limit remittances. By commanding the Office of Foreign Assets Control to pursue a level of enforcement not seen under the Clinton Administration, Bush has positioned himself as an essential asset for the anti-Castro hardliners in Congress. In early January, too, Bush authorized the appointment of Otto Reich as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Reich, a prominent Cuban-American diplomat, faced strong opposition from the Democrat-controlled Senate, led by Senator Dodd. His past lobbying efforts for the Helms-Burton legislation, and well-known support for the current sanctions, signals that the State Department will remain tough on Cuba. The President's slim electoral victory in Florida, coupled with the upcoming gubernatorial contest of his brother Jeb Bush, suggests that the White House will take a firm stand against normalization. Nixon may have gone to Beijing in 1972, but there will be no Bush in Havana in 2002.

Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether a policy that began with the directive of John F. Kennedy will need to be defended by the veto of George W. Bush. Most signs still point to a coming showdown on Cuba between pragmatists and ideologues within the Republican Party, between the older Cuban-American stalwarts and the more moderate younger generation, and between congressional reformers and the current leadership in the House of Representatives and the White House. Most observers believe that it is only a matter of time before the embargo is lifted—but who knows if Fidel's lease on life will be lifted first? The oddities of American politics being what they are, no one can be absolutely certain that the embargo will not last another forty years. But Semper Fidel? No; that, surely, is impossible. □

> It is a characteristic (and annoying) conceit of liberal internationalism that no other type of internationalism exists. Thus liberals have a hard time grasping that a conservative internationalist such as Bush can value alliances and organizations—but as instruments, not ends in themselves. To consult with allies is not to run a focus group. . . .
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> —Ramesh Ponnuru, "Get Realist", *National Review*, January 6, 2002

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Popper's Return Engagement

The Open Society in an Era of Globalization

Neil McInnes

THE NOTION of a contrast between open and closed societies, which was introduced by Henri Bergson and made popular by Karl Popper, is now familiar even to people who have read neither the former's *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (1932) nor the latter's *The Open Society and its Enemies* (1945). We all make the rough and ready ideal distinction between an open society that admits anyone who will comply with several abstract general requirements, and in which, once admitted, we can see most of what is going on and freely express our opinion about it; and a closed society that imposes unquestioning conformity with a tangle of concrete obligations, and in which members cannot know much of what is going on at the top and could not express an opinion if they did know.

A current example of the former would be a society that defines its openness in such general terms that it ends up granting even ill-intentioned foreign fanatics easy entry, freedom of movement, access to financial and vocational facilities, and undisturbed use of public goods for terrorist purposes. A recent example of the second would be a society in thrall to a half-blind zealot that forbids genuine education, limits communication, drives out its trained talents and leaves half the remainder stumbling about in a *burka*.

Bergson and Popper did not go to that level of detail in specifying open and closed societies; they were speculative philosophers with no particular qualification or interest in political studies. It is nevertheless useful to look more closely at their respective specifications, not so much to see what they got right (which was plenty), as to notice the dynamic or historical perspective they used. While denying prophecy and pooh-poohing historical inevitability, both plainly saw the open society as mankind's common destiny. The persistence of closed societies would be the cause of recurrent wars, said Bergson, but wars among themselves rather than wars waged by closed societies against open ones. For Popper the impulse to the closed society would be the cause of recurrent revolt against freedom and reason within societies that were trying to make the transition from one condition to the other.

For Bergson, the primitive closed society attached the strictest obligation to custom, and the device on its banner read "Authority, Hierarchy, Immobility." It was self-centered, warlike, cohesive and disciplined by the absolute authority of a chief and of a static religion. It fit "the pattern of our species as the ant-heap fits the ant", and its members cared nothing for the rest of humanity. In sharp contrast

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was the open society, which began as a dream and was still an ideal, but one to which the democracies were making progress. In intention it was open to all humanity; it encouraged diversity rather than conformity; its religion and its morality were flexible and adaptable; it conferred rights. Such a society was our natural destiny but, wrote Bergson: "We do not believe in the fatality of history. . . . There is no unescapable historic law" carrying us toward it. Its coming would be, perhaps, something like what we now call globalization, but it would go beyond markets and materialism to a spiritual transformation.

Here Bergson's besetting sin of rhapsody got the better of him. He foretold an open society the freedom and spontaneity of which would express the mystical *élan* pervading the universe. He warned, however—and here it is relevant to recall that Bergson was an exact contemporary of Sigmund Freud—that in human progress "the acquired overlay the natural" but does not oust it. The dispositions that supported the closed society "subsist immutable deep within all of us." Therefore, he averred, "the tendencies of the closed society have . . . persisted ineradicable in the society that is on the way to becoming an open one." The danger of relapse was obvious. Writing in 1932, it is possible that Bergson had an eye on Germany, and on the recrudescence of murderous tribalism taking shape there.

Karl Popper certainly had his eye on Germany, for he called the denunciation of the closed society written in his New Zealand bolthole "my war effort." It bore the telltale mark of many such war efforts: while stigmatizing the closed society imposed by Nazism, it was prudently discreet about identical conditions in our wartime ally, the Soviet Union. Marx was lavishly praised as one of the great liberators of mankind, and Stalin was commended for "making bold and often successful experiments in social engineering." This sort of complaisance toward communism was not uncommon during the war; Hayek sinned similarly if less egregiously in *The Road to Serfdom*. In later editions and under Hayek's influence, Popper corrected his aim, and *The Open Society* became one of the gospels of the campaign against the closed society of Stalinism.

Years later Popper's benign attitude toward Marx and communism (redolent of the Red Vienna of his youth) paid an unexpected dividend: he was taken up in China. In 1987 at a conference in Wuhan, Fan Dainian and Du Ruji (both of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and Shanghai philosopher Ji Shu-Li agreed that Popper's ideas were of the first importance to the Chinese people. After covering themselves by citing Popper's Marxist credentials, the trio told a doubtlessly surprised Chinese leadership that they themselves were true Popperians, for they had abandoned "utopian social engineering" for "what Popper calls piecemeal social engineering." Nothing was said of what Popper calls the closed society, lest some of the leadership's fresh Popperian laurels wilt instantly.[1]

Popper has received more critical celebration of late in the West, both in symposia such as *Popper's Open Society after Fifty Years: The Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper*,[2] and in a massive biography, *Karl Popper: The Formative Years*, by Malachi Haim Hacohen.[3] Unlike his

[1]Jiang Tianji and W.H. Newton-Smith, eds., *Popper in China* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

[2]Ian Jarvie and Sandra Pralong, eds., *Popper's Open Society after Fifty Years: The Continuing Relevance of Karl Popper* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).

[3]Malachi Haim Hacohen, *Karl Popper: The Formative Years* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

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Chinese acolytes, these scholars are keenly interested in what Popper says about the closed society. Popper begins: "In what follows, the magical or tribal or collectivist society will also be called the *closed society*, and the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions, the *open society.*" Closed societies differ among themselves but all are marked by "their magical or irrational attitude towards the customs of social life, and the corresponding rigidity of those customs." Their taboos and obligations exempt men from moral problems: there is never any doubt about how to act. What must be done might be difficult but it involves no personal responsibility, only a group responsibility based on magical ideas. In later editions, following Hayek, Popper identified the closed/open contrast with that between concrete social relations, which are face-to-face and personal, with abstract relations, which are impersonal and anonymous. As the latter come to predominate, Popper theorized, the society moves from closed to open.

Popper was never one for definitions (not out of laziness but on closely argued logical grounds), so what he says about the open society has to be pieced together. He did not identify open societies with any particular political or economic regime—not with free-market capitalism, for which, as a social democrat and former Marxist he had little sympathy, nor with political democracy, in which he saw little but a mechanism for voting governments out of office. (Hayek had this same blinkered vision of democracy as something that happens once every two, four or seven years, rather than the procedures of everyday public life.) The open society is simply the locus of "the traditions of a free people", the site of myriad personal decisions. It liberates the critical facilities of human beings.

Actually, there is little to be gained from more elaborate definitions; on the contrary, it is easy to exaggerate the differences between closed and open and end up with useless "ideal types" that have never really existed. Besides, no matter how stark the contrast, such contrast does not by itself necessarily entail clash or conflict. Closed societies can stew in their own juice indefinitely and disturb no one else, while the era of directly forcing modernity on "backward" (traditional) peoples was one chapter—the "colonial" one—that is now concluded in the history of the open society. What interested Popper—and it is the main reason we bother today with the concept of the open and the closed society—is what can go wrong in the transition from one to the other when modernizing forces are unleashed *within* a traditional culture.

What can happen, said Popper, is that the privileged, educated strata of the old order (not the common people, who are merely uncomfortable with the new ways) can seek to arrest the opening up of a society they have been used to rule. They will resort to violence, impose tyranny, begin a reign of terror against the innovators. They will seek the support, including even the armed intervention, of any other closed society that has managed to arrest modernizing trends. They will attack prominent symbols of the open society wherever they find them. Although their slogan is "back to the society of our fathers", they themselves are "morally rotten"; nihilism is common among them. And they will try to wrap the whole business in "a hypocritical and even cynical exploitation of religious sentiments." Although educated themselves, they will lead what soon becomes a "revolt against reason and freedom." Such reflections are surely relevant to the question that Daniel Pipes recently posed in these pages—Does poverty cause militant Islam? Popper, too, would probably say no; it is the insecurity of a challenged privileged class that is the

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more likely source of violent reaction.

Despite the ferocity of this counterattack, the defense of the closed society fails, for there can be no turning back. We can never return to the

> alleged innocence and beauty of the closed society. . . . The more we try to return to the heroic age of tribalism, the more surely we arrive at the Inquisition, at the Secret Police, and at a romanticized gangsterism. . . . [W]e must end with the most brutal and violent destruction of all that is human. *There is no return to a harmonious state of nature. If we turn back, then we must go the whole way—we must return to the beasts.* (Popper's italics.)

Popper's Plato

IT IS OBVIOUS that the passion behind this eloquence stems from a horror of Nazism, and yet one cannot help being struck by the relevance of much of it to the irruption of antimodern violence, notably in Islamic societies, in our own time. So one is tempted to ask what Popper's eloquence is worth as sociology: Where are the historical cases of a closed society cracking up in this way, under what Popper calls "the strain of civilization", on the path to the open society? He himself produces only one case—Greece in the 6th and 5th centuries BCE—but he treats it in such depth that it fills his first volume, "The Spell of Plato", entirely.

The Greeks, Popper says, were the first to take the step from tribalism to launch the "great revolution" that is the transition from the closed to the open society. This particular transition started with overpopulation among the Athenian ruling class of landed proprietors. They sought to relieve the pressure by ritual colonization, the foundation of "daughter societies" overseas. The consequent seafaring, foreign trade and imperialism threatened to dissolve the old ways of life; by the 6th century BCE, revolt and reaction had begun, emulating the resistance put up by threatened tribalism in Sparta. "*The strain of civilization was beginning to be felt*", stressed Popper. The oligarchs, the privileged or formerly privileged ruling class of Athens, led the charge against what they saw as one complex: democracy, monetary commercialism and naval policy. They sought the intervention of "the arrested oligarchic tribalism of Sparta"; the educated men led this betrayal, which became the Peloponnesian War. After the fall of Athens, the Spartans installed their puppets, the Thirty Tyrants, who began a reign of terror that in just eight months claimed as many lives as had ten years of war. Yet ultimately the reign of terror failed.

We have a witness to this first breakdown of a nascent, opening society, a hostile witness whose own family was implicated in the treacherous reaction, namely Plato. Popper says his aim is "to present Plato as a totalitarian party-politician, unsuccessful in his immediate and practical undertakings, but in the long run only too successful in his propaganda for the arrest and overthrow of a civilization he hated." His *Republic* was a model for an authoritarian and immobile closed society. Popper also tries, quite unfairly, to pin a charge of historicism—the belief in laws of history that warrant prediction of the future—on Plato. The only credit Plato gets is that he, "with deep sociological insight, found that his contemporaries were suffering under a severe strain, and that this strain was due to the social revolution that had begun with the rise of democracy and individualism."

Anti-Plato diatribes are an old tradition that periodically rediscovers itself with surprise (as with, not least, Georges Sorel's *Le Procès de Socrate*, 1889). Popper wrote his contribution to this tradition with the enthusiasm of one determined to

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scandalize the learned world. He succeeded hugely, and after fifty years his interpretation has survived as a one-sided but arguable presentation. What has been criticized is the fact that he raised only one instance of the crack-up of a society in transition, ancient Greece. In his second volume, "The High Tide of Prophecy", he had a field day exposing the historical necromancy of Hegel and Marx without ever suggesting that *their* historicism had anything to do with such events as unfolded in ancient Athens. Therefore, say critics, there is a "sociological deficit", a lack of evidence in Popper.

This rather misses the point. Popper was not practicing sociology and he was not a social scientist. (If he had been, he would have countered, as he argues in his many works on the philosophy of science, that science is not advanced by induction—by basing generalizations on a collection of instances—but by means of bold hypotheses that can then be submitted to attempts at falsification. This is a position within the philosophy of science that has been subjected to "shattering polemic" as fundamentally irrationalist, but this is not our concern here.[4]) The point, rather, is that Popper was operating with the same psychological theory as Bergson: the primitive mentality of the closed society survives in Western man and surfaces again in times of stress. The revolution the Greeks began is still going on, forever threatened by the "perennial revolt against freedom." That is why he only needs one instance: "This struggle touches our feelings, for it is still going on within ourselves. Plato was the child of a time that is still our own." The strain of civilization "is still felt even in our own day, especially in times of social change. It is the strain created by the effort which life in an open and partially abstract society continually demands from us. . . . It is the price we have to pay for being human." Westerners do not have to live through experiences similar to those of the Athenians at the time of the first breakdown of a transitional society; it is enough for the going to get rough for them to suffer the same primitive emotions, to relive "the birth trauma of our civilization."

Between Contingency and Necessity

IF POPPER'S curious version of the doctrine of reminiscence, or of the return of the repressed, were to stand up, it would be completely ethnocentric. It could have no relevance to races and nations that had never heard of Plato's Athens and that are not civilizationally descended from them. But that Popper was being ethnocentric had already been noticed by those who asked why a man writing in New Zealand, with the wreckage of the old closed Polynesian society all about him, would go looking for his examples in far-off ancient Greece. His reason was that he was exclusively concerned with Western nations, which were tied to a Greek heritage that Polynesia knew nothing of.

That does not invalidate Popper's account of how transitional societies may come to grief, however. Instead, it clears the way for applying it to societies that have no memory of Greece or significant intellectual link to it, and are having their own first experience of the break-up of the closed society—for example, Islamic societies that have been pitchforked by the petroleum industry and the avalanche of Western pop culture into a modernity that unnerves them. Might not their privileged educated classes be reacting like that of Plato's time, resorting to tyranny and terror, and to the exploitation of religion? And if they are—and they are—can we be

[4]D.C. Stove, *Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982).

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confident that they, too, will ultimately fail? It is questions like these that make Popper's return engagement as fascinating as his first.

But where would we get that confidence? Surely not from the writings of Bergson and Popper, who will have nothing of historical inevitability. Among other things, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* is a sustained attack on all varieties of historicism in the sense of historical prediction based on supposed laws of history. And yet Bergson and Popper both insist, as Ian Jarvie writes, that "history is the struggle to navigate the transition from an earlier and less desirable form of society to a later and more desirable form."[5] The transition, they warn, is not smooth, but revolts and relapses are nonetheless only temporary. History *is* a one-way street that leads from the closed to the open society. So despite all that Popper says against historicism, there is a Grand Narrative of Western history in him after all. Critics say there is "a whiff of Hegel" here, and there is. There is also more than a whiff of common sense, for no one really doubts that, however long it takes, the open society will eclipse the closed. If our philosophers have worked themselves into self-contradiction on the point, it is by pushing their campaign against historical inevitability too far, pushing it to the extent of denying entirely that there are regularities and long-term trends in history, laws in social and economic affairs.

That is surely the case with Popper. He was, as Hacohen's biography shows, at heart a lifelong social democrat and an exponent of piecemeal social engineering. This latter is a form of extreme voluntarism; it asserts that "we" (whoever that is!) can at any time take control of institutions, run them, redesign them, and in general turn them to our purposes. For that faith, we need complete historical lawlessness, the absence of objective obstacles to our will and of any contrary historical drift. But of course there are irresistible long-term trends in history. So, rather paradoxically, Popper insists on contingency in history so that human effort can seem capable of achieving necessary, piecemeal historical advance.

This paradox can be problematic. Just as *The Open Society and Its Enemies* began its long and successful career there set in a massive historical drift with all the force of inevitability that no one could resist: the dissolution of Europe's overseas empires. Even colonies that had no wish for "freedom" were cut loose by metropoles that knew they were doing wrong—take Papua New Guinea, for example—because the winds of change were blowing so hard that resistance was useless.

Or take the case of the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet empire, which seem to us now to have been inevitable and seemed so beforehand to a few wise men and women. Because Popper feels obliged to deny that anything happens for more than contingent, meaningless, accidental reasons, he argued, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union: "First, the Soviet regime might have lasted longer still, perhaps forever; it was not some law or destiny but a series of definite events—and definite decisions taken by real-life people at their own risk—which brought about its collapse."[6] But this is preposterous. Was nothing more general proven, nothing about the necessary failure of central planning, nothing about the inevitable bankruptcy of tyrannies that deny intellectual freedom? If communism collapsed almost by accident, why not start again but be more careful next time?

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[5]Jarvie and Pralong, pp. 71–2.

[6]Popper, *The Lesson of This Century*, interviews with Giancarlo Bosetti (London and New York: Routledge, 1997).

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Come the Culture Cult

POPPER'S political nominalism and voluntarism did not diminish his faith that the transition from the closed to the open society was proper, necessary and ultimately inevitable for all peoples. So he must have been astonished by the rise of the "culture cult", the doctrine that closed societies must be protected from modernization since all cultures are equally valuable and deserving of preservation; as Ranke would say, each is *unmittelbar zu Gott.*[7] To see how opinions have changed on this, one might consider one of the few references Popper made to the Maori when he lived eight years among them. In *The Open Society* he says, "The early Greek tribal society resembles in many respects that of peoples like the Polynesians, the Maoris for instance. Small bands of warriors, usually living in fortified settlements, ruled by tribal chiefs or kings, or by aristocratic families, were waging war against one another on sea as well as on land." There were differences, of course, but the two tribal societies had in common "their magical or irrational attitude towards the customs of social life, and the corresponding rigidity of those customs." For all I know, the Maori of that day would (apart from frowning at the incorrect plural "Maoris") have taken no offense, perhaps have been flattered, by this comparison with the ancient Greeks. Not so today.

Today Popper's comparison would be seen as an inconsiderate and possibly racist reminder that until 1840 the Maori lived in a cruel, ignorant, authoritarian society, "closed intellectually, socially and politically", devoted to perpetual warfare, environmental depredation and cannibalism—not occasional ritual cannibalism but cannibalism as a regular source of food. Roger Sandall says, "A long century of moral transfiguration has finally reached its apogee. With the cosmetic improvements of sundry members of the Culture Cult, only the most decorous and edifying version of the Polynesian past is allowed on public view—a genteel world of wise ecologists, mystical sages, gifted artists, heroic navigators, and pacifists who would not hurt a fly."[8]

A similar falsification of the past has been inflicted on the Australian aborigenes, American Indians and most other peoples whose traditional society has been irreparably damaged by Western conquest. To please the culture cult they are condemned to stay in the wreckage of their old closed society—defined as "traditional"—rather than seek improvement in the open society around them—castigated as a type of imperialism or colonialism. One consequence is that the grandchildren of men and women who could and did read books in English are today illiterate, both in English and in their "native" tongues. Academic anthropologists are content to see them remain illiterate, as well as unemployable, sick and drunk, rather than risk having them lose the tatters of their old culture in the new.

This story of the contemporary glorification of the closed society does not take us far from Popper, for in recent times we have learned a lot about the conditions in which he lived as he wrote *The Open Society and its Enemies.*[9] He spent several years in bitter contention with the head of his department at the university in Christchurch, an anthropologist named Ivan Sutherland (1897–1952). Sutherland wrote in praise of Maori society and had

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[7]Roger Sandall, *The Culture Cult: Designer Tribalism and Other Essays* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001).

[8]Ibid., p. 114.

[9]Colin Simkin, "The Birth of the Open Society", *Quadrant* (December 1990); Peter Biskup, "Popper in Australasia, 1937–1945", *Quadrant* (June 2000); and Sandall, "Karl Popper in New Zealand", in *The Culture Cult.*

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the delusion that he could actually join a Maori tribe and be accepted into its culture. He pursued this delusion until he began to lose his reason, and took his own life. Thus, the contest of the closed and the open society was not for Popper, as it was for most of his readers, a bookish matter, but an issue of flesh and blood, a painful daily struggle of intellect against unreason.

IT WAS SO, too, for another reason. Most people outside the culture cult have an attachment to the open society that is no more urgent or present in mind than their support of motherhood. Not so Popper. He was dedicated to the ideal of the open society with a rare passion, with an enthusiasm and a breadth of vision that often still shock his disciples. They shock his biographer, for one. Hacohen is so dismayed by the extent of openness that Popper envisages for society that he sets out on the task (curious in a biographer) of rescuing his subject from his dearest beliefs, in the name of causes that Popper would have dismissed as merely sectional and limiting.



Cyril Hoschl

Popper, 1994

Popper envisaged that in graduating to the open society, men would ultimately shed all of the old, partisan allegiances, especially nationalism and confessionalism, as he himself had done in leaving his native land and in denying all connection with the Jewish faith of his ancestors. "Racial pride", he declaimed, "is not only stupid but wrong, even if provoked by racial hatred. All nationalism or racialism is evil, and Jewish nationalism is no exception." His uncompromising cosmopolitanism and his resolute secularism, writes Hacohen, "left Popper a permanent exile, a citizen only in an imaginary Republic of Science. . . . Discounting all national, ethnic and religious identity as culturally primitive and politically reactionary, Popper posited a universalist vision of the scientific community and the Open Society where none of them counted."

Hacohen's several references to science are judicious, for Popper conceived of the truly open society as modelled on the scientific community (or what he imagined the scientific community to be, which it probably is not): policies would be put forward the way scientists put up hypotheses, and political programs would be implemented in the spirit of experimental science, on a trial-and-error basis. For anything like that ever to happen, all the passions and interests of real politics would have to drain away. So they would have to before Popper's social engineering could be applied: it assumed that all social issues were basically technical problems that could be solved in a calm, rational trial-and-error way. That he proposed "piecemeal" rather than "utopian" engineering changes nothing; politics is not just engineering, and the open society will never be just a laboratory.

"Like Kant", says a critic, "Popper is so deeply committed to a form of reductive and atomic individualism—refusing to grant even the existence, let alone the importance, of all forms of 'collective' behavior—that he is unable to provide anything but the 'thinnest' or most

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mechanical and instrumental—technological—interpretations of the institutions and traditions upon which the future of liberal societies depends."[10] In imagining the open society, Popper was under the influence of the Austrian socialists' *Sozialtechnik* and the bloodless politics of the Vienna Circle of logical positivists: the vision of a society that could reform itself scientifically and where science would determine ethics, politics and economics. Ironically, perhaps, it reminds one of the world of Plato's *Republic* at its worst.

A society as open and abstract as the one Popper sought sounds like a cold, draughty place to those of us who come still trailing clouds of partisan loyalty from the old closed society. Before every last one of us is divested of the attachments that made the old society cohesive and secure, we would have to undergo a moral transformation not far short of that mystical rebirth that Henri Bergson saw at the dawn of *his* open society. In the meantime, while sincerely preferring the open over the closed polity, most people would nevertheless shrink from a society as open, as abstract and as impersonal as Popper (and Hayek) conceived of. □

[10]Douglas Williams, *Truth, Hope and Power: The Thought of Karl Popper* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989.)

Politics on Volcanic Soil

The mythical organization of society seems to be superseded by a rational organization. In quiet and peaceful times, in periods of relative stability and security, this rational organization is easily maintained. It seems to be safe against all attacks. But in politics the equipoise is never completely established. What we find here is a labile rather than a static equilibrium. In politics we are always living on volcanic soil. We must be prepared for abrupt convulsions and eruptions. In all critical moments of man's social life, the rational forces that resist the rise of the old mythical conceptions are no longer sure of themselves. In these moments the time for myth has come again. For myth has not been really vanquished and subjugated. It is always there, lurking in the dark and waiting for its hour and opportunity. This hour comes as soon as the other binding forces of man's social life, for one reason or another, lose their strength and are no longer able to combat the demonic mythical powers.

—Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (1946)

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Freedom and Duty

Pericles and Our Times

Roger Kimball

MIDWAY through the long article on Afghanistan in the eleventh edition of *The Encyclopedia Britannica*, one comes across this description of the inhabitants of that ancient mountain country:

> The Afghans, inured to bloodshed from childhood, are familiar with death, and audacious in attack, but easily discouraged by failure; excessively turbulent and unsubmissive to law or discipline; apparently frank and affable in manner, especially when they hope to gain some object, but capable of the grossest brutality when that hope ceases. They are unscrupulous in perjury, treacherous, vain and insatiable, passionate in vindictiveness, which they will satisfy at the cost of their own lives and in the most cruel manner. Nowhere is crime committed on such trifling grounds, or with such general impunity, though when it is punished the punishment is atrocious. Among themselves the Afghans are quarrelsome, intriguing and distrustful; estrangements and affrays are of constant occurrence.

This refreshingly frank passage, by Colonel Sir Thomas Hungerford Holdich, was published in 1910. I was put in mind of Sir Thomas's commentary just before Christmas, when the *New York Times* took its quote of the day from one Faqir Muhammad, an officer in one of the many squabbling anti-Taliban armies: "This is what Afghanistan is", he said. "We kill each other." Indeed. And not only each other, so the American and British troops now enjoying the hospitality of the Afghans would do well to acquaint themselves with this travel advisory. It is as pertinent today as it was a century ago.

Sir Thomas's remarks are valuable not only because of their contemporaneity but also because they help us set today's issues in historical context. "The farther backward you can look", Winston Churchill once observed, "the farther forward you are likely to see", and, indeed, as the shock of September 11 gives way to the reality of America at war, it is particularly useful to ponder Churchill's remark. The pressure of contemporary events crowds us into the impatient confines of the present, rendering us insensible to the lessons of history—not least the lesson that tomorrow's dramas are typically unforeseen in the scripts we abide by today. Indeed, language itself conspires to keep us in the dark.

Consider that marvelous phrase "the foreseeable future." With what cheery abandon we employ it! Yet what a nugget of unfounded optimism those three words encompass. How much of the future, real-

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ly, do we foresee? A month? A day? A minute? "In a minute", as T. S. Eliot said in "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock", "there is time/For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse." So much of life is a juggling with probabilities, a conjuring with uncertainties, that we often forget upon what stupendous acts of faith even the prudent conduct of life depends. On September 10, 2001, none of us imagined that New York's twin towers would not continue standing for "the foreseeable future." Yet today, the events of September 11 can seem almost inevitable. Reasons have been furnished for every detail. Pundits have rehearsed knowing genealogies for all the actors. Plausible itineraries have been repeated until they seem like predictions. A look at the literature shows that all of those reasons and explanations were available on September 10; indeed, some had been propounded for years, but they lacked the traction that events give to hindsight. They were not part of the foreseeable future until that future, unforeseen, overtook us.

Such homely incapacities can provide a kind of signpost for us all. Even the extraordinary circumstance of wartime begets its anesthetizing versions of the ordinary. Our complacency exposed us to surprise on September 11; but new complacencies now compete for our allegiance. In part, this results from the pressure of familiarity. Sooner or later, a state of permanent emergency comes to seem like a normal state of affairs. Ceaseless vigilance by nature ceases to be vigilant. But there are other ingredients involved in the return of complacency. Already one senses impatience on the part of the media. From the very beginning of this conflict, President Bush warned that the struggle against terrorism would be measured in years, not weeks or months, but a protracted battle does not accord well with a 24-hour news cycle, with its demand for screaming headlines, new developments, clear victories.

While there is no single antidote to these liabilities, Churchill was right about history providing the best corrective to our myopia. We need to look backward if we are to relax the constrictions of the present. The "relevance" sought for the present time is best acquired from guideposts that have outlived the hectoring gabble of contemporary fashion. We are often asked if our "values" have kept pace, have "evolved", with the dramatic changes our political and social reality has seen in the past several decades. But values do not so much "evolve" as change keys. Our underlying humanity—with its essential moral needs and aspirations—remains constant, which is why, for example, the emotional and psychological taxonomy that Aristotle provides in his *Ethics* and *Rhetoric* is as fresh to humanity today as it was two and a half millennia ago.

A Funeral's Inspiration

WHICH BRINGS me to Pericles. Early in the Peloponnesian War, a plague swept through Athens, killing thousands and demoralizing the survivors. In a rallying speech, Pericles (himself soon to die) noted that, "When things happen suddenly, unexpectedly, and against all calculation, it takes the heart out of a man." Against the temptations of apathy and acquiescence, Pericles urged his listeners to recall the greatness of Athens, to face calamity with an "unclouded mind and react quickly against it." It sounds grand, but what lessons does the great Greek statesman have for us today as we embark on what promises to be a long struggle with an often faceless foe? To answer this question, one first wants to know what it is that Pericles stood for. To what sort of society was he pointing, and what way of life, what vision of the human good, did he propound?

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In his history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recounts the public funeral oration that Pericles, as commander of the army and first citizen of Athens, delivered to commemorate those fallen after the first year—the first of 27—of war with Sparta.[1] The short speech is deservedly one of the most famous in history. It outlines the advantages of Athenian democracy, a bold new system of government that was not simply a political arrangement but a way of life. There were two keynotes to that way of life: freedom and tolerance, on the one hand; responsible behavior and attention to duty on the other. The two, Pericles insisted, go together: We Athenians are "free and tolerant in our private lives; but in public affairs we keep to the law"—including, he added in an important proviso, "those unwritten laws"—the lawlike commands of taste, manners and morals—"which it is an acknowledged shame to break." Freedom and tolerance, Pericles suggested, are blossoms supported by roots that reach deep into the soil of duty.

Athens had become the envy of the world, partly because of its wealth, partly because of its splendor, partly because of the freedom enjoyed by its citizens. Athens' navy was unrivaled, its empire unparalleled, its civic and cultural institutions unequalled. The city was "open to the world", a cosmopolitan center; political life was "free and open", as was private life: "We do not get into a state with our next-door neighbor", Pericles said, "if he enjoys himself in his own way."

Of course, from the perspective of 21st-century America, democracy in Athens seems limited and imperfect. Women were entirely excluded from citizenship and a large slave class underwrote the material freedom of Athens' citizens. These things must be acknowledged, but must they be apologized for? Whenever 5th-century BCE Athens is mentioned these days, it seems that what is stressed are the limitations rather than the achievements of Athenian democracy. But concentrating on these limitations is like complaining that the Wright brothers neglected to provide transatlantic service with their airplanes. The extraordinary achievement of Athens was to formulate the ideal of equality before the law. To be sure, that ideal was not perfectly instantiated in Athens; perhaps it will never be perfectly instantiated anywhere, it being in the nature of ideals to inspire emulation but also to exceed it.

Nevertheless, the new ideal of equality before the law and the cultivation of an open, tolerant society made Athens the model of democracy for all the republics that sought to follow the path of freedom—just as America is the model of freedom today. Pericles was right to boast: "Future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now." In Athens, then, after innumerable trials elsewhere, democracy finally managed to get off the ground and stay aloft. In Periclean Athens what mattered in assuming public responsibility, as Pericles said, was "not membership in a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses." To an extraordinary extent, within the limits of its franchise, Athens lived up to that ideal.

Life in Athens was not only free but also full. When the day's work was done, Pericles boasted, Athenians turned not simply to private pleasure but also to ennobling recreation "of all kinds for our spirits." For the Age of Pericles was also the age of the great dramatists, the age of Socrates, the great artist Phidias, and others. Freedom, skill and ambition conspired to make Athens a cultural as well as a political paragon.

A recurrent theme of the funeral oration is the importance of sound judgment,

[1]The funeral oration runs from book 2.35 to 2.65 of Thucydides' *History*.

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what Aristotle codified as the virtue of prudence. The blessing of freedom requires the ballast of duty, and informed judgment is the indispensable handmaiden of duty. A free society is one that nurtures the existential slack that tolerance and openness generate. Chaos and anarchy are forestalled by the intervention of politics in the highest sense of the term: deliberation and decision about securing the good life. When it comes to cultural activities, Pericles said, Athenians had learned to love beauty with moderation—the Greek word is εὐτελείας, "without extravagance"—and to pursue philosophy and the life of the mind "without effeminacy", ἄνευ μαλακίας.[2] Culture and the life of the mind were to be ennoblements of life, not an escape from its burdens, not decadent pastimes.

The exercise of sound judgment was required in other spheres as well. In their conduct of policy, Athenians strove to be bold, but prudent; i.e., effective. "We are", Pericles wrote, "capable at the same time of taking risks and of estimating them beforehand." The exercise of sound judgment was not simply an intellectual accomplishment; it was the tithe of citizenship. "We do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business", Pericles observed, "we say that he has no business here at all." He did not mean that every citizen had to be a politician, but that all citizens had a common stake in the commonwealth, and that this common stake brought with it responsibilities as well as privileges. In our own time, a time when everyone is clamoring for his or her "rights"—when new "rights" pop up like mushrooms—it is worth remembering that every right carries with it a corresponding duty. Some rights may be inalienable, but none is without price.

Something similar can be said about democracy. Today, the word "democracy" and its cognates are often used as fancy synonyms for mediocrity. Plans to "democratize" education or the arts or athletics are plans to eviscerate those activities, to lower standards and to pursue them as instruments of racial or sexual redress or some other form of social engineering. Tocqueville was right to warn about the dangers of generalizing the principle of equality that underlies democracy. Universalized, the principle of equality leads to egalitarianism, the ideology of equality, which threatens to overwhelm the impulse to achieve and to excel—"always to be best and to rise above others", as Homer put it in a classic expression of the agonistic spirit. Radical egalitarianism—egalitarianism uncorrected by the aspirations of excellence—would have us pretend that there are no important distinctions among people; where the pretense is impossible,

[2]In her essay "The Crisis in Culture", Hannah Arendt provocatively suggests that Pericles "is saying something like this: 'We love beauty within the limits of political judgment, and we philosophize without the barbarian vice of effeminacy.'" Arendt links political judgment with "that curious and ill-defined capacity we commonly call taste": "The activity of taste decides how this world, independent of its utility and our vital interests in it, is to look and sound. . . . [I]ts interest in the world is purely 'disinterested', and that means that neither the life interests of the individual nor the moral interests of the self are involved." Like political judgments, she says, judgments of taste operate by persuasion rather than demonstration, "the judging person—as Kant says quite beautifully—can only 'woo the consent of everyone else' in the hope of coming to an agreement with him eventually. This 'wooing' or persuading corresponds closely to what the Greeks called πείθειν, the convincing and persuading speech which they regarded as the typically political form of people talking with one another." *Between Past and Future* (New York: Penguin, 1968), pp. 213–24.

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it would have us enact compensatory programs to minimize, or at least to paper over, the differences. The results are a vast increase in self-deception, cultural degradation and bureaucratic meddlesomeness.

Pericles reminds us, however, that a passion for democracy need not entail the pursuit of mediocrity. Democracy is a high-maintenance form of government. Freedom requires the disciplines of restraint and circumspection if it is to flourish. Athenian democracy was animated by freedom—above all, the freedom to excel—and it inspired in citizens both a healthy competitive spirit and "shame", as Pericles said, at the prospect of "falling below a certain standard." In all this, Pericles noted, Athens was "an education to Greece", a model for its neighbors.



Corbis/Bettman

At the moment he spoke, near the beginning of a long and ultimately disastrous war, Pericles' words must have carried special resonance. In celebrating what the Athenians had achieved, he reminded them of all they stood to lose. His funeral oration was therefore not only an elegy but also a plea for resoluteness and a call to arms. Pericles was right: The open society depends upon the interdiction of forces calculated to destroy it. "We who remain behind", he said, "may hope to be spared the fate [of the fallen], but must resolve to keep the same daring spirit against the foe."

The view of society and individual responsibility that Pericles put forward was rooted in tradition but oriented toward the future. He did not think much of the custom of public funeral orations, he said, but he felt bound to observe it: "This institution was set up and approved by our forefathers, and it is my duty to follow the tradition." At the same time, Pericles reminds us of the claims of the future by stressing the future's main emissaries: the children of Athens. "It is impossible", he suggests, "for a man to put forward fair and honest views about our affairs if he has not . . . children whose lives are at stake."

Pericles' funeral oration has exercised a permanent fascination on the political imagination of the West. Modified by time and circumstance, his vision has proven peculiarly powerful. It was absorbed by Christendom in the 18th century and helped to inform the democratic principles that undergird British and American democracy. Although occasionally forgotten since, it has always returned to inspire apostles of freedom and tolerance. That is fortunate, for the view of society that Pericles described is not inevitable. It represents a choice that must constantly be renewed. It is one version of the good life for man. There are other, competing versions that we might find distinctly less attractive, but that, nevertheless, are capable of inspiring strong allegiance. This was true when Pericles spoke—his speech presupposes the contrast between the Athenian way of life and others inimical to it—and continues to be true. The spectacle of radical Islamists dancing joyfully in the street following news of the

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September 11 attacks should remind us of that fact.

Three Illusions

PERICLES' VISION of the good society as one alternative among others was dramatically sharpened by the events of September 11. That attack was not simply an attack on symbols of American capitalism and military might, nor was it simply a terrorist attack on American citizens. It was all those things but more. It was an attack on the idea of America as a liberal democratic society; it was an attack on an idea of society grounded in the ideals enunciated by Pericles. It was, as Benyamin Netanyahu put it, a furious salvo in "a war to reverse the triumph of the West."[3] Netanyahu's words should be constantly borne in mind lest the emollient tide of rationalization blunt the angry reality of those attacks. Rationalization would rescue some of our illusions that we are better off without.

Indeed, many illusions were challenged on September 11. One concerns the fantasies of academic multiculturalists, so-called—"so-called" because what falls under the name of multiculturalism in our colleges and universities today is really a polysyllabic form of mono-culturalism fueled by ideological hatred. Genuine multiculturalism involves a great deal of work, beginning with the arduous task of learning other languages, something most of those who call themselves multiculturalists are conspicuously loath to do. Think of the fatuous attack on "dead white European males" that stands at the center of the academic multiculturalist enterprise. As a specimen of that maligned species, one could hardly do better than Pericles. Not only is he a dead white European male, but he is one who embodied in his life and aspirations an ideal of humanity completely at odds with academic multiculturalism. He was patriarchal, militarist, elitist and Eurocentric—indeed, Hellenocentric, which is even worse.

The good news is that Pericles survived September 11. The spurious brand of multiculturalism that encourages us to repudiate "dead white European males" and insists that all cultures are of equal worth may finally be entering a terminal stage. Figures like Edward Said and Susan Sontag, Harold Pinter and Noam Chomsky continue to bay about the iniquity of America, the depredations of capitalism and so on, but their voices have been falling on increasingly deaf ears.

The liberal media, too, began by wringing its hands and wondering whether the coalition would hold, whether we were fair to "moderate" members of the Taliban, whether the Afghans were too wily for Americans, whether the United States was acting in too "unilateral" a fashion. On Christmas Eve, in a masterpiece of understatement, the *Wall Street Journal* ran a story under the headline "In War's Early Phase, News Media Showed a Tendency to Misfire." "This war is in trouble", quoth Daniel Schorr on NPR. At the end of October, R.W. Apple warned readers of the *New York Times* that "signs of progress are sparse." Every piece of possible bad news was—and still is—touted as evidence that we may have entered a "quagmire", that we are "overextended", "arrogant", "unresponsive" to the needs and desires of indigenes. It is too soon to say which way the rhetorical chips will ultimately fall. But, as of this writing, a constant string of victories has the liberal pundits baffled. They had been waiting for a repeat of Vietnam, and the Bush Administration disobliged by giving them a conflict in which America was in the right and was winning.

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[3]Quoted in George Will, "A Strike at the Pillars", *Washington Post*, September 14, 2001.

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The hollowness of the left-liberal wisdom about the war suggests another illusion challenged by the events of 9/11: that the world is basically a benevolent, freedom-loving place, and that if only other people had enough education, safe sex, and access to National Public Radio they would become pacific celebrants of democracy and tolerance. This is the temptation of utopia—Greek for "nowhere"—and it must be acknowledged that America's fortunate geographical position in the world has long encouraged certain versions of this temptation. The extraordinary growth of America's wealth and military power in the 20th century—like Athens' great wealth and power in the 5th century BCE—has kept the wolf from the door and the marauder from our throats. It has also abetted the illusion of invulnerability. But increased international mobility and the widespread dissemination of technological know-how have conspired to neutralize, or at least attenuate, those advantages. September 11 made it abundantly clear that we have implacable enemies, enemies we cannot hide from, effectively appease or negotiate with, enemies that will struggle to the death to destroy us. "Allahu Akbar!", shouted a group of Taliban prisoners, just before they set about detonating hand grenades, killing themselves and their guards. The supreme Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, put it with all possible clarity when he said that, for him and his followers, "The real matter is the extinction of America, and God willing, it will fall to the ground."

A third illusion challenged on September 11 concerns the morality of power. It has been fashionable among trendy academics, CNN commentators and other armchair utopians to pretend that the use of power by the powerful is by definition evil. Violence on the part of anyone claiming to be a victim, however, is excused as the product of "frustration" or "rage"—emotions that for mysterious reasons are held to be exonerating for the dispossessed but incriminating when exhibited by legitimate authority. Hence the ponderous scramble to uncover "root causes"; that is, the search for sociological alibis that might absolve the perpetrators of evil from the inconveniences of guilt. The French writer Charles Péguy was right: "Surrender is essentially an operation by means of which we set about explaining instead of acting."

This favorite liberal pastime has not been abandoned, but it looks increasingly forlorn. As Jonathan Rauch wittily put it shortly after the terrorist attacks, the cause of terrorism is terrorists. September 11 reminded us that with power comes responsibility. Power without resolution is perceived as weakness, and weakness is always dangerously provocative. In the aftermath of September 11, we in the West have been cautioned against exciting Islamic rage. Perhaps; but is it not salutary for our allies and our enemies alike to understand that American rage, too, is an unpleasant thing? Pericles commended the Athenians on their "adventurous" spirit that had "forced an entry into every sea and into every land." Everywhere, he noted, Athens "left behind . . . everlasting memorials of good done to our friends or suffering inflicted on our enemies."

Since the 1970s, we have tended to flinch from such frank talk; we shy away from talk of forcing anyone to do anything; we seem ashamed of acknowledging that we have enemies, let alone acknowledging that we wish them ill; we are embarrassed alike by the perquisites and the obligations of power. Such squeamishness is part of the "effeminacy" against which Pericles warned. We Americans desperately wish to be liked, but often forget that true affection depends upon respect.

At least since the end of the Vietnam conflict, the United States has vacillated

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in discharging its responsibilities to power. As Conrad Black put it recently in these pages, the terrorists of September 11

> added to a pattern of mostly unrequited damage done to the United States. Vietnam, Iran-Contra, Beirut, Saddam Hussein's survival of the Gulf War, Somalia, the bombing of the Saudi barracks, East African embassies, and the U.S.S. *Cole*, and Kosovo's incitement of the irresponsible notion of a cause worth killing but not dying for—all of this confirmed in their views those who want to believe that the United States is a paper tiger.[4]

In the wake of September 11, it appears that this policy of bellicose vacillation has finally changed. But one still hears plenty of voices urging, not caution, but abdication. The left-liberal establishment cannot long bear to see a strong America regnant. It was chastened by disaster but incited by the prospect of losing hold of its illusions. Yet there are also encouraging signs, not least President Bush's January 29 State of the Union address, that America is prepared to follow through on its promise to eradicate terrorism and hold responsible those states that sponsor, finance or abet it. In this it is reclaiming a central part of Pericles' vision. "Make up your minds", Pericles said toward the end of his great oration, "that happiness depends on being free, and freedom depends on being courageous. Let there be no relaxation in the face of the perils of the war."

AMONG THE neglected masterpieces of Victorian political thought is Walter Bagehot's *Physics and Politics*. Published in 1872, it outlines the requirements for the survival and advance of civilization. Bagehot's ideal civilization was the civilization that he himself inhabited: the liberal democratic polity of 19th-century Britain, where most disputes were settled in law courts and politics was pursued through discussion, not force of arms. But Bagehot was canny enough—one might say adult enough—to understand that such a polity had been made possible in the first instance by force, and that it could be maintained in the long run only through the distillates of force that economic might and military prowess represent. "History", Bagehot wrote, "is strewn with the wrecks of nations which have gained a little progressiveness at the cost of a great deal of hard manliness, and have thus prepared themselves for destruction as soon as the movements of the world gave a chance for it."[5]

Bagehot's observation more than a century ago echoes Pericles' funeral oration, and for all we know may have been inspired by it. Does Pericles point the way for us in the 21st century? He had better: the alternative is cultural suicide. □

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[4]Black, "What Victory Means, *The National Interest* (Winter 2001/02), p. 155.

[5]Bagehot, *Physics and Politics: Or, Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of "Natural Selection" and "Inheritance" to Political Society*, edited with an Introduction by Roger Kimball (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1998), p. 58.

Erratum

On page 5 of Joseph S. Nye's "Seven Tests" in the Winter 2001/02 issue, a quote from President George H.W. Bush was erroneously attributed to President George W. Bush. We regret the error; the author was in no way at fault.

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Cruise Control

A Case for Missile Defense

Michael O'Hanlon

THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have reshaped whole swaths of debate over U.S. foreign and national security policies. Certainly, the issue of homeland security is a case in point. In that context, it was inevitable that the various partisans and detractors of national missile defense, and those with contending views of how homeland security should be organized, would use the September 11 tragedy as evidence for their particular position. And they have. For example, those who have held the very idea of national missile defense to be a form of inanity—if not insanity—have argued that since no imaginable deployment of national missile defenses could have prevented the September 11 tragedy, this proves how bad an idea it is. This is a little like arguing that if a person has purchased homeowner's insurance, he or she has no need for auto or life or medical insurance. The dangers to the security of a nation are multiple, no less than the dangers to the security of individuals.

That said, it does not follow that all kinds of insurance policies are equally necessary or that all insurance products are equally wise and cost-effective investments. All such policies and products require study, for nations no less than for individuals. Many such studies are going forward. But while there are ongoing and fairly well-rehearsed debates afoot over homeland security organization and national missile defense, one area that has slipped through the cracks of public consciousness concerns defense against cruise missiles. The analysis that follows represents a study of the technical requirements and costs of a defense against cruise missiles.

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A National Cruise Missile Defense

THE UNITED States today utterly lacks an effective cruise missile defense plan. But apart from the obvious post-September 11 concern about the hijacking of domestic flights, defending against cruise missiles has probably become the most challenging air defense problem for the United States in this era.

Groups such as the Rumsfeld Commission focused elsewhere but did note the possible threat of cruise missiles, including those launched from ships off U.S. coasts—and they were right to do so. Cruise missiles are prevalent around the world, with 75 countries owning a total of about 75,000. Most at present are antiship missiles, but a number of countries are working on converting some to land-attack variants. Cruise missiles are small and relatively easy to hide on ships or

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other vehicles that could approach U.S. territory before the missile was fired. They are hard to detect when launched or even as they approach their targets, not only because of their small size but also because of their modest infrared heat signature (especially by comparison with ballistic missiles) and their ability to fly low, using terrain for cover.[1]

Indeed, cruise missiles are small and inexpensive enough that it may not be beyond the means of terrorists to acquire them. Reconfiguring a standard cruise missile to carry a primitive nuclear warhead, likely to weigh half a ton or more, is probably beyond the abilities of terrorists, but outfitting a cruise missile with a dispensing mechanism for distributing chemical or biological agents or radiological materials may be feasible. In this sense, the cruise missile threat to the United States should be construed as one that could be posed by terrorists as well as other states seeking a means of coercion or deterrence.

To reliably protect the country against cruise missiles is admittedly a very difficult proposition, given the multiplicity of possible launch points, approach trajectories and targets. But a system of radars, perhaps held up by aerostat balloons, together with the existing network of U.S.-based fighter aircraft and a new series of surface-to-air missile sites, could provide at least some coverage of all of the nation's borders. That network might not provide leakproof defense in all cases, but it could stop most small attacks with high confidence and deny any attacker certainty that his cruise missiles would reach U.S. territory once fired.

Technologies are being developed that could perform some of these tasks. But the pace of research is too slow, with a target date of roughly 2010 for completing a master plan on cruise missile defense for *overseas* battlefields.[2] Cruise missile defense research efforts should grow to at least the cost of individual Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs—$200 to $300 million a year above current levels.

What would be involved in eventual deployment of a cruise missile defense, something that, owing to the nature of the threat, might have to be attempted in the course of this decade on roughly the same time frame as deployment of ballistic-missile defense? Given that the United States typically spent well over $10 billion a year on air defense during the early decades of the Cold War, when it worried seriously about the Soviet bomber force, the scale of the necessary effort could be substantial.[3] Large numbers of radars as well as widely-distributed interceptor missile bases would likely be needed to defend the vast perimeter of the United States, including non-continental states and possessions.

More specifically, the concept of operations for national cruise missile defense might look roughly like this. As an outermost layer of defense, Navy ships might intercept foreign ships known to have no legitimate business anywhere near American waters or the U.S. exclusive economic zone (which extends 200 nautical miles beyond American *terra firma*). However, this approach would likely work only against the vessels of certain foreign navies; it

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[1]Bruce Byrum and Scott Truver, "Cruise Missile Defense from the Sea?", *Proceedings* (July 2000), pp. 42–5.

[2]See General Accounting Office, *Cruise Missile Defense* (March 1999).

[3]John E. Pike, Bruce G. Blair and Stephen I. Schwartz, "Defending against the Bomb", in Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1998), pp. 272–84.

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would risk violating international laws of shipping if employed wantonly beyond U.S. coastal waters (which extend out only twelve nautical miles from the coast).[4] As a second and better layer, the Coast Guard could monitor ship traffic, using its new requirement for 96-hour notice of port visits to find commercial ships with suspicious owners, crews or cargoes. Its cutters could intercept and board such ships, generally tens of miles from land.

Clearly, even if they realized their maximum potential, such Coast Guard efforts could fail to prevent the launchings of missiles from dozens of miles off American shores. Both the Coast Guard and the Air Force would also be hard-pressed to prevent the launchings of cruise missiles from commercial aircraft secretly outfitted for such purposes. For these reasons, actual defenses against cruise missiles would be needed, too.

To provide such defenses, the United States would need to see the missiles coming, recognize them as cruise missiles and not small aircraft, and then launch nearby interceptors quickly enough to destroy the missiles before they could reach American shores. Accomplishing the detection mission requires continuous coverage of all approaches to U.S. territory by a system of radars based on land, ships, aircraft or balloon aerostats. Accomplishing the intercept mission, by contrast, requires one to estimate the distance at which enemy missiles might be launched. Clearly, if ships or planes could launch missiles arbitrarily close to U.S. territory, even a very dense network of shore-based interceptors could prove insufficient. Enemy forces could approach to within say a couple miles of their target, then fire their missile or missiles; unless interceptors were located within a few miles of any such point, they could not reach the enemy missile quickly enough to prevent it from striking its target.

So how much warning would likely be available, and from how close could enemy missiles realistically be launched? Assuming that the main threat of cruise missile attack would arise from ships, the problem may be solvable. If Coast Guard monitoring can work effectively, suspicious ships entering U.S. territorial waters and contiguous zones should certainly be identifiable. Assuming that they could be stopped at the outer edges of contiguous zones—and fired upon immediately if they did not—it should be possible to prevent the launch of cruise missiles from closer than roughly twenty nautical miles or about 25 standard miles. For a relatively simple subsonic cruise missile, that might correspond to five minutes of flight time in which interceptors could do their work before targets on land were struck.

These timelines translate into a difficult but not impossible job of protecting coastal regions. If defenses had to be deployed uniformly around American coastlines, and interceptor missiles could accelerate quickly and then travel at roughly one kilometer per second, it might suffice to have a base of several interceptors every fifty miles or so. If, however, the main goal was to protect larger towns and cities as well as key ports and infrastructure, fewer interceptors would be required along certain stretches of coastline, where spacing might be every 100 to 200 miles. Either way, given that the length of U.S. coastal zones is several thousand miles (even

[4]Beyond the twelve-mile territorial waters is another zone of twelve nautical-mile width known as the contiguous zone, in which the United States, like any other country, would have certain rights concerning customs and immigration and law enforcement. See David L. Larson, *Security Issues and the Law of the Sea* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), pp. 9–10.

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after one "smooths out" complex coastlines and waterways, and focuses just on the main perimeter of the country), many dozens of interceptor bases would be needed.

What about radar coverage? Here the key variables are the altitude at which the radars can be situated, together with their power and range. Radars on the ground, even if on hills, cannot see very far due to the curvature of the earth and the low altitudes at which cruise missiles customarily fly. If cruise missiles could fly as low as fifty feet, and radars often could not be located near shorelines on hills higher than 100 to 200 feet (for illustrative purposes), radars would be needed every fifteen to twenty miles all around the perimeter of the United States. By contrast, if airplanes or aerostats at several thousand feet altitude could be used to provide surveillance and targeting information, they could be spaced every 100 to 200 miles, reducing the total need to several dozen for the entire country. However, two or more such radars would probably be needed to keep one platform on continuous station.[5]

What total costs are implied by such a cruise-missile defense architecture? Short-range missiles would typically cost perhaps $1 million to $3 million apiece; their associated ground installations would add to that tab.[6] If ten were based at each of 100 locations, total acquisition costs for the missiles and their ground support might be $5 billion to $10 billion. Radars based in the air might cost anywhere from several tens of millions to several hundred million each, depending on their sophistication and on how successful engineers may be at finding inexpensive solutions. If 100 were needed at $100 million each, costs would be $10 billion.[7] If, by contrast, costs could be held to those for advanced unmanned aerial vehicles such as the Global Hawk, expenses might be half as much or less.[8] In addition, given the long endurance of that aircraft, fewer total aircraft might be needed to keep a certain number in the sky at a time, so total acquisition costs for the airborne platforms might be held to $3 or $4 billion.

Operating costs would of course be additional. For an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), annual operating costs might be $3 million to $5 million.[9] For a medium-sized aircraft, costs would more likely be $5 million to $10 million each

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[5]The radar horizon, measured in miles, is roughly equal to the square root of twice an object's height, measured in feet. In other words, an object at fifty feet altitude could be seen at ten miles, since two times fifty is 100, and the square root of 100 is ten. See J.C. Toomay, *Radar Principles for the Non-Specialist*, second edition (Mendham, NJ: Scitech Publishing, Inc., 1989), pp. 160–1.

[6]Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, *Annual Report for FY 1999* (Department of Defense, 2000), pp. VI-15 through VI-31.

[7]That unit cost would be somewhat greater than those of existing moderate-sized reconnaissance aircraft such as the E-2 or P-3. See Raymond Hall, *Total Quantities and Unit Procurement Cost Tables 1974–1995* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1994), pp. B-1 through B-10, and Colonel Timothy M. Laur and Steven L. Llanso, *Encyclopedia of Modern U.S. Military Weapons* (New York: Berkley Books, 1995), pp. 56, 77. (AWACS aircraft typically cost about $200 million, but are probably not the right surrogate for this purpose.)

[8]Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "News Release: Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unveiled", February 20, 1997.

[9]Eric J. Labs, *Options for Enhancing the Department of Defense's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Programs* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1998), pp. 37–56.

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year.[10] Assuming roughly 100 such aircraft, annual costs would thus be $300 million to $1 billion, depending on the capabilities of the airframe and the radar.

All told, a rudimentary cruise missile defense for the United States could probably cost $10 billion to $20 billion to deploy. It would cost roughly as much to operate over a twenty-year period. Overall, these figures would represent a modest investment on the scale of national ballistic missile defense, but a large number relative to most other homeland security requirements.

These numbers ignore several other factors that could change costs significantly. However, two of them would tend to raise costs, and the others would tend to lower them, so the net effect would likely be quite modest, and the above estimates might turn out to be reasonably accurate.

One factor that would raise costs would be the need for command, control and battle management infrastructure to connect radars to each other and to interceptors.[11] As one guidepost to possible costs, command and communications facilities for the proposed midcourse ballistic missile defense system designed by the Clinton Administration are expected to cost just over $2 billion (or about 10 percent of the total). In addition, costs of $1.5 billion were expected for construction of major sites; similar demands would arise for the cruise missile defense discussed above.[12]

Lower costs would likely result from the fact that existing Federal Aviation Administration radars might make it unnecessary to purchase and deploy radars in some parts of U.S. coastal regions. In addition, as noted above, aerostat balloons with very long endurance might be able to replace ground radars in a number of locations at considerably lower cost.[13]

THIS ANALYSIS shows that a defense against ship-launched cruise missiles is desirable and achievable, but difficult and expensive. As with all other defense systems, any cruise missile defense effort would have to compete with other programs of roughly equal importance. If we rule out, as we should, both technological impossibility and technological inevitability arguments, and if we recognize that resources for defense are far more elastic in a national crisis than almost anyone thinks they are in normal times, then the question of cruise missile defense falls into the familiar and proper context of political judgments about competing needs. Such judgment, however, needs to be exercised. The United States should seriously consider the desirability and feasibility of a national defense against cruise missiles armed with chemical, biological or radiological payloads. □

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[10]Rachel Schmidt, *Moving U.S. Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1997), p. 61; Bonita J. Dombey, *Modernizing the Aerial Tanker Fleet: Prospects for Capacity, Timing, and Cost* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1985), p. 20; Alan Shaw, *Costs of Expanding and Modernizing the Navy's Carrier-Based Air Forces* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1982), pp. 48–53.

[11]General Accounting Office, *Cruise Missile Defense: Progress Made but Significant Challenges Remain* (Washington, DC: GAO, 1999), pp. 17–8.

[12]Geoffrey Forden, *Budgetary and Technical Implications of the Administration's Plan for National Missile Defense* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, April 2000), p. 11.

[13]Byrum and Truver, pp. 42–5.

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America the Despised

Takis Michas

IN THE summer of 1999, the popular Greek composer Mikis Theodorakis said during an interview: "I hate Americans and everything American. I hope that the youth will begin to hate everything American." This most popular of Greek contemporary composers—a close friend of Slobodan Milosevic, who was reportedly ferried around in the latter's private plane—had already been widely acclaimed for his assertion during the Kosovo war that "there is no difference between Hitler and Clinton." Moreover, he advocated at the time a nuclear alliance formed of Greece, Belarus, Serbia and Russia and directed against Greece's erstwhile NATO allies—the United States in particular.

Celebrities everywhere have been known to say foolish things about political matters of which they know little and understand less, so Theodorakis' ranting might not seem worthy of much attention—except that he was soon nominated as Greece's candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. Theodorakis' candidacy was supported by leading Greek politicians and intellectuals from across the spectrum, including Prime Minister Costas Simitis, Foreign Minister George Papandreou and the leader of the conservative opposition New Democracy Party, Costas Karamanlis.

Of course, not all those who supported Theodorakis' candidacy shared his anti-American views. On the contrary, some, including Simitis, Papandreou and Karamanlis, have generally supported the United States and its policies. What is noteworthy, however, is that Theodorakis' views did not seem to faze those supporters precisely because such views have become part of mainstream opinion in Greece. Indeed, they are accepted by the majority as self-evidently true. In an opinion poll conducted among secondary school students at the end of the 1990s, for example, respondents were asked to rank a number of nations from most to least popular. Americans joined Albanians and Turks at the bottom of the list—even lower than the Gypsies, a group not held in particularly high esteem by the Greeks. Topping the list were the Serbs.

Anti-American sentiment in Greece was carefully nurtured during the 1980s by Andreas Papandreou, the populist leader of PASOK (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement). Anti-Americanism based on real and perceived wrongs relating to the rise of the Greek military junta (1967–74)

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and the Cyprus issue became the common denominator of political thinking. Throughout this period, Papandreou made it a cardinal point to deviate from Western norms and to antagonize Western, and especially American, governments. Greece thus supported the Jaruzelski dictatorship in Poland, refused to condemn the suppression of dissidents in the Soviet Union and its downing of a commercial Korean airliner, harbored organizations (such as the Kurdish PKK) perceived as terrorist by many in the West, opposed the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe, and failed to arrest the terrorists of the "November 17th" organization who have murdered more than a score of Greeks and foreigners since the mid-1970s, including the CIA station chief in 1975.

But all of this pales in comparison to the Gestalt-switch that took place in Greek foreign policy and in its populist worldview during the wars of Yugoslav succession. Throughout those wars Greece supported the Milosevic regime in Belgrade and the Karadzic regime in Pale morally, economically and politically. It repeatedly violated the UN-imposed oil embargo on Serbia and the EU decision concerning the freezing of assets belonging to the Milosevic regime. Greece's support was massive and involved all strata of society: the political class, the trade unions, the media and above all the Orthodox Church. The victims of Serbian aggression were simply erased from the moral perceptions of the overwhelming majority of the population and the political class of the country. Whenever a Greek politician voiced criticism about the fighting, it was nearly always directed against NATO air strikes and other "machinations" of the West and particularly the United States. "Greece's policies", said leading Serb journalist Peter Lucovic, "benefited exclusively the Milosevic regime, helping the Milosevic family and its associates to retain power in Belgrade. Greece was used by the Milosevic regime as the fine example of a Western country that supported democratic and patriotic Serbia."

Equally interesting have been Greek reactions to the terrorist attack against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001, and the subsequent war in Afghanistan. Both Prime Minister Simitis and opposition leader Karamanlis denounced the terrorist attack in the strongest of terms and pledged support to U.S. efforts to hunt down the perpetrators. Moreover, Greece provided U.S. and NATO aircraft full access to Greek airspace, military airports and other military facilities for refueling and maintenance. Greece also offered to send additional troops to the Balkans to free up U.S. forces for deployment in Afghanistan. But outside the narrow confines of the political class, initial reactions were very different.

Upon learning of the terrorist attack, the immensely popular Archbishop Christodoulos of the Greek Orthodox Church attributed the act to the "injustice and inequality" that pervades the world. It was unleashed, he said, because those in power behaved "without scruples and in defiance of the justice of God and Man." The view that America was somehow to blame for this terrible incident was soon echoed in much of the media. Television broadcasting in Greece in the wake of the tragedy was dominated by discussions of how America supposedly brought this event upon itself for perceived political and military sins.

Perhaps the most outrageous incident, however, involved not the media but sports. During a soccer match between a Greek and a visiting Scottish club, fans of the Greek team tried to burn the American flag before the start of the game

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and then booed during a moment of silence observed for the victims of the September 11 attacks. This happened to the applause of the nearly 20,000 who were in the football stadium at the time. "What went on in Athens disgusted me", the coach of the Scottish team told the Associated Press. "What badly disappointed me was that there was no effort made by anyone, the police included, to do anything about it. I could not believe such anti-American feeling in a European country."

AP Photo

Outside the U.S. Embassy in Athens, October 8, 2001

While feelings of sorrow and outrage marked the developing responses of most observers in the rest of Europe, the reactions in Greece have been at best subdued. "Instead of reacting with the shock, grief and outrage that every Greek American felt", wrote Nikos Konstandaras, the editor of the English-language edition of *Kathimerini*,

> the Greeks were seen—on satellite television and in editorials and too many comments by people in the street—to be analyzing the event with their trademark 'Yes, but.' The expressions of support for America were drowned out by the inevitable anti-Americanism that was once confined to the Communist Party but in the last 10 years, in the dearth of public statements to the contrary, appears to have become the only opinion on view.

The polls provide evidence. One poll, taken a few days after the incident, revealed that 25 percent of respondents said they felt "satisfied" and "relieved", and believed that "justice had been served" upon the United States on September 11. About 30 percent said that the terror attacks constituted a justified reaction to U.S. policies. Another poll found that only 6 percent of the Greeks, the lowest number in Europe, supported a U.S. campaign against countries that harbor terrorism. (A similar poll taken among the Palestinians showed that 7 percent supported America's anti-terror campaign.) Moreover, in a poll published in the Greek daily *To Vima* on December 29, 61 percent of the respondents said they felt unhappy about the coalition's victory in Afghanistan, and only 29 percent said they were happy about the outcome of the military campaign.

As columnist Richardos Someritis summed up the matter in *To Vima*, four main ideas dominated popular explanations of the September 11 terrorist attack. The first is that the attack was an act of Israeli or Jewish conspiracy. The second is that Osama bin Laden is the creation of CIA propaganda. The third is that the terrorist act was part of the struggle of the repressed against U.S. imperialism. And the fourth is that Greece is not threatened by terrorism, but rather by the fight *against* terrorism.

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Greece's New Anti-American Trinity

THE CURRENT ideological configuration of anti-Americanism in Greece is a new phenomenon and should not be confused with earlier critiques of American policies. Although some of its roots can be traced to earlier forms, conflating the two can lead to serious misinterpretations of contemporary Greek reality.

The ideology of anti-Americanism that marked the 1960s and 1970s in Greece reflected the state of mind of the radical Left. It based its critique of American policies on the inconsistency that purportedly existed between the ideals of liberty that the Americans officially espoused and the policies they followed either at home—the so-called Jim Crow laws discriminating against blacks in the South—or abroad—supporting dictatorships such as the Greek military junta or the Pinochet regime in Chile. This outlook may not have always been fair, but it was essentially benign. Despite its occasionally violent rhetoric and deeds, it did not challenge the essential principles upon which American society rested—namely, the principles of liberty, rule of law and individual rights. Today's anti-Americanism, in contrast, is no longer the exclusive prerogative of the Left. Growing anti-American sentiments among political conservatives and religious activists are converging with it to form the great river of a new and much more visceral Greek anti-Americanism.

As to the Left, the (unreformed) Greek Communist Party, one of the largest in the European Union (though it obtained only 5 percent of the popular vote in the last Greek election), still sees America as the Great Satan for the simple reason that U.S. policies precipitated the downfall of their beloved Holy Soviet Empire. Nonetheless, Communist opposition to the United States today is no longer articulated only in the Marxist idiom of proletarian internationalism, but increasingly in the language of nationalism. Thus, the Communist Party opposes strongly any "U.S.-dictated" rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. At the same time, it is one of the staunchest defenders of the principle of Greek "national sovereignty" and "territorial integrity." The party's formal adoption of the nationalist viewpoint was cemented in the "National Front" strategy announced during its 16th Congress in December 2000. During her speech to the assembled delegates, General-Secretary Aleca Papariga said that the new strategy no longer included a precondition calling for the party's social allies to accept socialism or "workers' power." The unity of the National Front would be grounded on the "defense of national sovereignty" and the rejection of "subservience to the demands of NATO and the United States and subjection to the New Order and the Maastricht Treaty." She even reminded the delegates of the topicality and relevance of Stalin's dictum concerning the need "to raise the flag of national independence and national sovereignty."

The Greek Communist Party had inaugurated its anti-Western popular front strategy during the Yugoslav wars of succession. From the very beginning, the party was one of the most vocal opponents of NATO actions because they "violated Serbian sovereignty" and aimed to "undermine Milosevic." The Communists joined forces with right-wing nationalists to organize demonstrations at the U.S. embassy; helped organize "humanitarian convoys" to deliver aid to the Bosnian Serb Republic; and sought "common ground" with the Greek armed forces. The latter efforts resulted eventually in the creation of the "Movement for National Defense" in November 2000 under the auspices of the Communist Party. The speakers at the organization's

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first meeting included a retired chief of the Armed Forces and other leading officers of the Greek Armed Forces. All strongly criticized NATO.

For some, the incorporation of nationalism into communist doctrine has a deeper ideological significance. Common to both systems is the absence of any concept of individual freedom. As former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann pointed out, the shift from communism to nationalism, such as that which took place under Milosevic, could be characterized as the transition from one collectivist ideology to another.[1] More importantly, both nationalism and communism are ideological means to mobilize the masses for the fight against a supposedly ever-present enemy in whose name individual rights and freedoms may be ruthlessly suppressed.

The intellectual sources of Greece's new conservative "anti-Americanism" also include a nationalist element, but they are more rich and varied than that. They reflect in part the xenophobic anti-Western attitude that characterizes the rhetoric of the Greek Orthodox Church. This connection points to the fact that it is not simply U.S. foreign policy that offends the nationalist Right. Instead, it is the entire narrative of American history and the values that define the United States, for these contradict the basic premises of nationalist conservatism in Greece: Multiculturalism and multi-ethnic narratives challenge the very essence of the linguistic, cultural and ethnic homogeneity that has always constituted the plinth of modern Greek nationalism. Indeed, one of the main fears among conservative nationalists in Greece during the recent Balkan wars was that the United States was trying to export its model of societal pluralism in the region. American support for Bosnia and Macedonia has been interpreted by Greek conservatives as an attempt to export multi-ethnic models to Greece's doorstep. If it is the case that the United States supported an independent Bosnia because of its once and potentially future multi-ethnic character, exactly the opposite was the case with Greece, whose government maintained from the outset that Bosnia was doomed precisely *because* of its multi-ethnic make-up.

Thus, conservative Greek newspapers now denounce the United States with the same vehemence as the Communist Party paper *Rizospastis*. Anti-Americanism is not restricted to diatribes in the press but is increasingly forming part of the public pronouncements of conservative politicians, which, of course, influence the views of the average conservative voter. A poll taken shortly after the September 11 terrorist attack revealed that over 50 percent of conservative voters define themselves as anti-American.

The third source of the new anti-Americanism in Greece is the Orthodox Church itself. Its enmity toward the United States draws its intellectual inspiration partly from the generally militant, anti-Western legacy of Eastern Orthodoxy. In attacking the United States during the war in Kosovo, the Church drew upon traditional Biblical sources to cast the United States in demonic terms. Its president was labeled a "Satan." New York became the new seat of the "Whore of Babylon." The Church, however, also drew upon its own historical legacy. Traditionally, the Greek Orthodox populations of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires had always perceived the West as being inhabited by "barbarian Franks", "schismatics" and "heretics" from the True Faith. The religious bond of Orthodoxy that held together the Greek population through centuries of occupation has always carried a strong

[1]Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers* (New York: Times Books/ Random House, 1996).

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anti-Western strain. Nobody understood this better than Karl Marx, who wrote: "There exists no polemical schism between the Musulmans [the Ottoman Turks] and their Greek subjects; but the religious animosity against the Latins may be said to form the only common bond among the different races inhabiting Turkey and professing the Greek creed."[2]

In Greece, as well as in other nations (such as Serbia) that emerged from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, religion became an essential component of the national ideology. The *ethnos* and Orthodoxy fused. Thus, to be Greek is to be Orthodox. The leader of the Greek Church constantly stresses the nation's identification with Orthodoxy. It is characteristic of the total identification of the Greek Church with the nation that, as Victoria Clark points out, even foreign converts to the Greek Orthodox Church adopt not only the theological dogma of the Orthodox creed but also the foreign policy positions of the Greek government.[3]

The fusion of Church and nation has reached a point that the religious leadership has become the spearhead for all of the major secular nationalist initiatives in modern Greece. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century, the Church promoted "The Great Idea" (Μεγαλη Ιδεα), the creation of a "Greater Greece" encompassing the territories of the old Byzantine Empire; now, about a century later, the Church has taken the lead in mobilizing the population on issues such as Macedonia, NATO and Serbia.

The Greek Orthodox Church—and particularly its present leader, Archbishop Christodoulos of Athens—has consistently adopted extreme nationalist positions. In the early 1990s the Church helped lead the opposition to the recognition of its northern neighbor and former Yugoslav republic under the name of "Macedonia." It played a decisive role in fomenting nationalist feelings by organizing and participating in mass rallies against the new state's "usurpation" of the name Macedonia. Moreover, for almost a decade, the Greek Church provided the ideological legitimacy for the Greek state's moral, political and economic support to the regimes in Belgrade and Pale. It also provided rhetorical cover for Serbian war crimes in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Church even invited indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic to visit Athens in the summer of 1993 in order to honor him at a rally in a stadium in Piraeus. Greek priests traveled regularly to war-ravaged Bosnia to provide spiritual succor to the Bosnian Serb army in Sarajevo, Zvornic and other places.

The anti-American and anti-Western narrative of the Greek Orthodox Church does not emanate from the religious metaphysics of Eastern Christianity in general, but from what the Russian theologian Alexander Schmemann calls the "theological nationalism" that dominates the Greek Church.[4] It is the worldview inherent in this type of nationalism that accounts for the anti-Western and anti-American attitudes of the Greek Church, not anything inherent in Orthodoxy's theology or dogma. But it is this phenomenon of "theological nationalism" that explains one of the most remarkable developments in recent Greek political life: the ideological rapprochement between a largely anticlerical and avowedly atheist Left and the Greek Orthodox Church. This is partly explained by the fact that Archbishop

[2]Friedrich Engels and Marx, *I Ellada i Tourkia kai to Anatoliko Zitma* ("Greece, Turkey and the Eastern Question"), translated by Panayotis Kondilis (Athens: Gnosi, 1985), p. 287–8.

[3]Clark, *Why Angels Fall: A Journey through Orthodox Europe from Byzantium to Kosovo* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

[4]Schmemann, *I apostoli tis eklesias sto sichrono kosmo* (Athens: Akrita, 1993).

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Christodoulos's speeches are often couched in a left-wing idiom, as when he attacks U.S. "imperialism" or denounces American ideas about a "New World Order" as "similar to Nazi ones." But this rapprochement also manifests itself in more direct ways. The Archbishop stated recently that he finds the Communist Party's geopolitical views on issues like globalization, Kosovo and U.S. foreign policy to be "much closer" to those of his Church than those of many other political parties.

The appearance of a group of influential "neo-Orthodox" thinkers has been one of the most important elements fueling the Church's strong anti-Western posture of the last several years. Writers such as Christos Giannaras, a professor at the Panteion University at Athens, have revived and focused the antagonism that existed between the Orthodox East and the Latin West during the Middle Ages. Giannaras and others have recast those traditional religious antagonisms (familiar to every Greek, whether religious or not) in the contemporary idiom of world politics, and used them as a basis for advocating foreign policy positions whose ultimate aim is the total separation of Greece from the West.[5]

According to these thinkers the West continues to perpetuate the legacy of hatred for the Orthodox Church that started with the Great Schism of 1054 and culminated with the sacking of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204. The West is hostile, and its values alien to the Greek experience. Thus, all the misfortunes that have befallen Greeks during their recent history—from the Asia Minor catastrophe in 1922 to the invasion of Cyprus by the Turks in 1974—are due to Greece's failed attempt to imitate the West. The continuing decline of Greece cannot be reversed until Greeks realize their cultural and spiritual superiority to the West as members of the Orthodox Church. The rot will stop only when the Greeks substitute the "servility" that characterizes their relation with the West with the spirit of resistance against the latter's "immoral barbarism." Herein lies Greece's path to salvation and its moral and cultural rejuvenation. Thus, to the Left's anger at America's sabotage of the Communist dream, and the conservatives' distaste for America's multicultural legacy, the Church contributes a spiritual justification for anti-Americanism.

More recently, in his regular column in *Kathimerini*, the newspaper of record for Greek conservatives, Giannaras went so far as to condone the terrorist attacks against Washington and New York, comparing them to acts committed by the Greek fighters of the War of Independence in 1821. It is also of interest to note that, in some instances, relations between the Communist Party and Orthodoxy are not restricted to ideology but extend to politics. Thus one prominent member of the neo-Orthodox movement, Kostas Zouraris, was included in the list of parliamentary candidates that the Greek Communist Party filed in the last elections.

The intellectual props for anti-Americanism in Greece also happen to blend well with the mix of conspiracy theories that dominate the folk worldview of the masses. In the popular mindset, argues Alexis Herakleidis, professor at the Panteion University at Athens, the universe is divided into two categories: the φιλελληνες (popularly rendered in the Western media as "Philhellenes"), the "friends of the Greeks", and their opposite, the μισελληνες or ανθελληνες ("those who hate Greece"). Greece, according to this view, is an αναδελφο εθνος ("a nation alone in the world"). It always lives on the "edge of a crisis." It is

[5]Giannaras, *Orthodoxia kai Disi neoteri Ellada* (Athens: Domos, 1992).

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always surrounded by enemies. Greeks are always at the center of σκοτεινες συνομωσιες ("dark conspiracies") that emanate from ζενα κεντρα ("foreign centers"). These conspiracies emanate from the "Ankara-Skopje-Tirana axis", from Bonn, from London, from NATO. But above all the conspiracies emanate from Washington or, according to more "sophisticated" versions of these theories, from "the Jewish lobby" in the United States. All have, as their ultimate goal, the subjugation of the Greeks.

The conspiratorial viewpoint is becoming more prominent in the political discourse of the Greek Church. The theme of the "victimization" of the Greek Orthodox flock is central in the speeches of Archbishop Christodoulos: "Our people feel", he said recently, "that they are always being treated unjustly by the great and the powerful." He justified the enmity felt toward the West because "the powerful of the Earth commit injustice against the Hellenes and ignore the rightful claims of Hellenism." The Archbishop, moreover, gave voice to fears that the West is secretly engaging in policies designed to weaken the Greek nation. "Our foreign friends", he said "are methodically trying to reduce the size of Greece."

The pervasiveness of the conspiratorial viewpoint also marked Greek reactions to the September 11 attack. In a nationwide poll published in *Eleftherotypia*, the number of Greeks who believe that the September 11 attacks were the work of bin Laden or some other Arab terrorist (in total, 39 percent) is *smaller* than those who believe in "another" perpetrator, whether the secret services of America (28 percent), Israel (8 percent), or extremist American organizations (6 percent).

SEEN AS a system of ideas, the new anti-American narrative in Greece has little in common with critiques of American policies and social structures that were prevalent in the 1960s and early 1970s. The latter were rights-based discourses and had as their goal liberal emancipation. Current anti-Americanism, on the other hand, is suffused with xenophobia, irrationality and plain hatred. Earlier forms of Greek anti-Americanism attacked what America did. Present forms attack what America is.

Confusing these two forms of anti-Americanism amounts to committing what philosophers call "a category error." Such a mistake can have serious policy implications, as it did when President Clinton visited Greece in October 1999. His trip planners thought that if he strongly condemned American support for the colonels' junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974, he would placate those Greeks who were protesting his visit. It did not work. The large and violent demonstrations against his visit went ahead as planned. What the former President's advisors failed to understand was that the protesters of 1999 were not primarily interested in the usurpation of Greek political freedoms by the old junta; they were instead affirming their deep-seated opposition to Western values and their ideological alliance to Milosevic's ethno-tribal politics.

The effects of such developments in Greek society on relations between Greece and the United States, NATO and the EU are, of course, impossible to predict with precision. What is certain, however, is that for a growing number of Greeks, the United States—Greece's formal ally—is rapidly becoming Enemy Number One. In a poll published in the Greek daily *Ta Nea* two weeks after the September 11 attacks, only 18.9 percent of respondents said they had positive feelings about the United States. "One of the most dangerous recent developments in the relations of Greece with its friends and allies", says

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Dimitis Katsoudas, head of the pro-Western "Center for New Policy–Pavlos Bakoyannis"—named after the most prominent Greek victim of "November 17th"—"is the consolidation of an anti-Western and anti-American sentiment that goes far beyond any logical reaction to aspects of U.S. foreign policy that may affect negatively Greece's national interests."

At the same time, those feelings go hand in hand with a pragmatic attitude on the part of the majority of the Greek population toward Greece's membership in NATO and its relations with the United States. Thus, as many opinion polls have shown, the majority of the Greek population combines a critical attitude toward the United States and its policies with an acquiescence to the Greek government's formal support for those policies. Whether this situation can be sustained in the long run, only time will tell. □

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A Poet Passes

Léopold Sédar Senghor Remembered

Ahmedou Ould Abdallah

IN 1961, less than twelve months after the independence of both Mauritania and Senegal, I was in my last year of high school at Van Vollenhoven, the prestigious French *lycée* in Dakar, Senegal. I still remember the beautiful green, white and beige cranes parading in the park of the presidential palace, the residence of former governors of French West Africa. I remember, too, going with a friend to visit my own President, Moktar Ould Daddah, then the guest of his Senegalese colleague Léopold Sédar Senghor.

To my surprise, President Senghor sat and spoke with us, giving a dissertation on lions ("quiet but respected kings of the bush") and explaining why Senegal's most important national award, "the Order of the Lion", is named after them. Senghor also spoke, beautifully and emotionally, of the baobab tree as a symbol of endurance, resilience, strength, but at the same time fragility; he was, of course, speaking in metaphor about humanity. Africans, he suggested, should be like the baobab: resilient but emotionally open. On leaving the palace for my boarding school, I was bewildered: There were almost no lions in Senegal except for one or two in the zoo. So why so much about lions, and why the baobabs even if there were plenty of them?

By 1972, I had become a member of my country's cabinet and went to Dakar in a presidential delegation visiting Senegal. As Senghor awarded me the Order of the Lion, his earlier comments on lions came to my mind. At a small dinner I followed his comments about universal civilization but also about cultural differences and manners among nations, and his jokes to illustrate his points. That same year I was lucky to travel with him from Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, to Dakar in his private plane. It was a delight. There were only five of us on board and he was in an excellent mood, talking to us after a difficult negotiation on the future of Air Afrique (still being debated!). He spoke of Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, the late President Sékou Touré of Guinea, a political enemy, and of military juntas. Zaire, he said, is prone to conflicts because Mobutu—then his political ally—has a good heart but a rather slow brain mechanism, making him easily forget commitments and, worse, his own past mistakes. President Senghor complained of Sékou Touré, the boisterous leader of a "revolutionary" party, but said that he should be forgiven his foibles as his brain had been permanently damaged

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by syphilis. He noted that military coups are not helpful, but their occurrence should be blamed on the mismanagement of civilians rather than on soldiers. Finally, he added that the interior minister of neighboring Mali was much more at ease with soccer fans than in discussing an issue with him; in this Senghor clearly showed his discomfort with exuberant or loud behavior.

Was he advising us, as we flew, on African politics or was he relaxing as a human being, speaking his mind, confident that he was with discreet and loyal traveling companions? He might also have again been sending a message from a professor to students: "Be alert but quiet, strong but human." Again I remembered the lions and the baobabs.

Senghor in 1973 Corbis/Bettman

YEARS LATER, I became Mauritania's Foreign Minister and had more encounters with Senghor. I remember in particular two meetings with him, one in a group and the other one alone. The first was at an Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Liberia in 1979. There was a heated debate on the question of Western Sahara—still on the OAU agenda today. Backers of the Polisario and Algeria were pushing for a new resolution based on one adopted by the United Nations. But Senghor supported Morocco and spent more than half an hour vigorously opposing the other group. He explained that the expression "takes note" is tantamount to a commitment of support and that all delegates should therefore pay more attention to the real meaning than to the superficial political acceptability of words. He was certain that political rhetoric often carried leaders far away from daily realities.

Later that same year, Senghor came to Nouakchott for a one-day official visit. There was a new political regime in Mauritania, with military officers unknown to him bestriding the scene. As Minister of Foreign Affairs I was responsible for the overall preparation of his visit. Upon his arrival, I had a short private meeting with him to present the program. He told me to feel comfortable as he had only three small requests: to meet the Ambassador of Spain to Mauritania, a writer; to have 45 minutes of rest after the luncheon; and—after pausing—to see the press communiqué on his visit before making it public. Smiling, he added, "you should not worry, I will not ruin your work. I will only add some punctuation as the French language cannot be dissociated from commas (*virgules*). The commas bring substance and sense without adding new words." When he read the document he indeed added four or five commas. That was typical of Senghor: methodical, well organized and disciplined. I still treasure that 22-year old press communiqué.

Although I was not a close associate or a confidant of Senghor, a number of coincidences in life brought me near to him. Sometimes, in the presence of a great man, that is enough. I had great respect for his political behavior. At a time of authoritarianism—the Cold War in Africa—he was strong and human enough not to impose a one-party system

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or to enforce state ownership over the economy. In 1980, he became the first post-colonial African leader to step down from office voluntarily. At that time it was an unheard-of political move, and one that sent his African colleagues into jitters. A "bad example", they said, criticizing him. Similarly, he liked to repeat that, in politics, family is the enemy, hence denouncing nepotism.

Beyond politics were Senghor's humanity and his art. His vision of humanity was not just African or Francophone but universal. Influenced by his early contacts with the French theologian, Pierre Teillard de Chardin, he stressed the need for a dialogue of cultures, of "giving and of receiving", not of culture conflicts. His poetry, in which he developed the idea of *negritude*, was—and is, for language outlives its author—sublime. When he died at age 95 this past December 20, humanity lost one of its most eloquent patrons.

The political and the personal merged in Léopold Senghor in the best of ways. A man who can really see beauty is bound to be humble before it, and so Senghor never built status for or statues to himself, or imposed his picture on his country's currency bills or postage stamps. At one of our encounters he said: "Birds are much more graceful than presidents on stamps." That made me remember the cranes I saw for the first time in the presidential park forty years ago; and now I cannot help but remember their grace and that of Senghor together. □

Correspondance
Correspondence

C'est l'heure de la veilleuse amie.
This is the hour of a friendly vigil night
Ta présence nimbe la lampe assoupie.
When your nimble presence softens the light.
Sur la plage blanche du papier
On paper white as a beach,
Mes mains cherchent tes mains de rêve.
My hands search your dream hands to reach.

Chère, nos voyages par le rapide
Dear one, we travel by the express train's silent leap.
Du silence. Que de cils inouïs
So many unknown eyelashes peep
Ouverts sur la nuit de tes yeux vastes!
On the night of your wide eyes!
A l'horizon que de foulards déployés!
So many waving scarves on the horizon skies!

Reverrai-je jamais la ville saignante
Will I ever again see the bleeding city
D'où monte la plainte sempiternelle des minarets!
Where rises the endless lament of minarets?

—Léopold Sédar Senghor,
Poèmes perdus (Lost Poems), translated by Melvin Dixon

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

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Books

Stress Testing the Global Economy

Eric Jones

Harold James, *The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 288 pp., $39.95.

Roger M. Kubarych, *Stress Testing the System: Simulating the Global Consequences of the Next Financial Crisis* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2001), 187 pp., $15.

Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson, *Globalization and History* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 355 pp., $27.95.

THE REWARDS for reducing uncertainty in an uncertain world are so large that the demand for political and economic forecasts never ends. Yet demand far outruns supply. We seem unable to predict the really big system breaks like the fall of Soviet communism or the Asian crisis, or at any rate to do so persuasively enough for society to prepare for them. How might we do better?

The answer depends to some extent on understanding the context in which forecasting takes place. The main process affecting international affairs has for some time now been the increased integration of global economic activity—"globalization" in the common parlance. That being so, do earlier manifestations of economic integration provide clues about the probable future of the current phenomenon? The sometimes violent backlash against trade and financial liberalization that we have witnessed since the final years of the 1990s gives the question a pertinence that seemed absent during the previous couple of heady decades when multinational enterprises rode high and trade barriers so conveniently fell before them. The upsurge of resistance makes it urgent to seek for indications as to whether phases of globalization are fated to be slowed, brought to a standstill, or even thrown into reverse.

Perspectives from history and concepts from economics thus seem likely to be helpful, and where we should look to find both these approaches brought into play is in economic history. Much of the unwillingness to apply economic reasoning in general history and the analysis of international affairs seems to stem from

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an aversion not only to many of its conclusions but even to its assumptions—that is to say, from an all-too-human reluctance to accept the fact that every course of action, including inaction, comes with a cost attached. Economic history is free from that weakness. Admittedly, some of its formal techniques suffer diminishing returns when applied to topics on the fringe, notably the interaction between economics and politics. Disagreeable though this may be to the harsh reasoners among economists, broader humanistic judgment comes into its own when dealing with such themes. As Clive Crook says in an admirable survey of globalization in *The Economist*, few economists nowadays learn enough history.[1] This tends to offset their undoubted strengths as problem solvers, because it disarms them regarding just what is and is not novel. Alvin Toffler put the point nicely: "We now have students so ignorant of the past that they see nothing unusual about the present."

A long view from economic history offers the counteracting benefit of perspective, a point that seems trite until we consider how misleading the lack of it may be. In one of the books discussed here, O'Rourke and Williamson rightly criticize the journalistic tendency to project the recent past into the indefinite future. They observe that this habit has—since September 11 we should say had—engendered the popular view that globalization is unstoppable. Recent protests and violent happenings mean that such an opinion is in serious doubt; indeed, as these authors demonstrate, it should always have been disputed. Before journalism threw itself into confusion over the current anti-globalization campaign, not to mention terrorism, O'Rourke and Williamson had already concluded that globalization is not unchallengeable. They were drawing on their study of the first globalization boom of 1870–1913 and how it was brought to an end. They saw that there would be a backlash this time, too.

Luckily, then, some modern writers *are* literate in economic history, and they have much to teach us. The work of a general historian, Harold James' *The End of Globalization*, stands out because the author has really done his economics homework. James appeals to the economic history of globalization in order to place the present and the future in the longer context of international economic integration. He delves as far back as the unease inspired by the Reformation and the great age of discovery in the 16th century, but concentrates on the breakdown of international order during the 1930s. An adventurous volume by Roger Kubarych, *Stress Testing the System*, which simulates a contemporary financial shock, counterpoints history's usefulness almost as sharply by rehearsing earlier attempts at building scenarios that failed because they did not explore past experience deeply enough. A third, slightly older, but magisterial work is O'Rourke and Williamson's *Globalization and History*, which, as noted, turns the searchlight of econometrics on the 1870–1913 period.

Competition, Agriculture and Migration

EVEN EARLIER cases of economic integration than that of 1870–1913 may teach us something, despite the fact that they concerned only Europe. Although such episodes were not "global" by definition, nor in the strictest sense even international (because they partly predate the rise of the nation-state), they are still capable of illuminating the merits and discontents of integration. Oliver Volckart, for example, traces the

[1]Clive Crook, "Globalisation and Its Critics", *The Economist*, September 29, 2001.

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effects of competition among multiple political units as early as the centuries between 1000 and 1800.[2] He notes that because Europe's political units were then so small and packed close together, hard-pressed individuals could move fairly readily from one to the next, either to escape oppression or to find a better life. They took their money with them. The availability of "exit" as an option induced rulers to compete for the mobile factors of labor and capital by offering more attractive constitutions, laws and customs. Princes offered commercial privileges at bargain prices to attract particular groups to settle and pay them taxes in the future.

Competition was evident along these lines during the Middle Ages, but between the 14th and 18th centuries rulers concentrated on protecting the holders of privileges they had already sold. New entrants, or at any rate free entrants, to business were discouraged. By the early modern period, the maze of restrictive privileges was tending to smother additional market growth. Joel Mokyr tells us that this also impeded further technological advances of the types that had taken place during the phase of high medieval openness.[3] Then, in the 18th century, the rulers of mainland Europe perceived what was happening in Britain and once more reversed their policies. They grasped that skilled immigrants and more foreign investment would establish new enterprises and generate higher taxes, and began to re-open their economies to fresh talent and capital. Pre- and early-modern economic history therefore makes the association between openness and growth as apparent as it is today, and warns that growth is always vulnerable to cumulative erosion by special interests.

Markets were internationalized more fully during the late 19th century than during any previous period and, perhaps surprisingly, the process went further in some directions than during the late 20th century. Recent globalization has focused on commodity trade and flows of financial capital more prominently than it has involved movements of people. During the 19th century, however, the bias was rather different; relative to the size of population, international migration was at a high point. Wage earners felt threatened in high-income countries such as the United States and Australia, to which migrants flocked. At the same time, land-owning and cereal farming in Europe were undermined by cheap grain from the New World. The protectionist reaction came quickly. O'Rourke and Williamson do not attribute the onset of protection to the effects of the World War, nor date it to the depression years of the 1930s. They point out that as far as labor migration and agriculture were concerned, free movement and free trade were being curbed well before 1900. Societies find it agonizingly hard to adjust to openness. That is why, historically speaking, it is fair to say that the long liberal era after World War II has been more of an anomaly than the many periods of relative closure.

Enthusiastic globalizers loudly, and reasonably, trumpet the gains from economic integration, particularly the gains of the post-Cold War period. They have had a bull run. Yet substantial advance has not been secured in every respect, notably in these two areas of agriculture and labor mobility. Triumphalists feel that agricultural protection will have to fall eventually because the budgetary cost of warding off imports and transferring revenue to farmers is so enormous. In any case, they incline to the opinion that farming does

[2]Volckart, *Political Fragmentation and the Emergence of Market Economies: The Case of Germany, c.1000–1800 AD* (Jena: Max-Planck Institute, 1999).

[3]Mokyr, *The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

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not much matter because it is a shrinking sector in developed economies.

But "eventually" is a long haul; actual existing history, so to speak, takes place in the lag periods. It is therefore a mistake to underestimate the perverse hold of farming on the psyche of countries that are generally frightened of external competition, of which the outstanding example is France. Only public acquiescence within the developed countries could permit such vast transfers to continue. The catch is this: the importance of agriculture to poorer countries is such that if they continue to be excluded from Western food markets, they can return the compliment by blocking negotiations to liberalize trade in goods and services in ways that were not possible during the free-for-all 19th century. An impasse therefore threatens within the world trading system before we even start to take account of external threats or protest campaigns.

With respect to labor, triumphalists argue that it matters little if people cannot move freely about the world. Simply permitting their countries to trade will enable them to raise their rate of economic growth. But historical and modern experience both show that individuals are reluctant to sit through this slow, cold process: they will head for lands that have actually demonstrated their ability to prosper. That is why today, in countries where private businesses are willing to hire, half of the immigrants are illegals. The pull of businesses wishing to fill jobs conflicts with the push of governments trying to appease domestic labor unions and xenophobic citizens. At the moment, official controls are tightening precisely when the aging of populations in the developed world is reducing domestic labor supplies. This can only rile turbulent young populations elsewhere in the world and, given the strength of demand, ensure that people smuggling will continue to be rewarded. "Globalization" at the margins will therefore continue by stealth, but the prospects for extensive new legal migration are not good. Agriculture is, if anything, an even greater sticking point.

Simulating the Future

WRITING about world affairs means giving hostages to fortune. At least this puts one in good company. Henry Kissinger had just finished proclaiming in Frankfurt that the United States lacked serious enemies and had not been attacked on its own soil since Pearl Harbor when a news editor broke in to announce the strike on the World Trade Center. A few months earlier, the organizers of the Financial Vulnerability Project of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)—the simulation of a financial shock that is the subject of Roger Kubarych's *Stress Testing the System*—had rejected the idea of any scenario involving the bin Laden organization, the sources of its funding, or "fictional intelligence reports of plans for future terrorist assaults on U.S. facilities." They rested on the assumption that "government agencies likely were already considering contingencies involving bin Laden."

Puncturing "past futures" is always easy. The Financial Vulnerability simulation was not strictly intended to predict; it was concerned with the consequences of a major shock rather than the actual shape of the shock. Scenarios have more open-ended purposes than forecasting, "fuzzier" purposes, if you like, comparable to the grandmotherly musings of economic history. Nevertheless, *actively* and *explicitly* dismissing the scenario that really was to take place was unfortunate. There is no getting away from the fact that the simulation missed the true shock for reasons which suggest that some lessons of the past have not been learned. This genera-

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tion is not the first to play war games. As Kubarych reports, Admiral Chester Nimitz stated that the war with Japan was "gamed" so often, by so many groups, that nothing came as a surprise, "absolutely nothing, except the Kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war." The error in 2001 was the same one of mirror-imaging, of assuming that non-Westerners would behave like Westerners. No one except the politically incorrect would have admitted to thinking otherwise.

For all that, the CFR simulation exercise was an ingenious idea in a financial sector normally given to heavily-quantified (and repeatedly wrong) predictions. The CFR exercise is interesting less for its conclusions—necessarily transient, the more so in view of the impact of September 11—than because it may persuade other observers to contemplate open-ended scenario planning. The U.S. Army seemingly agreed when it hired Hollywood scriptwriters to imagine fresh terrorist scenarios right after that fateful day. This non-quantitative, apparently fanciful method is perhaps the only way to get decision-makers, who, until now, have inclined to be condescending about such approaches, to consider the whole range of influences on the global economy. They have tended to believe there is a sharp, identifiable difference between what they "need to know" as opposed to a broader range of "soft" variables and complex interactions that fall under a merely "nice to know" heading best left to people in ivory towers. How wrong they were.

The CFR simulation, tragically abetted by September 11, may help to change their minds. It was genuinely ahead of the game. Only its real importance, therefore, leads me to go on picking on some of its weak points. Participants were drawn from the financially great and good, and they were Americans. They were going to think like Americans and anticipate a future of prosperous internationalism whatever the occasional upset. No future of theirs would ever include a re-run of the medievalism to which Islamic terrorism would like to take us back. The organizers did dream up "a large number of fascinating, highly imaginative plot twists", but neglected to pursue them because they "feared that simulation participants would have . . . ridiculed them or dropped everything else to dig into them." The claim made for scenarios is that eliciting imaginative possibilities is one of their special virtues. But this benefit was foregone here. Too few resources were expended on preparing the scenarios and too little time ("a whole Saturday") allotted. Moreover, financial crises are seldom single shocks. They are not just Brutus murdering Caesar, but full-fledged Greek tragedies with horribly ordained multiple role-playing. Simulating a slither into the depths rather than a dramatic plunge would have been more compelling. It would definitely have been truer to the simulations that economic history has already run for us.

Will Globalization Backfire?

HAROLD JAMES distinguishes three ways in which globalization may be reversed or reverse itself. The first is the one favored by the perpetual opponents of capitalism: Intrinsic contradictions in the capital markets will make them blow up. Capital markets will *exsolve*, so to speak, giving off bubbles that burst with a bang. At its worst, a bursting like this in the Great Depression forced the world economy down to a low equilibrium where exchanges tended to retreat behind national frontiers. The institutional apparatus to support it was, however, rebuilt after 1945, and what has been done once can be done again, if necessary. In principle, rescuing the system should be easier now that there are precedents for so doing. Politicians may actually be

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more willing to reconstitute international organizations than to face down opposition in their own countries. A failure of nerve in the face of predictions of the self-liquidation of international capitalism would be worse than unnecessary; it would amount to a death-wish.

Otherwise, second, if everything does go wrong, the international economy may *dissolve*. One route to such dissolution would be via institutional failure, the inability of the system's presiding institutions to manage its crises successfully. James devotes most of his labor to this problem of the interwar years, producing a learned and (for a technical subject) enviably readable history. Although he formally leaves open whether globalization will survive this time, his arguments all tend toward optimism. Yet the somewhat uncertain management of institutions like the World Bank and IMF does not warrant complacency. In keeping the world financial system afloat on September 11, the hero of the hour was Roger Ferguson, Alan Greenspan's deputy, who stayed when the Federal Reserve building was mostly evacuated, issued a statement saying that the Federal Reserve system was still operating, and provided $80 billion of liquidity during the day. It is all too easy to imagine other circumstances, less professional and brave people, and an alternative response.

This leaves James' third issue: the backlash against globalization. The prospect became a significant one about 1997, when opposition within the developed countries began to approach a crescendo and to coalesce across their borders. We may label this auto-immune disease the Seattle syndrome. It was trumped by the atrocities of September 11, which we may term the Taliban scenario. The two species of opposition may reinforce one another, but it is convenient to deal with them separately.

The New Opposition

WE THUS need to step outside the reviewing procedure at this point in order to consider two broad streams of threat to globalization. No book written before September 11 could be expected to take into account the specifics of the world after that date. None does, though James explicitly deals with the issue of whether the modern phase of globalization might be reversed, while O'Rourke and Williamson are persuaded that, as they find in the past, counteracting resistance is always likely to build up. The difference between past and present experience is, however, as significant as the similarity. That difference lies, in large measure, in the extra-political and extra-legal nature of modern anti-globalization protests. This is true if we look at threats from within or those from without, at Seattle or the Taliban (or as we may now say, Al-Qaeda).

Hitherto there was simply no confluence of violent, middle-class internal opposition to globalization in rich countries of the type signaled by the Seattle riots. Ironically, the most impressive organization in the history of international trade was in favor of free trade, not against it. This was the Anti-Corn Law League that campaigned against agricultural protection in 19th-century Britain. As a grassroots organization the League was stupendous; it sent out one million pieces of propaganda from its Manchester office during a single week in February 1843. The Seattle protestors' use of the Internet was scarcely more dramatic, the difference of course being that the League was "for" free trade and modern protestors are against it in an astonishingly reactionary fashion. As for anti-globalization from the outside, so to speak, there was not in the past any systematic, lawless trans-global opposition of the kind offered by the Taliban-*cum*-Al-Qaeda training camps and actions. The conclusion we should draw

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from all this is that history may take us some way toward understanding globalization and its discontents, but it cannot take us the whole way. Hence, as I say, we must step a little outside the books under consideration in order to map the shape of modern anti-globalization protests.

The Taliban Scenario

THE REACH of Western information is more nearly global than either capital movements or commodity trade. Technologies and markets that broadcast images and news are capable of causing disturbances in three ways. First, the Hollywood effect raises unrealizable aspirations for living at the level of a fairy-tale United States, where the modal citizen appears to be represented by a film star in southern California. Second, American movie producers seem unaware—given the box office appeal of their products, why should they worry?—that the merest flecks of background in their films may prove inflammatory in more rigid and patriarchal societies. (I refer to the ordinary dress and everyday status of American women.) Third, we are now reaping what we have sown: the electronic transmission of information and misinformation runs both ways, providing ample exposure for the opinions of, say, Al-Qaeda. And their messages are intended to promote negative globalization.

Some of the present troubles accordingly arise from the fact that the world's political and economic markets are out of kilter. As far as the mass of the population in the less developed world is concerned, a disequilibrium consists in the way that information flows have heightened economic expectations far ahead of the ability of trade and investment to satisfy them. The poor are both titillated and frustrated. They therefore listen to the anti-globalization, anti-Western, and counter-capitalist ("counter-cap") messages put out by the disgruntled or opportunistic intellectuals among them. These intellectuals are men (here we can safely say men) whose status would be most threatened by competition from outside ideas. Some have gone so far as to forbid students in Muslim *madrassas* across South Asia access to newspapers and television. Where intellectuals-turned-fundamentalists have the grain of coherent ideologies to work with, their potential threat to the world system is greatest.

I do not claim that the West could have countered these effects easily and, although they have led to palpable envy around the world, they have not always provoked violent anti-Americanism. Nor is the contemporary revulsion against Westernization the first there has ever been. A similar element was present in the early rise of Indian nationalism. E-mails are not indispensable; mass action did not await their invention. Printing presses, railways, telegraphs, and postal systems were sufficient. Nor would official attempts to "explain" the American way of life have been particularly effective; such things must sound to poor peasants in distant lands like recipes for pie in the sky. Nevertheless, some intellectuals in the non-Western world might have been receptive to argument, as were those in the defeated countries after 1945.

Efforts to argue the abstract case for Western styles of economics and politics need not prove futile in the longer run either. It is worth considering an analogy with the way scientific revolutions occur, at least according to Thomas Kuhn, which is to say not by changing the minds of established authorities but by converting the next generation. A new Colombo Plan would help. As it is, Western academics seem fixated on the motes in the eyes of their own political systems, while

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the hubris of private-sector globalization seems to have blinded politicians to the value of generous and far-sighted public actions. Closing the overseas libraries of the United States Information Service, for example, has surely been an unfortunate act of cheese-paring.

As we quickly learned, the perpetrators of the atrocity in New York and Washington were not from within. They were external individuals who make up what Gerard Baker, an American columnist of London's *Financial Times*, calls "the ultimate anti-globalization movement." No one knows precisely what the ordinary inhabitants may be thinking in the countries from which this movement is recruited. Revealed preference suggests that many of them have responded to the Hollywood effect and display no objection to rich-country ways. Some are even desperate enough to put to sea in leaky boats in the hope of landing on a Western shore.

The powerful and influential, on the other hand, resist globalization on any number of grounds, summarized as distaste at the "imposition" of Western, or so-called American, culture. Their unease is largely cultural, its *bêtes noire* the supposed materialism and individualism of the West. The charge of materialism actually confuses material wealth with a fixation on objects. As an American friend who had worked in the Sudan once remarked to me, "we are not the materialists, goods come easy to us." But no one in the West would wish to escape the charge of individualism, and individual choice is a clear threat to hierarchies. Beneath all the various cultural overburdens, the aged patricians in less-developed societies who rage against these things are rent-seekers, striving to maintain privileges associated with existing forms of social organization. (I will not call the folkways "traditional" since they are adulterated by plenty of borrowed technology.) Undoubtedly, most of the individuals involved are so conditioned by their upbringing as not to recognize the element of selfishness in trying to deny their brothers, and especially their sisters, a taste of the modern world.

It is fashionable to see resentment against the West in terms that amount to a stage theory of economic history. Economies that have failed to climb aboard the bandwagon of growth fester away in corners of the world while the rest of us proceed ahead. Every so often the losers erupt in ways that hitherto have seemed little more dangerous to the West than an occasional spent meteor clanging into the desert. In any case, as the saying once went, we have the Maxim gun and they have not. There is a smack of the "end of history" thesis about the underlying assumption of unidirectional change. In its bald form, the thesis is economistic.

In this vein, individuals are assumed to seek happiness in material form. Once they attain something approximating their goal, they, or their children, will move up to a new stage, looking for services as well as goods, and for services that embody freedoms—independent judiciaries, an end to corruption, a press that does not suppress too much at the behest of the powerful, maybe even pluralistic government. We know that this happened in Europe, and we can see it happening in East Asia. We can interpret part of the struggle within Iran in approximately the same way. Where the tendencies have still not emerged, we tend to rescue the thesis by saying that momentum has stalled not through choice but via the machinations of old elites. Hence we portrayed the backlash in Afghanistan as a pathological response to national economic failure, whereby those in power stir up their people to opt out.

Opinion in the developed world assuredly believes that the fundamental-

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ist challenge to the West is driven by the inability of alien leaderships to cope with modernity. Yet if it is economic humiliation that bothers the fundamentalists, resentment should direct itself against East Asia, not the West. While other regions fell behind, East Asia pulled itself up by its bootstraps. If anyone has lost face they have lost it to the spectacular economic growth of Japan, the little dragons, and now China. The West was rich from the start. Since fundamentalists attack America and not Asia, it follows that the animus must have more complicated roots than simple economic humiliation.

Undoubtedly, the economistic interpretation of global change is acceptable in a broad sense. It is borne out by the history of the developed countries—unless one wants to imagine that the quest for freedoms and introduction of liberal laws has been independent of the emergence of a bourgeoisie. Yet as soon as this is said, the limitations of the theory are evident. Again: history takes place in the lags where motion outruns inertia. Economistic models and "swell of the ocean" theories must always assume that the outcome is written. So it may be in broad outline, but the pace and details of the story are made up as we go along. Economic history is not so deterministic, at least not in fine grain.

At the very least, the growth process may be delayed or distorted (involving attempts to pick and choose among borrowings, with the emphasis on information technology and military hardware). This seems to be the case now, given the reactive hardening of attitudes and the narrowing of Quranic teaching among the current young generations in the Islamic world. Anything approaching outright war on a regional scale or even a series of big terrorist strikes could still close down a large share of world trade. In that sense external backlash retains the power to disrupt globalization. Prevailing unidirectional theories do not adequately prepare us for this.

The Seattle Syndrome

FURTHER rapid liberalization of global trade had become doubtful even before September 11, 2001. Most governments are compromised by favors owed to special interests. Western leaders respond snappily to polls in shopping malls. Businessmen are at least as short-termist and even more reactive. They have not gone out of their way to proclaim why the anti-capitalist and anti-globalist lobbies have added two and two together and got five, besides failing to face down the shock troops of the protest movement. Few business people write books and, ironically, the most publicized exception, George Soros, has come out against global capitalism. With political and business leaders like these, economist authors may well feel they are tacking into the wind. They may be reduced to hoping that Keynes was right—meaning that educated opinion will capture the minds of later generations.

Before September 11, anti-globalization was almost entirely an intra-Western affair. Until then, Kissinger seemed to be right that the United States lacked external enemies strong enough to be a threat. My first thought on hearing of the assault on the World Trade Center was indeed that the anti-globalization front had finally kicked over the traces. After all, the attack had done the protesters' work for them. In the weeks that followed there were job losses, reduced international movements of people, huge costs to Western economies, shrinking international business activity—all outcomes that they had been working for, together with the knock-on of increased morbidity and mortality in the less-developed world that they scarcely acknowledged would

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soon be the accompaniment.

Much Seattle-style protest seems to be a lifestyle choice, feeding on an array of anxieties, real and pretended. Protest gives a purpose to life, protest is fun, protest is sexy, and *protest can be made to pay.* Some companies appear to be paying Danegeld to bodies openly devoted to undermining international business. The Unilever Corporation is reported to have been funneling millions of dollars to anti-globalization groups. This money passes via a new subsidiary, Ben & Jerry's, to bodies such as Global Exchange, which campaigns to shut down the World Bank and WTO, and the Ruckus Society, which largely did shut down the Seattle WTO meeting. Ironically, some of the money went to a group called United for a Fair Economy, which campaigns against excessive pay for CEOs—though not very effectively as far as Unilever is concerned, since the firm's co-chairman was paid about $1.8 million in 2000. Executives of Unilever have previously advocated trade liberalization, and knew full well, when they took that company over, that Ben & Jerry's would support anti-globalization causes. Yet they seemed to think that it was worth buying even though, for unexplained reasons, they felt unable to place restrictions on its behavior.

Nor is this all: *Public* money has gone for similar purposes. The European Union lavishes taxpayers' money on counter-cap groups. UK National Lottery money has gone to the World Development Movement, a critic of corporate globalism. With a protest gravy train like this, "activists" are plainly onto a good thing.

Joseph Schumpeter once feared that capitalism's success would undermine the work ethic. The counter-cap assault gets its backing today from an ever-changing brew of discontents among the very middle class that is the beneficiary of business endeavor. Some of the individual objections to globalization may have merit but many positions are frivolous ("capitalism should be nicer"), others are mindless ("don't trade, blockade"), and still others are clearly wicked (web sites directing that the cobblestones of Gothenberg could be pried up and used as missiles). No operable and consistent policy alternative is offered; protest strikes out blindly. Less than three weeks after September 11, anti-globalization demonstrators in London had switched to protesting against government plans to involve the private sector in the provision of Britain's health and education services. The Green Party co-sponsored the rally. Two female "activists" danced topless. Seven others were arrested on suspicion of conspiring to commit violent crimes.

The counter-cap movement is held together by the suspicion of markets, a strong collectivist instinct, and a belief in protest as a form of moral uplift (signaled, no doubt, by topless dancing). The demands of such a movement cannot possibly be appeased. The movement is Stakhanovite: when one goal is reached, the target indicator shifts upwards, as in some Soviet factory. What, then, drives all this? Lurking beneath the kaleidoscopic variety of causes seems to be a rise in expectations capable of outstripping even the rise in wealth and leisure achieved in Western society, indeed made possible by this very achievement. Fuel is heaped on the flames by readily-aroused hostility to any increase in competition in the workplace.

The constant mutation of protest betrays its negative and opportunistic sides. More sober protesters might take counsel were not so many of them adamant in their beliefs that the global environment is going to hell in a handcart and that world trade is inherently a bad thing—the latter opinion being firmly held by people who, to judge from those I have asked, have never heard of David

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Ricardo, let alone read him. One sign of widespread bad faith is the misrepresentation of the WTO as a dictatorial form of world government rather than a very limited world association in which legitimate governments are represented.

Some governments, too, are plainly guilty of opportunism over the issue of globalization. Lionel Jospin wants France to speak for anti-globalization. He backs a Tobin tax (a levy on cross-border capital movements) contrary to the advice of his finance minister, Laurent Fabius. Professor Tobin himself does not think that imposing such a tax would be a good idea in present circumstances: his aim was to stabilize exchange rates, not generate funds for the next fashionable development project. Fabius counters Jospin by proposing a tax on arms sales and he has upped the ante. To Fabius, it is not France but Europe that is uniquely placed to lead the discussion of globalization—a discussion whose statist results he announces in advance as the taking of action to regulate the global economy and protect the environment. He takes the view that Europe's unique capacity to achieve this arises from its experience of regional integration and its balanced institutional framework. Yet this "balanced framework" includes the Common Agricultural Policy, which blocks the marketing of farm crops from poor countries at a cost to them of an estimated $75 billion per year! Next, Gerhard Schröder leapfrogs over to claim that Germany *and* France should lead the debate. We now face not only state-sponsored anti-globalism, but a bidding war over who is to head it.

Can Backlash Really Prevail?

THE TREND of counter-cap opinion and even some government opinion would lead to damaging or even reversing trade flows. Most "activists" want more regulation and more national sovereignty, while in the same breath demanding that the West intervene, in a virtually neo-colonialist way, to force economic development on poorer nations, at the expense of *their* sovereignty. To Harold James their hopes seem forlorn. In his concluding chapter he remarks that, absent coherent ideology and without examples of countries successfully de-linked from world trade, big government and nationalism are discredited shells. Cuba and North Korea certainly seem to bear that out. James's view is a rational one. The question is, will rationality prevail?

James takes the position that international organizations are stronger than they were between the wars. As his subtitle, "Lessons from the Great Depression", suggests, the interwar period serves as his principal economic and intellectual baseline. However, his faith in the strength of modern international organizations sits a little uneasily alongside his vision of a world system too complex to plan and held together by spontaneous coordination. It sits awkwardly, too, with his account of the scant means of enforcement available to world bodies.

Central to his argument is the belief that the "Washington consensus" on economic liberalization differs fundamentally from the inter-war "Geneva consensus." The world of the League of Nations was built on treaties; the modern world is built, he says, on "sustained reflection about appropriate policies." Thus, in deciding that globalization probably will not be reversed, he relies heavily on "intellectual conversion" to free trade. Maybe good ideas can drive out bad after all and Gresham's Law be overturned, though the recurrent history of trade protection scarcely guarantees this, and James himself admits that free market parties do badly in the polls. The question therefore becomes this: Can the world rely on the intellectual commitment of politicians in the face of outside threats, internal

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protest, and the ever-present clamor for protection by sectional interests? The diffuse interests of the whole of society are always hard to defend in the teeth of lobbying by more tightly-focused groups; Mancur Olson long ago drew our attention to that.[4]

Liberalization has undoubtedly been assisted by the fact that policy positions in many countries are held by individuals trained in Western economics departments, and who therefore do understand Ricardo's theorem, comparative advantage and the benefits of trade. Their positions, however, tend to be advisory rather than legislative. As for the ultimate resilience of academe, it is a frail reed. Recall the passage in Peter Drucker's autobiography about the first Nazi-led faculty meeting at Frankfurt, the most liberal of German universities.[5] After hearing his Jewish colleagues dismissed without salary and forbidden to enter university precincts, the leading liberal got up and asked: "Will there be more money for research in physiology?" An extreme case of human fear, frailty and greed? Fear, frailty and greed, yes; but such behavior may not prove altogether exceptional in the face of violent anti-globalization protest and well-funded conniving.

By pressing ahead with the WTO ministerial talks at Doha this past autumn, even in the face of the September 11 attacks, world leaders have certainly shown that James is right, up to a point, to have spotted an intellectual conversion to free trade. But will those leaders always remain among the converted, and if they do, will they succeed in advancing international economic integration in the face of opposition on so many fronts? The happy smile of Franz Fischler, the EU agricultural commissioner, when he returned from Doha bodes ill. "The final form of the declaration was aimed", reported the *Financial Times* on November 16 last, "primarily at pacifying Europe's powerful farming lobby."

Just as nations have interests more than they have friends, so governments have lobbies more than they have principles. From a purely abstract standpoint James may be right. I hope so. But if the intellectual commitment of the political classes is all that lies between us and deglobalization, we are by no means completely out of the wood. Economic history suggests that more than good intentions may be needed to preserve globalization from the countervailing forces it provokes. □

[4]Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

[5]Drucker, *Adventures of a Bystander* (London: Frankfurt, 1979).

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> Trade and Commerce, if they were not made of Indian rubber, would never manage to bounce over the obstacles which legislators are continually putting in their way.
>
> —Henry David Thoreau,
> *Civil Disobedience* (1849)

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The Best Defense

Barry R. Posen

John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 448 pp., $27.95.

THE ABSENCE of a sovereign in international politics, the root of what structural realists call the condition of anarchy, encourages states to look to their own security. Power, especially the power to wage war, is the means to this end, and states try to accumulate power because in the event of aggression by others, they must rely on themselves; they live in a "self-help" world. All "structural" realists agree on this point. Where they have come to disagree in recent years is whether states "satisfice", in Herbert Simon's artful term, or "maximize."[1] Do they struggle for power until—for whatever reasons—they feel reasonably secure? Or do they struggle on until they achieve something like hegemony—the domination of their political environment (however they define both domination and environment)?

The "satisficers" are now called defensive realists; the "maximizers" offensive realists. John J. Mearsheimer, in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, establishes himself as the leader of the offensive realists, for his is the first systematic, historically grounded statement of the "theory of offensive realism." Informally, Mearsheimer's analysis also constitutes a test of that theory. The result is a superb book: the theory is stated with admirable clarity; evidence is marshaled by the battalion. Though the non-specialist reader must assimilate a slightly esoteric set of terms, there are only a few of them and they are so colorful that Mearsheimer need only explain them once. Few international relations theorists would introduce a new term into political science such as "bait and bleed strategy"; perhaps more should do so because the reader does not easily forget such evocative language. Anyone interested in international politics can read, enjoy, understand and argue with this book. It is not without problems, which will be taken up below—but first to the argument.

The Theory

REALISTS, OR rather "structural realists" as they have been termed since the publication of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* in 1979, believe that broad patterns of behavior among the most powerful states in international politics over hundreds of years can be explained by the fact that all states must deal with the same problem: anarchy. This critical problem shapes the way states live. States must look to their own defense. They arm when they might prefer not to. They ally with countries they loathe. They might even start wars when they prefer peace. States work hard to make themselves secure. Nevertheless, many structural realists—sometimes dubbed "defensive realists"—believe that despite the condition of anarchy, states will stop well short of hegemony if geography or technology or social organization favors the defense. States seek power as a means to an end—security. Starting from a world of fear and struggle, defensive realists come to a qualifiedly optimistic conclusion: that, at least in theory,

[1]Simon, *The Sciences of the Artificial* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 64-5.

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conditions exist under which all states can be safe, even in anarchy. Wars could still happen for any number of reasons, but violent struggle for security may not be inevitable.

Mearsheimer also believes that states seek power to attain security, but he argues that so long as anarchy exists, no state can ever be truly secure. He asserts that even powerful states will seldom believe they have enough power to remain secure so long as others have significant power. Instead, states will keep trying to add to their power. They will try to maximize relative power by moving to increase their share of all the power in the world. Indeed, any state that gets the chance will bid for hegemony: it will try to make itself unchallengeable militarily by any state capable enough, and close enough, to ever threaten it with damage. This is a key disagreement between offensive and defensive realists. There is no happy ending for Mearsheimer, hence the "tragedy" of great power politics in his title.

Mearsheimer does not argue, however, that all states seek hegemony all the time. Most lack the capacity to achieve hegemony, and though they are interested in improving their relative power position, they are also interested in protecting their existing power position, which their attempts at aggrandizement may jeopardize. But what kind of hegemony do capable states seek? Mearsheimer argues that they bid for regional hegemony.

A regional hegemon seeks to be the most powerful state in its surrounding area, especially on land. If strong enough, it will wage war to finish off any "near peer" competitors around it. The power of a state derives from the size of its economy and its population, but these factors must be distilled into "land power" for a state to be a great power. Mearsheimer argues that land power is the most important kind in international politics because land power wins wars. Land power is based mainly on the size and quality of a state's army and, in modern times, the air and naval capabilities that contribute directly to the striking power of armies. Aspiring hegemons, therefore, seek to be the most capable land power in their region, and by a very substantial margin.

Aspiring hegemons cause most of the excitement in international politics: ultimately, other states that value their sovereignty have to stop them, but their efforts to contain aspiring hegemons are plagued with difficulties. When an aspiring hegemon starts to move, neighboring states will be slow to "balance" its expanding power. Neighboring powers will form balancing coalitions if they must, but their first preference is to see if some one power among them will do the heavy lifting. States pass the security buck to others if they can, hoping that another state will expend its own strength to stop or at least weaken the aspiring hegemon, leaving the buckpasser stronger relative to both. Mearsheimer observes that buckpassing is even more common than balancing, and on this point he tilts with "defensive realists" who argue that balancing is the most common response to hegemonic ambitions. Offensive and defensive realists agree, however, that the least likely response is "bandwagoning." States seldom join up with the expansionist program of the most powerful state in the system unless they are too weak to play either the balancing or buckpassing game. Bandwagoning, all realists agree, at best dooms a state to be the hegemon's final victim.

The choices a state has in dealing with an aspiring hegemon are influenced heavily by the constellation of power in the international system—bipolarity, balanced multipolarity or unbalanced multipolarity—as tempered by the facts of geography. Like Waltz, Mearsheimer

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finds bipolarity—a world with only two relatively equal superpowers—to be the most stable system. The two powers watch each other carefully, and neither can make gains without energizing intense balancing behavior by the other. Balanced multipolarity is the second most stable system; though it may be characterized by much diplomatic jockeying for advantage and some war, large-scale war should not occur. The least stable system is unbalanced multipolarity. One power emerges far ahead of the (regional) pack, and will soon be tempted to try to cement its advantage. This leads to hegemonic war (though this is not a term that Mearsheimer uses). Moreover, because other powers are usually tempted to buckpass rather than balance, the aspiring hegemon may be able to knock off some of its rivals one at a time until the survivors realize that only a great coalition can stop its march.

The concept of "unbalanced multipolarity" is one of Mearsheimer's key theoretical innovations. It is Mearsheimer's story of Europe's great wars. In contrast to defensive realists, Mearsheimer does not believe that there is enough variation in the inherent defensive or offensive possibilities of military technology in any given era to affect significantly the competitive behavior of states. Defensive realists believe that competition among land powers will be muted when the defense has the advantage. Mearsheimer believes that land power is land power, and that the power to defend and the power to attack are pretty much the same. To make this point, he carefully measures the power of states since the French Revolution. He shows convincingly that the great aspiring hegemons—Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia—were significantly superior to their immediate neighbors when they embarked on their ambitious careers. Moreover, he shows that the young United States embarked on a similar career in North America, and for similar reasons. He notes, however, that the United States is modern history's only successful regional hegemon; all others failed.

Are there any great powers that just "stop"? Mearsheimer observes that the insular powers—Britain and the continental United States—have not bid for Eurasian hegemony. The reason, to which he refers repeatedly, is the "stopping power of water." The insular powers do not try to establish Eurasian continental hegemony despite the disparity between their power potential and that of the land powers. They do not do so because, in Mearsheimer's view, it is difficult for them to get ashore on continental land masses with a large army. By the same token, it is difficult for any state on the continental land mass to get at them. This is Mearsheimer's sole concession to defensive realism, though he does not quite admit this theoretical point.

The only security concern of the insular power, therefore, is the threat of domination of the Eurasian continental land mass by a single hegemon. This could come about, as balance-of-power theorists have often suggested, if a continental empire could combine the surpluses of many conquered continental states and use it to produce a naval challenge to the insular state. Thus, the insular states buckpass to continental balancers unless it appears likely that an aspiring hegemon might succeed; they then seek to restore the balance by helping the surviving competitors of the continental hegemon to cut it down to size. Afterwards, insular states withdraw from the continent, their faith in the "stopping power of water" restored. This occurs, ironically, just at the moment that they have overcome that stopping power by projecting massive land forces across the water into the heart of the continent, a wrinkle that Mearsheimer overlooks. The British went

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home after the Napoleonic Wars and World War I. The United States went home after World War I and seemed on the verge of doing so after World War II, until the risk of Soviet hegemony over Europe caused it to reconsider.

The Problems

MEARSHEIMER has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the behavior of great powers—especially great land powers. For the most part, their security concerns are not easily satisfied. Their basic tendency is to expand to dominate their immediate environment, meaning, for the most part, the territories around them. They do this for security reasons: one does not need a hyperactive genius like Napoleon, an imaginative but adolescent atavist like Kaiser Wilhelm II, or a monster like Adolf Hitler to get hegemonic wars. One only needs unbalanced multipolarity amid the massive power of the states these men led. Stated baldly this argument is overdrawn, but it serves an important theoretical purpose: to show that all aspiring hegemons have in common a significant military advantage over their neighbors. Mearsheimer successfully demonstrates that the great land powers do bid for hegemony and that "land power is the main instrument for winning wars." He is twice correct, but it would have been helpful had he wrestled theoretically with the fact that the "land powers" seldom win their great hegemonic wars. Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the Cold War are 0 for 4, and the great sea powers have been central to bringing them down.

Indeed, Mearsheimer's treatment of sea powers is full of unsolved puzzles. He gives vast causal weight to the geographic fact of "large bodies of water." In this, he has much in common with the better geopoliticians such as Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman. Britain and the United States have indeed foregone direct efforts to dominate the Eurasian landmass. Even when the temptations must have been high, at the end of great balance-of-power wars that left Britain and the United States on the continent in positions of strength, the stopping power of water overcome, these two have packed up and gone home, or nearly done so. Surely this is more than an accident of geography. It seems a prediction of *defensive*, not offensive, realism. With the continental hegemons eliminated, the insular powers felt safe enough to leave.

The insular powers are guilty of other kinds of satisficing behavior, too, a fact that also seems better explained by defensive realism. How are we to understand why the British stayed out of the American Civil War? Mearsheimer handles this in a brief and unsatisfying footnote: the British calculated that the Union would win and that intervention was fruitless. But given the duration and scale of the North American bloodletting, it is peculiar that the British would have been so resigned to the notion that they could not defend, much less improve, their power position by helping the South.

Similarly, it is peculiar that the United States, having expanded across North America, drew back from the direct conquest of Canada and Mexico, not to mention other countries in Central and South America. Mearsheimer credits the United States with understanding that by the time the lands encompassing the lower 48 states were under U.S. control, Mexico and Canada were recognized as full-fledged nations and were thus too difficult for the United States to conquer and govern. Such restraint seems remarkably sagacious, indeed *un*-tragic, given offensive realism's predictions for the behavior of land powers. Presumably, offensive realism would argue in reply that massive power disparities made the United States the hegemon

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of the Western Hemisphere to such a degree that there was no need to directly conquer neighboring Canada and Mexico.

Given that the United States did indeed establish and defend a kind of hegemony across the entire Western Hemisphere, and that the British established and defended their hegemony across the then-less-developed world, it appears that at least some of the behavior of the insular powers can be explained by offensive realism. Such powers expand their influence wherever others are weak, but they endeavor to do so without direct occupation by large armies. Water did not stop the United States or Britain; rather, it was the medium by which they expanded. The "stopping power of water" that Mearsheimer observes was in truth an artifact of the presence of several organized great powers on the Eurasian landmass. Because they had to defend themselves from each other with armies, they had limited resources left for navies. Insular powers preferred to project their own defense outward with navies; it was eminently reasonable for them to want to fight at sea, away from their homelands, rather than on their own shores. Insular powers were free to put the bulk of their resources into navies and were rewarded for doing so by no longer having to worry about invasion.

Clearly, then, major sea powers strove for much more than regional naval superiority—they built navies of global reach, and sought a margin of superiority over any, and sometimes all, possible challengers. Having done so, they had a potent instrument of power projection at hand, and they used it to expand their power where others were weak or disorganized. Given their continental security problems, the land powers would have had a difficult time building a navy sufficient to challenge an insular power endowed with roughly equivalent resources, a problem the Wilhelmines tried and failed to solve. Likewise, the insular powers would have had a difficult time building an army to challenge the great land powers, but they still managed to challenge the not-so-great.

The case of Imperial Japan, however, undermines Mearsheimer's argument that the "stopping power of water" predicts continental restraint for insular powers. Japan was an insular power, yet starting at the end of the 19th century it struggled to dominate the peninsula and islands in its immediate neighborhood. Not many decades into the 20th century Japan tried to conquer the proximate Eurasian land mass. Japan was undeterred by the stopping power of water, and also unreassured by it. Mearsheimer treats the facts of the Japanese case extensively, but devotes only a single paragraph to its status as a theoretical anomaly. Japan expanded because there were no great powers in Northeast Asia to prevent it from so doing. Opportunity mattered much more to its behavior than did the defensive barrier provided by nature. Japan succumbed to the temptation to expand its power by asserting control over weaker players, as did the United States and the British before it. The United States and the British relied more on strategies of indirect influence, though they did not forego direct military intervention and control when it was necessary or feasible. Even when British and U.S. intervention was direct, these two states seem to have been adept at local tactics of divide, co-opt and conquer. Japan relied on direct military conquest and stern repression. Perhaps the power disparity between Japan and these weaker states was too small to permit less heavy-handed tactics.

In contrast to what Mearsheimer asserts, his theory of "offensive realism" predicts that the sea powers should have the same general expansive orientation as the land powers. Japan is the clearest and most brutal example of "land power"-like

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behavior, but instead of playing it up theoretically, Mearsheimer plays it down. The tactics and strategies of the two great insular powers, Britain and the United States, have usually differed from those of the great land powers, it is true, but their expansive orientation could just as easily have been stressed. Overall, Mearsheimer would have been wise to take up this point and offer an explanation for how and why the expansive strategies of land and sea powers differ, and what kinds of success each kind of power permits. Such an explanation, even if imperfect, would have sat better with the theory of offensive realism than the somewhat mechanical invocation of "the stopping power of water."

The Future

MEARSHEIMER'S theory of offensive realism explains even more about international politics than he himself suggests. It predicts that all great powers will be grabby—land powers and sea powers. Defensive realists predict too much cooperation. Anarchy does provide strong incentives for states to improve their power position, and they will attempt to do so with greater energy than would generally make sense to the disinterested observer. Nevertheless, Mearsheimer's account of the "stopping power of water" and its influence on the insular powers does suggest that physical facts may make a state feel relatively safe, with the result that it will compete with less energy, maybe less brutality, and perhaps with less self-destructiveness than will the land powers. If both observations are correct, then perhaps the divide between offensive and defensive realists is not really so great. Anarchy invites states to compete intensively for power for security reasons—and they do. The purpose of power is security, and sometimes states achieve enough security to temper, though not terminate, their pursuit of more power.

On the basis of his historical account of the influence of the "stopping power of water", Mearsheimer predicts that the United States will soon come home. It will return to its historical "off-shore balancer" role. But holding geography out of the equation, the world today is quite similar to his system of "unbalanced multipolarity." A consistent theory of offensive realism should predict that once the international system becomes one of unbalanced multipolarity, even a disproportionately powerful insular state should succumb to the temptation to try to dominate the entire system, and knock potential peer competitors out of the game. Mearsheimer predicts otherwise: the permanent defensive advantage offered by the ocean barrier will somehow always bring even the greatest of sea powers back home. Thus his prediction that the United States will soon come home—though this outcome is nowhere in sight.

How unbalanced is the current international system? Very much so. If Mearsheimer's definition of power would allow us simply to count GDPs, he might agree. One has to treat the EU as a unitary great power to find an economy and population roughly equal to the United States; otherwise it takes more than four nation-states in combination to approximate America's economic prowess. Mearsheimer's way of measuring power demands that we also assess current ground force strengths, and he would note that the U.S. Army and Marines are small by the historical standard of continental great powers. But even Mearsheimer measures land power by the combination of ground forces and their supporting air and naval forces. U.S. air and naval forces now provide an historically unprecedented augmentation of American ground power. We do not know how much, because there has not yet been a good test (not even in Afghanistan), but most agree that the

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augmentation is large. It could be larger still if the U.S. Air Force were more interested in the land battle.

It is also worth noting that though a great sea power could formerly hope to command only one global commons—the sea—in many parts of the world the United States now commands the sky above 10,000 feet. Although the United States does not now truly command space (it probably cannot immediately deny space to others and simultaneously fully protect American assets), it uses space for many more military purposes than does any other power, which provides the United States with an extraordinary intelligence, communications and navigation advantage. If it came to it, the United States would probably win an extended armed struggle for command of space. The United States has gone beyond command of the sea to command of the planetary commons. Counting economic power, and military power properly measured, the current distribution of power globally is probably as unbalanced as it was when it took more than two decades, six coalitions, and the ultimate military cooperation of Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia to bring down Napoleon.

The United States is, however, an insular power protected by a "large body of water." Mearsheimer and most of his defensive realist foils are right to predict that the United States is unlikely to embark on a campaign of continental conquest to consolidate its global hegemony. The United States will probably not be tempted to risk all on a single throw of the iron dice, because the loss of its world hegemonic position would but incrementally reduce its security. The oceans do provide an extra margin of defensive safety. The U.S. nuclear arsenal makes a direct great power challenge to the United States exceedingly difficult, even if the United States were no longer the global hegemon, and makes equally self-destructive a direct U.S. military challenge to another power with sufficient nuclear weapons. Indeed, in a somewhat murky discussion, even Mearsheimer concedes that states with secure nuclear retaliatory forces are very unlikely to attempt the conquest of their nuclear peers. Nuclear deterrence will likely moderate great power competition, making old-style hegemonic wars unlikely.

Nevertheless, since the Cold War ended, the United States has not only held its positions across the globe, but is trying energetically to expand its power and influence. As the last Defense Guidance of the elder Bush Administration recommended, it has been U.S. policy to try to forestall the rise of "peer competitors." The United States has not brought its legions home as it did after World War I and nearly did after World War II, or as the British did after the Napoleonic Wars and after World War I. The post-Cold War "debate" on foreign policy between Democrats and Republicans has not been fought out over the issue of whether the United States should have an activist foreign policy: the two parties could only disagree on how much military management of the internal politics of strategically insignificant failed states the United States should undertake. The two parties agreed that the U.S. military's Unified and Specified Commands and Commanders should continue to organize the entire globe for war; that NATO should expand; that the U.S. military should be substantially more capable than that of any other state or combination of states; and even that the U.S. military should be forward deployed—still a quarter million troops as of June 2001. They have also agreed, more or less, that the United States should preserve some degree of nuclear superiority over other nuclear powers, and that it would be better if no other nuclear powers emerged—both policies that Mearsheimer would predict. And the terrorist attacks of

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September 11, 2001, which portend a significant increase in the cost of hegemony to the United States, seem to have injected still more energy and commitment into an expansive U.S. foreign policy, not less.

I happen to view U.S. foreign policy activism since the collapse of the Soviet Union to be excessive relative to U.S. security requirements. So, I think, for most practical purposes, does John Mearsheimer. But it is peculiar that Mearsheimer should find this policy of U.S. primacy at odds with his theory. After all, his theory, offensive realism, predicts it. □

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Kaplan's War

Mark Blitz

Robert D. Kaplan, *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos* (New York: Random House, 2002), 198 pp., $22.95.

FROM WHAT standpoint should we conduct foreign affairs? We currently discuss this issue by deploying a stylized division between national interest and morality, or realism and idealism. Endless variations on this division, with degrees of neo- and paleo- as varied and subtle as the thousand shades of beige in a decorator's palette, try but necessarily fail to overcome the underlying split.

Many sensible people like to combine the contenders: national interest in the service of something noble, or limited by general rules; moralism that is neither self-immolating nor unaware that proper action requires a live actor. Nonetheless, it is difficult to put the two together convincingly. This should be no surprise, because the Kantianism in which the split originates must leave a principled gulf between the two halves. The free and ideal cannot be the determined and material; what is moral or legal ought to shape our actions even if these dutiful measures fail to satisfy. Some day, Kant believed it was moral to hope, what is right will always be what succeeds. That day is in the infinite future, though, and however close we come it can never be reached.

Our other reigning analytical division concerns how much to rely on others in our foreign policies and how much to go it alone. This split is deeper than a mere tactical squabble because idealism and internationalism are often conflated, as are realism and nationalism. Kant and Woodrow Wilson welcomed leagues and federations while America-firsters have preferred to seal our borders. These conflations are misleading, however. A case for world government can be made by realists on Hobbes' grounds of self-interest and fear alone. The democratic nation-builders of the UN-ridiculing Reagan era were motivated by a love of equal rights as much as if not more than by national interest. International institutions can govern for reasons as narrow, or under laws and regulations as palpably biased, as nations can be

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broad-minded and generous. The two major distinctions we have learned to use, problematic in themselves, do not overlap in any simple way.

We therefore need coherent intellectual ground from which to overcome—or, better, place ourselves ahead of—these ritualized divisions, especially the split between realism and morality. As it turns out, prior to the division of the world into interest and idealism by modern intellectuals, political choice in foreign affairs (often) appeared in a more unified manner. It is this unity that concerns Robert Kaplan—not only its history, but also its future.

Kaplan's *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos* is useful and interesting because it gropes toward such a coherent political perspective for the future, one based on interest without being immoral. That said, Kaplan clearly begins with what is harsh, not gentle, in this point of view. Indeed, reading him reminds one of the morbid thoughts that always seemed to be gathering under Andrei Gromyko's solemn countenance, a flock of ravens straining to be released into the howling night. *Warrior Politics* is the book of someone for whom an excess of dollar bills causes immediate concern about an impending shortage of green ink.

In the observer of foreign affairs, however, such a taste for worry can be beneficial. What would make for an annoying if darkly fascinating dinner companion can produce healthy caution when lives, fortunes and freedoms are at stake. For excessive concern to be useful, however, it must be moderated, and to be moderated it needs to be allied with good judgment. Aristotelian prudence rather than Nixonian brooding must be the guide.

Kaplan seeks to step in this prudential direction, and to develop from the habit or inclination to be on guard a useful standpoint from which to deal with what is threatening. He argues for "constructive pessimism" in foreign affairs, and makes his case not only with the evidence of his own journalistic eyes, but also the experience of others, as well as the views of thinkers and reflective statesmen. His strategy is to mine the philosophic literature and bring to the surface some brilliant advice on behalf of sobriety and watchfulness. He is not content to quote a sage remark or two, but allows himself the "excitement" of actually reading and following the authors to whom he is attracted.

Kaplan organizes his book around what he believes Machiavelli, Churchill, Kant, Thucydides, Livy, Sun-Tzu and others can teach us about how to face our international future. Because he examines these thinkers for his own purposes he is not altogether true to theirs: no one should read this book to learn precisely what Thucydides has to say. But because his sober intention is not far from theirs, because he is well guided in interpreting them, and because, above all, he is a serious man not blinded by pretense or pretentiousness, he is for practical purposes often close enough to the mark.

Kaplan is timely as well as thoughtful. Indeed, to call *Warrior Politics* timely is to damn with faint praise. Kaplan's warnings about Osama bin Laden, bioterrorism, and a volatile future of urban crowding, Islamic extremism, and poverty in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, were prescient when they were written, well before September 11, 2001. Several months ago, indeed, they might have seemed to some to be immoderate. The terrible reality of our murderous enemies now makes Kaplan's arguments appear more cautionary than excessive.

KAPLAN'S realism begins by looking at, not away from, facts and trends. The facts with which he is most concerned are those that challenge and will continue to challenge the United States in parts of what used to be called the Third World: growing populations

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(especially of young men), significant unemployment, ungovernable cities, radical religions, and easily producible weapons of mass destruction. After the destruction of the World Trade Center it is less likely than before that these facts will be ignored or downplayed, but it is still altogether possible that we will underestimate their continuing salience.

A second set of facts concerns American power in the world. The United States is unrivaled, but not all-powerful. We cannot intervene in every place to which moral concerns might drive us. We are subject to the realities of human self-interest and fear, and to geographical and historical constraints as well. We cannot escape some of the ways war must be fought—"if our soldiers cannot fight and kill at close range, our status as a superpower is in question", writes Kaplan—but we are also subject to technological change and to unconventional military asymmetries. While international law and organizations are becoming more powerful (in some areas), for the foreseeable future keeping the peace will depend on our own strength, interests, intentions and will.

These facts form the base for understanding how we must conduct ourselves—namely, realistically. This means that our approach must be guided by the "anxious foresight" that Kaplan finds in Hamilton, Madison and most other thinkers he discusses, as well as in statesmen such as George Marshall. We must be modest in our self-regard at moments of victory, cautious and when necessary manipulative with rivals, and restrained with our friends and those whom, however silently, we control. We must remember what ancient history teaches: "without struggle—and the sense of insecurity that motivates it—there is decadence."

Why must such realism govern our approach? The reason, as Kaplan never fails to remind us, is that human beings are usually self-interested, scheming, narrow-minded and fearful. As Machiavelli put it famously in *The Prince*, those who "make a profession of good in all regards must come to ruin among so many who are not good." A pagan "morality of consequence", not a Christian morality of intention, must therefore be our guide if we are to prosper and succeed in this world—hence Kaplan's provocative subtitle. We are also prone to overestimate our capacities and beneficence. Those of us who forget our limits will fail. The pagan ethos, however, will "curtail illusions", restrict fanaticism and reduce "the scope for miscalculation."

Kaplan clearly believed all this already, but he enjoys finding his view confirmed in the classics of political philosophy and strategy. He recognizes, too, that realism alone is not enough: "a policy with no moral intent will be cynical." According to Kaplan, Chamberlain was as realistic as Churchill but something more than realism was required in 1938. Now, one may doubt whether someone overcome at the crucial moment by baseless hope born of excessive fear was in fact realistic. But be that as it may, Churchill understood the real Hitler better than did Chamberlain, and Kaplan recognizes that Churchill's breadth of vision was not realism in the usual sense.

What is or causes this greater breadth? Kaplan locates the proper neighborhood to explore for his answer: "The moral basis of our foreign policy will depend upon the character of our nation and its leaders, not upon the absolutes of international law." But he has trouble clarifying his discovery. He mentions Greek virtue, warrior virtue, heroic virtue, and patriotism, but he is never quite able to say what these are or square them with the unblinking ability to look harsh facts in the face that he rightly admires. He recognizes the importance for Churchill of both his grasp of history and sense of daring, but he cannot put his finger on what unites these and differentiates Churchill from his often very gifted fellows. Similarly, Kaplan quotes approvingly

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Theodore Roosevelt's assertion that "aggressive fighting for the right is the noblest sport the world affords", but he does not make clear how FDR's and TR's concern with democratizing can be squared with their aristocratic virtue and realism.

Two additional studies might have helped Kaplan figure this out. One would be to examine Aristotle's discussion of great pride or greatness of soul, and of ethics generally. Such study would allow him better to articulate and round out his view of classical virtue, and of its links to the kind of practical reason he admires.

A second would be to reflect on the ambition to found or defend a liberal democratic regime. Hamilton and Madison surely were prudent realists as Kaplan suggests, but they also ambitiously helped to found a country. The success of their enterprise, serving as it did revolutionary principles, was hardly guaranteed. Their path was not the safe path, yet their actions were not headstrong. In both great pride and democratic ambition there is a link between seeking justice and seeing men and events as they are. One can see the facts realistically but not cynically, deeply but not as matters of calculation or causes of fearful inaction. Such facts look as they do because one sees them in terms of one's wish to make a home for one's own excellence, and to do so in a world of freedom on which such excellence depends.

OF COURSE, virtue in the service of liberal democracy and aristocratic excellence are not identical. Indeed, they will develop and conduct themselves differently, whatever their links in freedom and practical judgment. It is not only that Kaplan fails clearly to illuminate the unity of justice and interest that makes up the statesman's perspective; it is also that he skirts some of the problems in the relation between virtue and democratic politics. Democracies do not favor the education and training that allow Churchills to be produced; surely they, no more than other regimes, can guarantee such men. Party politics, mass media, technological changes and administrative complexity, moreover, require attention and limit or direct effort in ways that modify the simplicity, directness and reserve of more traditional excellence. Kaplan mentions most of these phenomena but does not truly grapple with their effect on the kind of statesmen he admires. It is also true that liberal democracies must usually succeed under ordinary leadership, for this is the leadership their founders and inventors know they are most likely to have: pessimism, however constructive, could expect no more.

If Kaplan is correct to think that something like warrior virtue will be as necessary in the future as it was in the past, these limits of democratic life must be considered. Perhaps it is enough if we foster the virtue of responsibility among our citizens, not in the narrow moralistic sense of guilt-fearing accountability, but in the more practical sense of taking on tasks and doing them effectively—including the political tasks of protecting and promoting natural rights and their intelligent use. Responsible character is more easily and widely achieved in a liberal democracy than is the out-sized virtue of Churchill or Lincoln or the passion of Achilles; yet it can make room for these should they appear, and if it must appear.

From the standpoint of responsibility, virtue or the ambition of democratic statesmen, "our" national interest will always be inseparable from what forms us: directions for foreign policy will be visible through principle restrained by advantage, or advantage shaped by principle. Our standards foster responsible confidence in ourselves and in the judgment that liberal democracy's merits will prevail. For this reason, responsible confidence is a more accurate American watchword than constructive pessimism.

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Despite his interest in individual warrior virtue, Kaplan is a shade too taken with cautious realism and quasi-determinism. His mild preference, or insufficient distaste, for world courts and other international institutions that limit American self-governance indicates that his heart is too much with regular (and sometimes stultifying) order at the expense of free flourishing within, and therefore sometimes at the edges of, this order.

In these ways, Kaplan falls a bit short of his goal. But a bit short—even quite a bit short—is still closer than most. Kaplan puts his readers on the right track in thinking about foreign affairs. This is admirable. Nonetheless, the track to our fog-shrouded destination is so full of curves that we are bound to become derailed. Given the difficulties, it should be no surprise that Kaplan, thoughtful as he is, is an imperfect guide. □

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Bacon's Proof

The Career and Controversies of Edward Teller

Adam Schulman

Edward Teller (with Judith L. Shoolery), *Memoirs: A Twentieth-Century Journey in Science and Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2001), 628 pp., $35.

NEARLY 400 years ago, Francis Bacon heralded the dawn of a new era of science and technology, when knowledge and power would be joined in one goal and scientists, rather than priests, would provide authoritative guidance for humanity. Henceforth, according to Bacon, scientists would secure and augment their prestige in society not so much by their dazzling theoretical insights as by the mastery of nature that their practicable science would confer on other men. Bacon predicted that the fruits of the new science would include not only inventions for the relief of human misery but also weapons of immense destructive power.

The Baconian project seemed to reach its zenith in the mid-20th century, when a small group of brilliant theoretical physicists unlocked the secrets of nuclear energy and collaborated on the invention of the nuclear reactor and the atom and hydrogen bombs. Edward Teller, now 94 years old, is among the last survivors of that titanic generation of physicists who permanently altered our world through their work on the Manhattan Project. Teller, who was involved in the race to build the atom bomb from its inception, is now famous—or more often notorious—as "the father of the hydrogen bomb." But Teller was also an early member of that select band of European theoretical physicists who, in the decades between the two world wars, laid the foundations of quantum mechanics, the comprehensive theory of matter and energy on which our understanding of nature now rests.

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Teller's memoirs, written with the aid of Judith Shoolery, are a fascinating record of the mutual entanglement of theoretical physics and world politics in the 20th century. Perhaps never again will a handful of theoretical scientists wield the enormous influence on world history that Teller and his colleagues exercised in the final months of World War II. Besides being an informative insider's account of those extraordinary times, Teller's memoirs are also valuable as the personal account of a man who pursued the twofold Baconian vision in its starkest form: to probe the fundamental nature of physical reality and to bring into the world devastating weapons of mass destruction.[1]

EDWARD TELLER was born in Budapest in 1908. His early years are notable chiefly for the friendships he formed with three other young Hungarians, all of them destined to become world-famous physicists who aided the Manhattan Project in decisive ways: Eugene Wigner, John von Neumann and Leo Szilard. The four friends, all of them Jewish, were destined to immigrate to the United States, fleeing European anti-semitism in general and the Nazis in particular. It is, of course, one of history's great ironies that Hitler's persecution of the Jews led to a vast intellectual westward migration, chiefly but not exclusively Jewish, which, among its other effects, greatly enhanced the intellectual firepower of the Allied war effort.[2]

Teller recounts his early experiences as a young theorist in the heady days of the birth of quantum mechanics. As with so many young physicists of the time, Teller's early career consisted mainly of an itinerant apprenticeship at the great scientific centers of Europe. Teller earned his doctorate under Werner Heisenberg in Leipzig, worked with Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker in Göttingen, and studied with Niels Bohr in Copenhagen. In 1932 he paid a memorable visit to Rome where he began a lifelong friendship with Enrico Fermi who, among many brilliant achievements, was the first to produce radioactive elements by bombarding uranium with neutrons. Without quite realizing it, Fermi had in 1932 discovered nuclear fission—the splitting of uranium atoms into atoms of other elements, accompanied by the conversion of mass into energy. The nuclear age was at hand.

Before leaving Europe permanently for the United States in 1935, Teller spent a year at the University of London. It was at that time that Leo Szilard proposed that the bombardment of nuclei by neutrons might release additional neutrons as well as radiant energy, thereby initiating a chain reaction that could result in a powerful explosion. Szilard shared his idea with Teller, who recalls having found it "interesting, frightening, and logical."

Prior to World War II, Teller spent six years as a professor at the George Washington University. These years were marked by frequent contact and collaboration with other great physicists who had emigrated from Europe to escape Hitler and the coming war, including Fermi, Bohr, Szilard, Wigner, George Gamow and Hans Bethe. In 1939, Werner Heisenberg visited Teller in Washington. When Teller asked Heisenberg why he would not stay in the United States, Heisenberg answered, "Even if my brother

[1]Teller's memoir is not his first foray into biography. A quarter century ago, he made himself and many of his papers available for Stanley A. Blumberg and Gwinn Owen's *Energy and Conflict: The Life and Times of Edward Teller* (New York: Putnam, 1976).

[2]See most recently on this subject Jean Medawar and David Pyke, *Hitler's Gift: The True Story of the Scientists Expelled by the Nazi Regime* (New York: Arcade, 2000).

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steals a silver spoon, he is still my brother."

Heisenberg was to spend the war years as the outstanding physicist in Nazi Germany and, it now seems clear, as the scientific leader of the German effort to achieve the atom bomb. In February 2002, letters written to Heisenberg after the war by Bohr—but never sent—were made public, documenting Bohr's claim that Heisenberg had devoted himself with enthusiasm to the Nazi bomb project.[3] At issue was a visit paid by Heisenberg and von Weizsäcker to Bohr in occupied Copenhagen in 1941, an incident now famous as the subject of Michael Frayn's hit play, *Copenhagen*. According to Bohr, at their meeting Heisenberg expressed his confidence that Germany would win the war and revealed that he had been working on the atom bomb more or less exclusively for the past two years. Heisenberg himself, after the war, claimed to have done what he could to prevent the development of an atom bomb in Germany. As for Teller, he has insisted from the start of the controversy that Heisenberg never had his heart in the work and that, to the extent that he labored, he labored as one forced. "I could not imagine", writes Teller, "that he would support the Nazis willingly, much less do so enthusiastically."

At a 1939 Washington conference on theoretical physics, Bohr announced that two chemists in Germany, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman, had shown that neutron bombardment can split uranium into lighter elements, with the release of energy and other particles. Nuclear fission, which Fermi had observed without interpreting it correctly, was now an established fact. Once again it was Szilard who drew the practical implications: if the fission process produced additional neutrons, initiating a chain reaction, then both nuclear energy and nuclear explosions would be feasible. The release of extra neutrons was soon confirmed experimentally. Szilard, Teller and Bohr quickly realized that nuclear fission could have profound military implications, particularly in light of the looming threat from Nazi Germany.

Corbis/Bettman

Teller, August 1984

Szilard drafted a letter to President Roosevelt alerting him to the possibility of a fission weapon. He felt the letter would have more weight with Roosevelt if it were signed by the most famous physicist of the time, Albert Einstein. On a memorable August day in 1939, Teller drove Szilard to Long Island to visit Einstein in his summer home. Einstein signed Szilard's letter, which foretold "extremely powerful bombs of a new type" and urged the President to fund nuclear research and to maintain "permanent contact between the Administration

[3]All eleven documents released on February 6, 2002 may be viewed at the web site of the Niels Bohr Archive at www.nbi.dk/NBA/papers/introduction.htm.

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and the group of physicists working on chain reaction in America." Having read the letter, Roosevelt at once set up an Advisory Committee on Uranium. At its first meeting, Teller asked for and was granted $6,000 to purchase graphite to construct an experimental nuclear reactor. Such were the modest beginnings of the Manhattan Project which, with the help of ten thousand people and the expenditure of $2 billion, produced the world's first atom bomb in 1945.

It is astonishing to reflect on how little time passed between Bohr's 1939 announcement of nuclear fission and the first successful test of the atom bomb in 1945. The Manhattan Project was carried out first at Columbia University and the University of Chicago, and later at a new laboratory established at Los Alamos, New Mexico. J. Robert Oppenheimer, a physicist recruited from the University of California at Berkeley, led the Los Alamos team. Teller, along with Bethe and von Neumann, was involved in much of the theoretical work of designing a fission bomb, and his account of that time is a valuable addition to the literature on the Manhattan Project. But from the beginning Teller was also an enthusiastic proponent of work on a fusion or thermonuclear weapon.

In an atom or fission bomb, the splitting of the uranium atom after it is struck by a neutron releases other neutrons in addition to a large quantity of energy. If a sufficient amount (or critical mass) of uranium is present, these other neutrons cause the fission of other uranium atoms, thereby initiating a chain reaction. Typically, two subcritical masses of uranium are kept apart until just before detonation; the size of a fission bomb is thus limited by the need, for safety's sake, to keep the quantity of uranium subcritical prior to detonation. In a hydrogen or fusion bomb, the main energy comes from the fusion of heavy hydrogen into helium. A hydrogen bomb is actually composed of a small fission bomb and a much larger fusion bomb; the tremendous heat generated by the fission device triggers the chain reaction of hydrogen fusion. Because of its two-stage design, a hydrogen bomb is also known as a thermonuclear weapon. With no restrictions as to critical mass, the size of a hydrogen bomb is virtually unlimited.

The thermonuclear bomb originated in the mind of Enrico Fermi in 1941. Initially, Teller himself was skeptical that a fission device could produce sufficient heat to create fusion. Fusion will not begin at temperatures lower than 50 million degrees, a condition found only at the center of stars like our sun. In any event, work on the fusion bomb—nicknamed "the Super" at Los Alamos—languished during the race to produce the atom bomb. The first such bomb (code name: Trinity) was tested successfully in July 1945, to be followed within a month by the dropping of atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

After the surrender of Japan, many of the senior scientists involved in the Manhattan Project wished to end their involvement in weapons research and return both to theoretical physics and to their normal lives. Oppenheimer declared that "with the war over, there is no reason to continue work on the hydrogen bomb." As for the Los Alamos laboratory, according to Teller, Oppenheimer said, "Give it back to the Indians." As Teller describes it, the attitude of most physicists reflected their revulsion after the use of the atom bomb on Japan and their optimism that, with the peace established in 1945, nuclear weapons research would be unnecessary. Bohr's view was typical: War in the nuclear age, because of its destructiveness, had become impossible. Therefore, scientists should no longer work on weapons. Teller found these opinions

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naive and unrealistic, and he was soon proved correct.

The Soviet Union exploded its first atom bomb in 1949, thanks in part to information supplied by Klaus Fuchs, a Communist spy at Los Alamos. If the hydrogen bomb were feasible, there was no doubt that the Soviets under Stalin would seek to develop it; Teller and others were therefore more determined than ever to press ahead with the American thermonuclear program. But Teller faced impassioned resistance from other physicists who seemed to believe that if we did not pursue the hydrogen bomb, then neither would the Soviets.

In January 1950, shortly after Fuchs' arrest for espionage, President Truman announced his decision to continue work on all forms of nuclear weapons, including the hydrogen bomb. Thus it was that, after a delay of some years, Teller could once more devote himself energetically to the thermonuclear program with the full support of the U.S. government, if not that of the majority of American physicists. Teller's account of this work is especially absorbing. The huge calculations required were performed with the aid of the world's first computing machines, designed by Teller's brilliant friend John von Neumann. The key breakthrough was an insight, due partly to Teller and partly to the mathematician Stanislaw Ulam, that fusion would commence if the fission explosion were used not only to heat the heavy hydrogen but also to compress it to a high density. The relative contributions of Teller and Ulam are still hotly disputed, and Teller's treatment of this subject is not perhaps definitive. In any event, on the basis of the Teller-Ulam configuration, and crucial calculations provided by Richard Garwin, a thermonuclear bomb was successfully exploded in 1952. The Soviets exploded their own thermonuclear bomb in 1955, and so began in earnest the era of uneasy peace preserved by the threat of mutually assured destruction.

IN THE YEARS after the achievement of the hydrogen bomb, Teller continued to play a leading role in formulating American policy on nuclear energy and weapons research. Most importantly, along with Ernest Lawrence at Berkeley, Teller persuaded the government to create a second national laboratory for nuclear weapons research in Livermore, California. Teller was also active in setting rules for the safety of nuclear reactors and in promoting advanced education in the field of "applied science", a sort of hybrid of engineering and theoretical physics.

Nonetheless, in the minds of most American physicists today and a good part of the educated public, as well, Edward Teller remains a sinister figure, somehow epitomizing in his person all that is morally suspect about the Cold War, atomic energy, and nuclear weapons. Indeed, Teller is generally taken to be one of four possible models (with Werner von Braun, Herman Kahn and Henry Kissinger) for Stanley Kubrick's unforgettable character Dr. Strangelove, played brilliantly by Peter Sellers in the 1964 film. In part, this is attributable to Teller's incessant promotion of the hydrogen bomb, his unpopular advocacy of peacetime uses for nuclear explosions (to dig harbors and canals, for example), his skepticism toward arms control, and, during the Reagan presidency, his role in promoting the Strategic Defense Initiative. Of course, in this last respect, the contempt heaped on Teller mirrors the fate of nearly every prominent public intellectual who dared to deviate from the prevailing liberal orthodoxy, especially in the last decades of the Cold War.

But Teller has also been particularly despised and shunned for his supposed role in the "downfall" of J. Robert

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Oppenheimer, whose security clearance was revoked by the Atomic Energy Commission following hearings in 1954. Oppenheimer was charged with harboring Communist sympathies; he was stripped of his clearance in part because of Teller's adverse testimony. Many physicists have never forgiven Teller for what seemed to them an act of treachery against a brilliant colleague who had, after all, guided the Manhattan Project to its triumphant success. It was easy enough to conclude that the long-running tension between Teller and Oppenheimer over whether to pursue the hydrogen bomb was the real reason Teller was willing to help destroy his former boss's reputation.

This is a complex and difficult subject, however, and one on which Teller's memoirs do shed some interesting light. (Teller's complete testimony is included as an appendix to the book.) While Oppenheimer was certainly no Soviet agent, he was, in his own words, "a member of just about every Communist Front organization on the West Coast." He also committed serious indiscretions and recklessly lied to federal investigators, actions for which he might have lost his clearance even without Teller's testimony. As for his own role, Teller clearly indicates that he regrets his decision to testify against Oppenheimer, that he admired him immensely, and that, in his testimony, he questioned only his colleague's judgment and never his loyalty. In any case, since Oppenheimer retained his post as director of Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study, one should not exaggerate the injury done to him by the suspension of his security clearance.

On the whole, it seems clear that the vilification Teller has endured is largely unmerited; that for decades he worked tirelessly and devotedly on behalf of his adopted country; that he made immeasurable contributions to American national security; and that, in all likelihood, the hydrogen bomb he bequeathed to the world has helped, by its deterrent effect, to maintain the relative peace the world enjoyed during the latter half of the 20th century. For these lasting achievements, Edward Teller, that supreme practitioner of Baconian science, deserves our admiration and our gratitude. □

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Arabian Nightmares

David Pryce-Jones

Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Oxford University, 2002), 180 pp., $23.

THERE IS a story, perhaps apocryphal, about a scholar who wrote a book of a million words on his subject. Asked why it had to be so long, this scholar replied that he did not have the time to write a shorter book. At rather regular intervals, Bernard Lewis publishes short books on one or another aspect of Islam, its history, and its cultural or political expressions in all periods up to the present. Each the fruit of a lifetime of scholarship, the books in this sequence have a character and a wisdom all their own. The tone is dispassionate though often sprightly, the argument authorita-

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tive, the supporting detail fresh, absorbing, and taken from an immense range of original sources. Lewis is master of the major languages of the Middle East and Europe. Now in his mid-eighties, he is the most emeritus of professors, an orientalist in the best sense of that great tradition. They don't come like that anymore.

The long-drawn process in which the Christian West and the world of Islam discovered one another is a favorite theme of his. He has clarified complex interactions arising from war and peace, examining the range of perceptions and misperceptions, prejudices and stereotypes, and of course borrowings and accommodations that have come into play and which govern today's fraught and unequal relationship between the West and Islam. How these two very different civilizations will come to terms that satisfy the demands and values of them both is now one of the world's more urgent questions.

In the historic days of its glory, Islam was the more dominant of the two. Muslim scholars preserved the learning of the classical world, and built on it; Lewis speaks of "their enterprise and their openness." Muslim armies conquered at all points of the compass. Why, Lewis asks, did the discoverers of America sail from Spain and not a Muslim Atlantic port as might have been expected? Machiavelli and Guiccardini both feared that the Ottoman Turks were destined to occupy Italy. Writing in the 1550s, Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, ambassador of the Holy Roman Emperor to Ottoman Turkey, sounded a modern note of doom. The West displayed public poverty, license and debauchery, while the Ottomans had unity and discipline. Worse, "the enemy is accustomed to victory, and we to defeat." A prototype of the 20th-century Cold War was waged as the West defended itself against the threat of further Muslim encroachments in eastern Europe and the Balkans. In the 17th century, as Lewis records, raiding parties from North Africa were still seizing slaves from England and Ireland, and even from Iceland.

Western nations won this early cold war convincingly. Over two centuries, Russia, Britain and France, and finally Holland, Spain and Italy, pushed the Muslims back and carved empires out for themselves at the expense of the Islamic world, conquering and absorbing Muslim states from northwest Africa to the East Indies. By the end of the 19th century, the two surviving Muslim powers, Ottoman Turkey and pre-Pahlavi Iran, were wrecks in need of re-invention. Only these two countries and such remote, inhospitable parts of the Muslim world as inner Arabia and Afghanistan, remained free from occupation by a foreign and Christian power. Contrary to Busbecq's prediction, it was the Muslims who became accustomed to defeat, and the West to victory.

For Muslims, public acknowledgement that their civilization had failed was inescapable. The world was no longer rightfully ordered, as it had been in so many previous centuries, and the shame of it cut painfully deep. Theirs is what anthropologists call a shame society, in which acquisition of honor and the converse, avoidance of shame, are the keys to motivation. These values serve to distort reality by imposing false heroism and equally false self-denigration. Muslims everywhere duly came to despise their own impotence in the face of unbelievers. The internalization of this emotion remains today the continuing cause of Muslim rage.

In one country after another, nationalist movements formed with the aim of ousting foreign occupiers and recovering self-respect and independence. As a result of the world wars, and the accompanying loss of power and moral authority, the European empires all collapsed.

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Seemingly, the world of Islam had won a reprieve, a second chance to prosper as a civilization of its own. Instead of freedom, however, independence has brought Muslim countries a series of unrelieved wars against neighbors of all denominations (Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, and African animists); and also a series of unrelieved aggressions and civil wars among Muslims. Worst of all, independence has brought the rule of the autocrat and the secret police, injustice, corruption and torture. The barbarity is worse than what went before, and there is no civilization worthy of the name: No high culture, no serious art, no remotely modern medicine, no world-class scientific research, but instead the general frustration of the creative energies of millions of lively and intelligent people. Something has all too evidently gone wrong.

Western observers have often blamed Islam itself for the decline of Muslim civilization. In particular, they like to point out that Islam unites church and state, and makes a dogma of it. This absolutism allows no scope for compromise and power-sharing. For this reason, Ernest Renan, the originator of the study of comparative religion, set the trend when he called Islam "the heaviest chains which have ever shackled humanity." In the West, in contrast, the separation of church and state was a necessary prelude to the replacement of wars of religion with democracy. Lewis concurs, but he does not make much of Islam as a factor in holding Muslims back. Autocracy based on religion, after all, was perfectly compatible with civilization in the past, and not only in Islam. Besides, and more important, he knows that the unity of church and state in Islam has been for most of Islamic history a religious ideal but not an actual practice.

What really went wrong was something more imponderable. From earliest times, Muslim envoys had traveled to the West, and Lewis gives instructive examples of what they found and did there. Handpicked as they were, these men did not stay on after their missions; they neither bothered to learn Western languages nor to study the societies in which they found themselves. Confident of their superiority, or as Kipling in his day was to warn his countrymen, "drunk with sight of power", they missed the major intellectual movements in Europe, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the New Learning and its emerging science and technology. Until the late 18th century, Lewis writes, only a single medical book had been translated into a Middle Eastern language, and that was a long-outdated treatise on syphilis, itself contemptuously known as "the Frankish disease." By the time Muslims realized that they had removed themselves deliberately from the mainstream of intellectual development, it was too late for them to catch up and remedy it. They had condemned themselves to be passive sufferers rather than active agents of events.

Lack of intellectual curiosity is in itself a fatal flaw, and in this case it had been conditioned, and then consummated, by misplaced pride. Continuous defeat in war at the hands of despised unbelievers began "to shake the very structure of Muslim society." This danger imposed the question: What was the secret of European success? As the Japanese were to do when they found themselves in the same predicament, Ottoman and Iranian and Moroccan rulers began in the early part of the 19th century to send envoys to the capitals of the West with the mission of studying what should be done. As Lewis puts it, knowledge was something to be acquired, rather than grown or developed.

Lewis quotes a number of these envoys' reports, which together provide a fascinating measure of the divide between the civilizations. One envoy was aston-

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ished at the sight of the Habsburg emperor taking his hat off to women as a sign of respect. Another had witnessed a scientific experiment to do with electricity, so strange to him that he ascribed it to "Frankish trickery." Yet another, visiting London, thought that the absence of divinely revealed law had reduced the British to the pitiable expedient of enacting their own statutes. Such encounters exemplify and explain the inventiveness of the one civilization and the stagnation of the other.

A few Muslim rulers tried to turn their backs on the steadily encroaching West and seek refuge in Islam. By the mid-19th century, however, most rulers—the Ottoman sultans foremost among them—were instead listening to those who advocated fundamental reforms, and they struggled to adapt their societies in order to survive. They founded language schools and sent students to Europe; they commissioned translations and bought printing presses. They utilized the services of European converts to Islam, known at the time as "renegades", and engaged specialists to upgrade their armies and navies. They toyed with constitutional ideas. In real terms, as well as psychological, the costs of these changes to character and identity were immense. And still they lost the wars.

IMITATION is the sincerest form of flattery, but these efforts to catch up were yet again based on an incomplete intellectual analysis. What has happened to most Muslim societies, as Lewis unfolds it, is modernization without Westernization. The sense of these two abstract nouns must be carefully distinguished. Modernization in the Muslim world has resulted in national armies, all ranks equipped with European-style uniforms and weaponry, and such other features as high-rise buildings and oil wells and paved roads and flyovers—in short, the outward appearances that are to be observed in any non-Muslim country. The novel and the theater and film-making are cultural forms successfully transplanted across the cultural divide, as are clocks and timetables and calendars. Voltaire at his estate of Ferney, it turns out, had men making watches for the Turkish market. But also in the package of imports are filing systems, computers, surveillance devices and other instruments of the tyrannical government which is the curse of the Muslim world at present. For the unfortunate man and woman in the Muslim street, modernization has no necessary connection with such integral features of the West as freedom, civil rights or equality of opportunity.

Going beyond the mimicry of externals, Westernization involves a change of thinking profound enough to shift the basic institutions and assumptions of social and political life. Westernization would replace autocracy and one-party rule with democracy and the rule of law; it would replace civil war and the secret police with power-sharing. Westernization means respect for the rights of others, in particular the acceptance of women on juridically equal terms with men. In a society in which the conduct of women is held to be the source of honor or shame for men, this latter reform is not merely an upturning of long-held values but a crude invasion of Muslim private life. In an aside, Lewis draws an analogy between soccer and parliamentary politics, both of which stem from the English genius for drawing up rules. The adoption of soccer in the Middle East is modernization. The adoption of parliamentary politics would be Westernization. In another inspired aside, he takes the plot of Verdi's *Aida*, commissioned by the khedive of Egypt in 1871, which turns on the choice tormenting the opera's hero between two women he loves. This would have been meaningless in the Egypt of the day, or in Saudi Arabia today,

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where the hero could have had both ladies legally.

"Following is bad enough", Lewis writes, but "limping in the rear is worse." In this crisis, a counter-reaction has long been building among Muslims, the essence of which is that everyone else is to blame for the plight in which they find themselves trapped, that they are innocent victims of malevolence or conspiracy. The most recent outsiders and unbelievers out to do down and destroy Islam wantonly are held to be Americans and Jews. In order to rationalize such a pointless ambition on the part of other people, they have to demonize the United States and Israel. The Islamic anger of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian revolution, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and the secular anger of Saddam Hussein and Yasir Arafat, are twin aspects of the process of modernizing without at the same time Westernizing. And what all this anger coincidentally achieves is another pretext for the Muslim world to turn on itself with violence. So we have a cycle, with violence producing conspiracy-mongering, and fear of conspiracy producing more frustration and violence. Left without redress, it is bound to end in a thousand and one Arabian nightmares.

What went wrong, then, in the last analysis, has been the inability of Islamic culture either to sustain itself or to evolve in the light of today's world. The political and social forms of Islam have long since decayed into bad and despotic government, injustice and corruption, inequality between the sexes, and the impossibility of innovation. The sole surviving defense of identity now seems to lie in the inner compulsion to recover honor by whatever means are at hand, and to avoid shame. Ayatollah Khomeini and Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein and the rest share the same vocabulary to denigrate Western—and especially American—"arrogance" and "haughtiness", and also to reject perceived "humiliation" and to insist on the assertion of their own dignity, if need be through terror and war. In his next short and invaluable book Lewis might examine the role that these values play in holding Muslim public and private life in a static grip apparently impervious to reform. People liberate themselves from feelings of shame and humiliation only through their own deeds; mere words of explanation and expiation, however rational, are to no avail.

In both its religious and its secular nationalist forms, Muslim rage looks to provide for some time to come an organizing principle for mobilizing against the United States and Western civilization in general. In short, we may be facing another variant of cold war, or worse. But there must be Muslims who will read Lewis and agree that catastrophe lies down this road. What is required is reinvention, and this in turn requires a philosopher, the equivalent of a Muslim Locke or Montesquieu, to provide new definitions of the role and purpose of Islam in the state and society, and so recover a properly-working Muslim identity in the contemporary context. There seem to be no such persons. In that case, Lewis concludes, the suicide bomber may become a metaphor for the whole region, or else some outside power might conquer the Muslim world once and for all. There are not enough civilizations for mankind to so heedlessly write off any one of them. We should all hope, therefore, along with Professor Lewis, for the true victory of Islam—not against the West, but for itself. □

David Pryce-Jones is a senior editor of *National Review*. His book, *The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs*, has just been reprinted by Ivan R. Dee.

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Letters

God and Mammon:

Daniel Pipes rightly argues that militant Islam often surges in countries experiencing rapid economic growth ("God and Mammon", Winter 2001/02). Nowhere is this phenomenon more pronounced and conspicuous than in India's Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Militant Islam appeared on Kashmir's radar screen in 1989. Prior to this, Kashmir was quiet and peaceful. It even thwarted Pakistan's unsuccessful attempt in 1965 to export radical Islam. But things began to change in the 1980s, and it is not difficult to see why. During 1977–78, 33.4 percent of the Kashmiri population lived below the poverty line. By 1983–84, it had declined to a mere 16.7 percent. The average monthly per capita income for 1986–87 was 3,348 Rupees ($95), while in 1971–72 it was only 588 Rupees ($17). By the late 1980s, Kashmir had become one of the richest states of the Indian Union.

It is ironic that in their changing historical identity—from Hindus to Buddhists, back to Hindus and then to Muslims—the people of Kashmir had never achieved a better standard of living or attained greater freedom than during the current period. Yet all these developments could not pre-empt the emergence of militant Islam in Kashmir, which has so far resulted in the deaths of nearly 20,000 people.

Economic prosperity alone, however, cannot precipitate the growth of militant Islam; it merely awakens the sleeping giant. A close study of Muslim traditions would suggest (as does Ram Swarup's *Understanding Islam through Hadis* [New Delhi: Voice of India Press, 1983]) that the root cause of Islamic militancy might lie not just in economics or politics, but also in the fundamentals of Islam.

RANDHIR SINGH BAINS
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What Victory Means:

Conrad Black's admirable overview of desirable goals for the United States ("What Victory Means", Winter 2001/02) suffers from the fault expressed in the Shakespearean conversation between Hotspur and Owen Glendower (*Henry IV*, Act III, Scene 1). Glendower: "I can call spirits from the vasty deep!" Hotspur: "Why so can I, or so can any man; but will they come when you do call for them?"

There are certain facts that affect the coming of Lord Black's spirits. The most important is that the United States is, and has been since World War II, not just a member of the community of European nations, but its center of gravity—without whom no significant transnational enterprise can succeed or arguably even take place, either on the continent of Europe or in areas where vital European interests are involved. This has been borne out by a number of events which are recent and familiar enough not to list again here.

Unfortunately, there are elements on the continent—especially in France—that bitterly resent the American position, and continue to do what they can to sabotage and diminish American influence on the continent and restrict the scope of U.S. action elsewhere, both in the UN and through other channels. Not the least of these efforts is the attempt to set up the European Community as a competitor to the United States, not just in economic terms (with the pathetically rickety euro at its center), but in order to limit or block the necessary exercise of American

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power, even where it aims to disarm a threat to Europe's vital interests. In some quarters this contrariness has extended to actual help for the efforts of America's sworn enemies in the Middle East to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Because of America's position in Europe, this essentially hostile and very active determination affects almost all the facets of Lord Black's program. It would seem a matter of common sense to do what we can to counter it.

HERB GREER
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Ancient Soldiers, Modern Warriors:

In his article in the Winter 2001/02 issue ("The World of Achilles: Ancient Soldiers, Modern Warriors"), Robert Kaplan claims that "the United States is a peaceful, commercial republic that has usually tried to avoid war." A commercial republic we are. But peaceful? Since World War II we have fought seven wars: Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Gulf War, the Kosovo War and now Afghanistan. That is an average of a war every eight years or so. And that does not count such warlike activity as support for insurgents in Nicaragua against the Sandinistas and in Afghanistan against the Soviets. In five of these wars the impetus was not an attack on the United States or its forces. Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Gulf War and Kosovo were all cases where we decided to go to war; it was not forced on us.

I realize Mr. Kaplan's comment was made in passing, but passing comments can reveal assumptions. Mr. Kaplan evidently thinks of us as peaceful. We are not. This is obvious to most of the world and if we are to plan policy intelligently, we ought to see ourselves clearly.

JOHN HARLLEE, JR.
Breckenridge, CO

Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis:

There is much to take issue with in "Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis" (Winter 2001/02), by Henri J. Barkey and Philip H. Gordon.

For starters, it could have been written by the Foreign Ministry of Turkey, or by the Livingston firm, or any of the other lobbyists Turkey has hired. Mr. Barkey and Mr. Gordon have no good word whatever to say about the Greek Cypriot side and view the tragic Cyprus problem purely in amoral, geopolitical terms. *The National Interest* identifies the authors as having "worked on Greece-Turkey-Cyprus issues at the State Department and National Security Council . . . from 1998–2000." If their take on the Cyprus problem reflects past administration policy on Cyprus, it is no wonder the problem has remained "intractable." (More about the intractability red herring later.)

Following are some random observations, random because the article discourages rebuttal unless one has the time to challenge every misrepresentation and misstatement of fact.

First, evidence of bias: Nowhere is Cyprus referred to as the "Republic of Cyprus", its proper and universally recognized name, recognized by the United States and every member of the United Nations except Turkey. Instead it is referred to as the "Greek part of Cyprus", "southern Cyprus" (note the lower-case "s"), "Greek Cypriot-controlled Cyprus." Mr. Denktash's breakaway statelet, on the other hand, is elevated to the status of "Northern Cyprus", or the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."

Second, the accession of Cyprus to the European Union is described in near hysterical, apocalyptic terms. The authors' main thesis is that Cyprus' EU accession will bring in its wake a series of "crises": "[U]nless something is done . . . the entry of a divided Cyprus will reverse" the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey; "trigger a severe crisis between Turkey and the West"; "increase tensions on the island"; "alienate Turkey from Europe"; "worsen Turkish domestic political problems"; and produce a "crisis that could lead to Turkish annexation [of the occupied area north of the Green Line] . . . and a possible military confrontation between two NATO members." "The United States has an important role to play in

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defusing the Cyprus time bomb before it explodes." It will come as news to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nicosia that it holds such trump cards. But should those dire predictions come to pass, does Turkey have anyone to blame but itself?

Third, the threatened "annexation of Northern Cyprus" (that is, *occupied* Cyprus) is mentioned a number of times as if seizure of sovereign territory were a legitimate option of Turkey. Since when is the forcible alteration of internationally recognized borders legitimate? Is it surprising that Brussels is finding it difficult to entertain one country's aspirations to EU membership while it holds another country under military occupation?

Fourth, it has been a cliché and a lazy way of dealing with the Cyprus problem to view it as "one of the most intractable problems in international relations for decades." Is it intractable because of irreconcilable differences? Or because one side is intransigent? Consistent evidence of Turkish stonewalling, backpedaling and dissimulation is in the historical record for anyone who wants to look for it. I have little inclination to do the authors' homework for them, but they can refer to Javier Perez de Cuellar's memoirs and to statements made by Richard Holbrooke on June 8, 2001 and to any number of UN reports citing the lack of political will on the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side. It is also wrong and simplistic to frame the issue as an "ethnic dispute" and one of "stubborn animosities." Barkey and Gordon speak of "two antipathetic communities" but both sides lived in reasonable harmony for centuries, as their article concedes. And they can again. . . .

Fifth, with regard to the S-300 fracas, the authors describe it as a "humiliating retreat" for the Greek Cypriots. Surely the humiliated party was Turkey, not little Cyprus. It doesn't say much for Turkey's military machismo and its massive military machine if it can feel intimidated by Cyprus' purely defensive ground-to-air missile system that posed no serious threat to its mainland.

Sixth, curiously, there is no reference to the guiding principles of a settlement that both sides have for some time agreed to, namely a bizonal, bicommunal federation. Federation was a major concession on the part of the Greek Cypriots. Even the term "bizonal" was a difficult concession because of the implied separation of the two communities. For years now, Mr. Denktash has ridden that hobbyhorse to death.

Seventh, the so-called "Greek Cypriot-led embargo" has probably less to do with the appalling economic conditions in the occupied area than mismanagement and corruption of the regime there.

Eighth, another curious omission is any reference to the numerous UN Security Council resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Turkish occupation troops from Cyprus and the return of refugees, the tracing of missing persons (on both sides), and so forth. Instead Barkey and Gordon scold the Greek Cypriots for "using their EU relationships to pursue major new arms procurements [instead of using] their enhanced security status within the EU to reduce arms on the island." In actuality, President Clerides has put forward a comprehensive demilitarization proposal. It was endorsed by numerous members of Congress. The Secretary-General at the time supported it and recommended it to Turkey's then-prime minister, Tansu Ciller, who trashed it. Madeleine Albright, as Secretary of State, also tried to reduce the Turkish military presence and got nowhere.

Finally, there is much hand-wringing over Turkey's so-called security concerns and those of Turkish Cypriots who "still fear their Greek counterparts' intentions (often for good reason)." It bears repeating that it is the Greek Cypriot side that has been invaded, made to suffer massive human rights violations, had its cultural and religious monuments desecrated and looted, thousands of its citizens turned into refugees, suffering the indignity of having a 35,000-strong foreign army occupying 40 percent of its soil. To pass over the human tragedy is to write in a moral vacuum.

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Barkey and Gordon reply:

One of the reasons the Cyprus problem has been so intractable—a word it does seem fair to apply to a situation that has been stalemated for 27 years—is the tendency of each side to focus exclusively on the injustices it feels it has suffered without so much as acknowledging the point of view, rights and interests of the other side. Mr. Dehilas is right that Greek and Turkish Cypriots can live in harmony on the island as they have done in the past, but not if they remain determined to see only the worst in the position of the other side. If he had spent less time scouring our piece for alleged bias, and more time considering our suggestions for how to get a unified Cyprus into the EU (or to limit the damage to all parties should that prove impossible), he probably would not have provided such a good example of the one-sidedness that makes reconciliation on the island so difficult.

Odom's Russia:

Because "Odom's Russia: A Forum" (Winter 2001/02) focuses primarily on Russia's political institutions, it ignores the question of the "commercial DNA" bequeathed to the economic enterprises of the post-Soviet successor states. This is of no minor import. Throughout the 1990s and into the present, the entrepreneurial drive to harness the enormous commercial potential in Russia and the other Newly Independent States has been largely absent, and its very absence ignored. Even as new laws and regulations were enacted, the brick wall of a stultified entrepreneurial ethos and a stagnant business culture have caused efforts to reform the former Soviet Union's economy and related governance structures to flounder.

The Soviet Union was a hierarchical structure that provided enterprises with detailed organizational charts and procedures manuals for the production of all goods and services. Prices were set through command-and-control processes, not buyer-and-seller negotiation. In business terms, the Soviet Union might best be understood as an unprofitable firm, with Josef Stalin as a robber baron CEO and the Politburo an overly compliant board of directors.

Unfortunately, Western reformers treated the post-Soviet world like an inefficient market. When the Soviet Union collapsed, thousands of intricately linked state-controlled enterprises were atomized. Western advisers assumed that these enterprises were embryonic capitalist operations that had simply been constrained by an inefficient market. Donor agencies provided regulatory infrastructure that, in some instances, made already Byzantine bureaucracies more burdensome and further constrained entrepreneurial initiative. This was not so much a question of right-vs.-wrong, but a matter of selecting firm-vs.-market remedies to be the independent variable for economic development.

Reformers emphasized market rules that permit voluntary exchanges between consumers, workers and owners of production. They ignored the need to make firms commercially viable. Ultimately, firms are the actual economic units that develop skills to produce goods and services. Soviet firms were not encouraged to be competitive. Innovation was not rewarded. The apparatchik culture favored political rather than business entrepreneurs. The entirety of the old Soviet corporate culture needed to go.

In commercially viable economies, markets and firms provide a system of reflexive checks and balances. Firms provide governance and transparency, and markets provide valuation multiples and liquidity. In Russia, large oligarchical "financial-industrial groups" use political connections to obtain subsidies and preferential treatment, and the shadow economy provides short-term payoffs. Despite regulatory changes in the Russian market, the apparatchik culture continues to thrive. Firm remedies are needed to empower Russia's economic development and provide incentives for the democratization of Russia's socio-political institutions. □

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Weak Realpolitik

The Vicissitudes of Saudi Bashing

Adam Garfinkle

ABOUT SIXTY years ago, R.G. Collingwood wrote, "Every new generation must rewrite history in its own way."[1] Inasmuch as his thinking was suspended somewhere between hope for a science of history and an awareness of its practical limits, philosophers of history have been arguing ever since about what he really meant. But one thing he must have meant is that what interests us about the past is at least partly a function of what bothers us or makes us curious in the present. As Collingwood said, "As far as we can see history as a whole . . . we see it as a continuous development in which every phase consists of the solution of human problems set by the preceding phase."[2]

Human affairs generally move so ponderously, or in such complicated ways, that contemporaries have trouble seeing "history as a whole", or detecting the phases to which Collingwood pointed. But as a glacier or a tectonic plate may slip to dramatic effect, so sometimes major events rattle us into historical awareness. When they do, it is uncanny how we find ourselves reassessing the significance of dates as symbols of the touching points of historical phases. On September 1, 1939, 1918–19 suddenly shrunk in significance for Britons and Frenchmen and 1870–71 suddenly grew. When the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union dissolved, 1917 suddenly became a less important date, and 1914 a more important one. September 11, 2001, was such an event, so it is worth asking how our historical perceptions may change as a result of it.

To be sure, some movement in our historical awareness may be detected already. In the past six months many Americans have grown intensely interested in the Middle East and Islam in general—and in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Islam, and the U.S.-Saudi relationship in particular. So far, however, relatively recent matters have monopolized our attention, and an abundance of detailed newspaper feature series has contributed to that focus. The seriousness of our historical thinking is also affected by emotion. We Americans are more than just curious, and more than merely bothered, about these Saudi subjects. Some are better described as very, very angry.

For starters, it soon dawned on us that while the targets of initial U.S.-led military operations would be the Al-Qaeda organization nestled in the bosom of the Taliban regime, the real source of

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[1] R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 248.

[2] Collingwood, "The Theory of Historical Cycles", *Antiquity* (1927), in *Essays in the Philosophy of History*, William Debbins, ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), p. 87.

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the problem lay in our two most tactically significant *allies*: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. As to the former, we knew that Pakistan's military and intelligence services had created and supported the Taliban, thus providing sanctuary and foot soldiers for mass-casualty terrorism. As to the latter, not only were 15 of the 19 terrorists Saudi nationals, but the open secret that the Saudi regime deflects popular frustration and opposition away from itself and onto the United States and Israel became more widely confessed in public. As Sandy Berger put it once out of office, "the veil has been lifted and the American people see a double game that they're not terribly pleased with." Though silent on whether he had been displeased with it while in office, he continued: "They see a regime that is repressive with respect to the extremists that threaten them, but more than tolerant—indeed, the more we find out, beneficent—to the general movement of extreme Islamists in the region."[3]

It soon occurred to others that even this deflection game—what George Shultz has termed "a grotesque protection racket"— was not the deepest root of the matter.[4] The clerically-run Saudi educational system inculcates an intense religious and cultural chauvinism into its youth—and youth under the age of 16 are today about half the Kingdom's population.[5] Saudi *ulema* have tutored generation after generation in what amounts to jihadist incitement against non-Muslims. The late Hamud al-Shuaibi, a Saudi cleric who followed Wahhabi Islam to its logical conclusion, put it exactly right: "The Saudi people follow the sheiks that relay the truth and the ones who follow Quran and Sunna, not the ones who follow the political side. Jihad is the highest form of worship. This is a very high station. So all look for this station. If the government allowed people, all the Arab Muslims would go to war."[6] This explains why, in a recent poll conducted by Saudi intelligence and shared with the U.S. government, more than 95 percent of Saudis between the ages of 25 and 41 expressed sympathy with Osama bin Laden.[7]

Saudi Arabia's political culture, then, is caught in a double-bind owed to the Kingdom's very origins: the alliance between the power of the Al Saud and the theology of Abdel ibn al-Wahhab. Saudi society naturally generates resentment against its own political leadership, for that leadership's power is far too scant to implement the jihadist teachings of its own schools. Moreover, the Kingdom relies on outside physical protection and a welter of sheltering financial and institutional arrangements with the United States while at the same time exporting its excess religious zeal in the form of opposition to that protector. This double bind has been managed with only modest breakage for most of the last half century, but as U.S. protection has become more visible since the Gulf War, and as the excess of zeal has grown from both demographic trends and the establishment's essentially reactionary approach to economic liberalization, an always tricky balance has grown more problematic.[8]

Just as recognition of these realities was penetrating minds in and around the Beltway, Saudi behavior fed the growing sense of American disquiet. First, Saudi

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[3]Quoted in the *Washington Post*, February 12, 2002.

[4]Shultz, "Terror and States", *Washington Post*, January 26, 2002.

[5]See Neil MacFarquhar, "Anti-Western and Extremist Views Pervade Saudi Schools", *New York Times*, October 19, 2001.

[6]Quoted in the *Washington Post*, December 15, 2001.

[7]Cited in the *New York Times*, January 27, 2002.

[8]See Joshua Teitelbaum, "Deserted", *The New Republic*, October 22, 2001, for an account of these changes.

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leaders refused to publicly acknowledge that the United States might use Saudi bases against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and for a while it was not clear if the U.S. military would even have unfettered unpublicized use of them. At the same time, the Saudi government raised barriers to U.S. law enforcement agencies' efforts to learn about the Saudi terrorists of September 11. Americans were incredulous at being told by Saudi officials, long after it had become even remotely plausible, that few if any of the terrorists were Saudis but had stolen Saudi passports and identities. When subsequently asked to help U.S. officials in the critical task of "following the money", Saudi officials at first denied, *pace* Mr. Berger, that any public or private Saudi money had financed any terrorist organization. This raised the question of whether the Saudis were lying, which would have been bad, or whether they were clueless as to what was going on under their noses, which would have been worse. *The New Republic* bluntly summed up the emerging conclusion: "In fact our Arab 'coalition partners'—particularly Saudi Arabia—are actively sabotaging our efforts to identify the wider terrorist international, made up in large part, of course, of their citizens."[9]

Before long, too, recognition of the inadvertent but unmistakable Saudi complicity in September 11 begged the reinterpretation of older data into something of a pattern. The Saudis had impeded the U.S. investigation into the Riyadh and Khobar Towers bombings that killed 23 American soldiers in November 1995 and June 1996. Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries that has refused to participate in an FAA-run airplane manifest agreement that lets U.S. officials know who is arriving into the United States from abroad. The Saudis have at times been unhelpful to sensitive U.S. Arab-Israeli diplomacy, actively dissuading Yasir Arafat during and after the summer 2000 Camp David summit, for example, from accepting compromises over Jerusalem that are a *sine qua non* for a settlement.

More pointedly with regard to Al-Qaeda and company, the Saudis refused to take Osama bin Laden into custody in 1996 when the Sudanese government offered, with American encouragement and support, to deliver him there. As egregious, in April 1995 the FBI learned that Imad Mughniyah was on a flight from Khartoum to Beirut that was scheduled to stop in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. FBI agents rushed to Jeddah to apprehend Mughniyah, who was responsible for the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, during which a U.S. Navy diver was murdered in cold blood, and for the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine complex in Lebanon. But the Saudis refused to let the plane land. (Mughniyah went on to become an important liaison between Hizballah and Al-Qaeda, and is even now helping to host escaped Al-Qaeda terrorists in Lebanon.)

AS ALL OF this history was being revived, reviewed and discussed, together with post-September 11 developments themselves, the Saudis shouted foul. They claimed, most pointedly, that a conspiracy was being mounted against them by the American media, averring *sotto voce* that this was because so many Jews occupy high positions in that media. Very much related, the Saudis sought to excuse their own reticence to help the United States by alleging, in the person of Crown Prince Abdallah himself on January 28, that Saudi reluctance flowed from justifiable anger throughout the Arab world over America's "absolute" support for Israel.

Now, Saudi attitudes toward Palestine and Israel, and toward Jews in the American media, may seem like side

[9] *The New Republic*, November 5, 2001.

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points considering all the other things that have impinged on U.S. and Saudi interests since September 11. But they are not. The Saudi leadership's approach to Palestine helps define its predicament, stuck as it is between the demands of its own society and its need for friendship and protection from the United States. Moreover, this predicament has been, and will remain, a central and uncomfortable fact in the American war on terrorism.

U.S.-Saudi disagreement over Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy had passed through a dramatic stage in the weeks just before September 11, and Saudi complaints after September 11 make little sense without an awareness of that drama. To understand either, however, some background is necessary.

While Saudi Arabia has for decades been ritually referred to by Americans and Europeans as "moderate", there has never been anything the least bit moderate about its basic view of Israel. Saudi religious figures and most Saudi citizens see Israel and Zionism in ways indistinguishable from Al-Qaeda or the Iranian mullahs at their worst (which they frequently are). They accept unquestioningly a passion-play version of the conflict that is entirely one-sided and, given the closed nature of Saudi society, few Saudis have ever even heard any other account. Israel stands irredeemably guilty of "original sin", Palestinians are ever and always mere innocent victims, and no wild Arab press exaggeration—or pure invention—of dark Israeli deeds is too bizarre to be believed. Partly on account of their educational indoctrination, too, many Saudis are avid consumers of anti-semitism, both vintage imported versions from Europe and fresh creations from the pens of contemporary Arabs. It may make at least back-page news in the United States when an official of the Saudi Ministry of Religious Affairs refers to American Jews as "brothers of apes and pigs" and calls on America to "get rid of its Jews", but it is occasion for nods and yawning inside the Kingdom.[10]

In light of this, it seems odd upon a moment's reflection that the Saudi political establishment has always supported Yasir Arafat, the leader and symbol of secular Palestinian nationalism, rather than Islamist alternatives, like Hamas, whose religious-based views are closer to those of Saudi clergy and society. That it has done so illustrates how the Saudi internal dilemma projects itself onto Saudi diplomacy. To be saddled with the political leadership of a weak state means to be simultaneously pragmatic in private and ideologically spotless in public. While the royal family would probably accept any settlement over Palestine that would satisfy Arafat and the nationalists, the Kingdom has been very reluctant to take an active public part in any diplomacy that might in the end legitimate Israel's existence, within any borders whatsoever, for fear of the internal reaction it might provoke. (Crown Prince Abdallah's "speech in the desk" comment to Thomas Friedman about possible Saudi normalization with Israel might signal a lightening of that reluctance, but as of this writing, in late February, it is too soon to say.) For the Saudi leadership, in any event, Arafat is as moderate a figure as it dares to support.

This is why, despite longstanding and obvious differences between U.S. and Israeli views of a settlement, despite Arafat's having visited the Clinton White House more often than any other foreign dignitary, and despite the fact that the U.S. government has provided more financial support to the Palestinian Authority than has the Saudi government, Saudi leaders still say publicly that U.S. policy has been "absolutely, 100 percent" biased toward Israel during the second so-

[10]Abdallah Bin Matruk Al-Haddal on *Al-Jazeera* TV, January 22, 2002, as reported in MEMRI Special Dispatch 343, February 8, 2002.

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called *intifada*. Such a view sounds self-evident to most Saudis because it is accompanied by a parallel belief that *any* support for Israel is unjustified because Israel's very existence is illegitimate. Over the past 17 months of Palestinian-instigated violence, most Saudis see the Israeli state as terrorist and the Palestinians as blameless targets and martyrs.

Whether Crown Prince Abdallah and his court privately hold the same attitude is not clear. But it is clear that, both before September 11 and since, the Saudi government has acted as it has because it is far more afraid of its own domestic shadow than of Washington's glare. It knows that its own internal peril paradoxically gives it enormous strength in its dealings with the United States because as difficult as the Saudi status quo is, serious people in Washington realize that all the available alternatives are worse.

It is from this mix of motives and assessments that the Saudis brought considerable pressure on the Bush Administration last spring and summer to change its standoffish public diplomacy with regard to Palestinian-Israeli troubles. An August 24 press conference in which the President laid the major share of blame for the Israeli-Palestinian impasse on Arafat touched off a particularly intense Saudi effort. By early September, that effort resulted in two promises: one very deferrential one from the United States to put its views of a settlement into the public realm, and one from Chairman Arafat to do what needed doing to resume negotiations toward a ceasefire if not a settlement.[11]

September 11 intervened before either of those promises could be kept. But the promised speech from the United States was nevertheless made, by Secretary of State Colin Powell on November 19, with significant foreshadowing from the President on October 2 and November 10. With these pronouncements, a Republican administration went on record supporting the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Arafat, however, did not keep his promises to Abdallah. Instead, he connived to bring Iranian arms and influence into the Levant, right up to the shores of the Red Sea. In secret league with Hizballah through Iran, Arafat seemed to be planning a kind of re-run of the 1973 Middle East War, with Iran playing the Soviet role, Hizballah in place of Syria on the northern front and the PLO *tanzim* in place of Egypt on the southern front. The aim was basically the same: to cause such danger and fear as to trigger outside intervention on the Arabs' behalf.

As evidenced by the President's January 29 State of the Union address, the administration has drawn the proper conclusions from all of this: that President Bush, at his August 24 press conference, was right the first time; that Arafat and the PLO are on the wrong side of the war against terrorism; and that trusting Saudi (and Egyptian) advice on how to handle other Arab leaders brings embarrassment and failure. One wonders how the President now reads his hurried, placating response to Crown Prince Abdallah in late August. After all of Arafat's special industry since the summer, one may also wonder how the Crown Prince reads it.

HOWEVER they read it, it is evident that a combination of new indignities and old resentments has coalesced into a crescendo of American criticism of Saudi Arabia. Senator Carl Levin was the first, on January 15, to raise the possibility of withdrawing U.S. forces from Saudi soil, but by the time he went public, an attentive audience in Congress, the Pentagon and

[11]This history is summarized in Robert G. Kaiser and David B. Ottaway, "Saudi Leader's Anger Revealed Shaky Ties", *Washington Post*, February 10, 2002.

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elsewhere stood ready to applaud his view. Privately, some senior former U.S. officials began saying things only slightly off the record that would have been hard to imagine six months earlier. At the core of these remarks has been advice to speak frankly, at long last, and at the highest level to the Saudis about key matters that divide us. As Brent Scowcroft put it (for the record), "We probably avoid talking about the things that are the real problems between us because it's a very polite relationship. We don't get all that much below the surface."[12] The developing sense is that we should finally give the Saudi leadership to understand that they need us more than we need them.

But is that really true, and is there any sense to such a calculation in the first place? Despite all that has happened since September 11, there has been a limit to Saudi bashing, and for good reason. While some experts believe that the United States does not need Saudi facilities to make war against the Iraqi Ba'ath regime, for example, most Pentagon officials would rather do with than without those facilities. Saudi oil still matters greatly to the limping world economy, too, inasmuch as we have neither a serious energy policy in this country nor yet a ready substitute for Saudi swing production abroad (though the Russians are trying and hinting). More important, if the United States lets loose of the Saudis to sink or swim as they might, they might actually sink—only to be replaced by a regime that more resembles the Taliban than, say, the Hashemites in Amman. What benefit, then—aside from the idle pleasures of rhetorical release, or the scoring of petty political points—is there in bashing them?

There is none. The point of foreign policymaking is not to feel good but to do well. A useful step in that direction would be to take up Collingwood's advice in earnest to rewrite our history.

When we recall our lessons as to what was significant between the end of World War I and the onset of the Great Depression, we have been used to naming such items as the Washington Naval Conference, Locarno, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. From the vantage point of September 11, however, new historical coordinates arise. In the wizened, windswept autumn of 1924, the Al Saud wrested ownership of the Hejaz from the Hashemites, who had lorded over the holiest places of Islam since the 10th century. With that conquest—which could have been prevented by a few gunboats and some strong language had British policy not been otherwise bent—the basic territorial configuration of what became known in 1932 as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established. Meanwhile, in the eastern part of the Kingdom oil was being found in abundance, and by the 1970s money began rolling into Saudi coffers in amounts that neither traditional conceptions nor vaults could hold.

The combination—oil riches and the religious legitimacy conferred by control of Mecca and Medina (and of the *hajj* along with it)—has allowed the Saudi partnership of the Al Saud and the Al Wahhab to overturn the equilibrium of Islamic civilization that had existed for nigh on a thousand years. The Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam is neither traditional nor orthodox. It is a slightly attenuated fundamentalism that dates only from the end of the 18th century. Though linked to the Islamic past through Ibn Taymiyah, a 13th century exegete, and to the minoritarian *salafiyah* strand of interpretation before him, as recently as fifty years ago the large majority of Muslims considered Saudi Wahhabism to be exotic, marginal and austere to the point of neurotic. But an aggressive and very well-funded campaign of intra-Islamic evange-

[12]Quoted in the *Washington Post*, February 10, 2002.

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lism has established it as the paragon of Sunni piety today. This is, in a word, bad; bad for Arabs, for Muslims, and for everyone else. More than anything, the ascendancy of Wahhabism within the Islamic world, to a point that is now beyond the control of the Saudi state, is the core source of the terrorist attacks of September 11—and of the way that those attacks have been variously received and understood by Muslims everywhere.

Once we understand "1924" properly, we are instantly sobered by the new perspective it provides. We see that Saudi society, caught as it is between its origins and the inexorable press of modernity, is an inherent threat to the United States and to its allies, Arab and non-Arab alike; that by its very nature it cannot help but be such a threat. While we can and should try to persuade the Saudi government to help us "follow the money" and to do other things manifestly in its own self-interest as well as ours, we will get nowhere trying to persuade Saudis to be what they are not. We may not like the way Saudis think about the non-Islamic world, or what they teach in their schools, or how they define concepts like charity and terrorism. But for American Christians or Jews to demand that they educate their children to become "better" or "more tolerant" Muslims is utterly futile. Next to the apparently unlimited hubris of those who think it so easy to change the political culture of the Muslim world with so-called Middle East Marshall Plans, this presumption—that we have the right to insist on the reform of other peoples' religions—has to rank as the most outrageous American foolishness of the post-September 11 period.

Too many Americans, then, have simultaneously underestimated the Saudi problem and overestimated the potential near-term efficacy of American influence in regard to it. On the one hand, as a matter of first principle, the United States should not "learn to live" with a *Saudi* Arabia in perpetuity. A Wahhabi-inspired country controlling the Hejaz and that much oil wealth will never be desirable from the perspective of either American interests or values. Arabia has not always been Saudi or Wahhabi, and some day it will probably stop being both; should it become prudent for the United States to advance that day, it would be worth considering. On the other hand, we must recognize that this time is not at hand. The Saudi version of weak realpolitik is becoming an increasingly tense management problem, but it is not just a Saudi problem; it's our problem, too.

As we wait for such a time, there is a lesser but not trivial benefit to seeing the Saudi problem for what it really is. If we stop kidding ourselves about the fit and affection of the two societies for one another, we may grasp the enormous distortion that Saudi money has wreaked on our common sense about the Middle East. Yes, tens of billions of dollars passed around hither and yon over a few decades can do that. But there is hope. Rudy Giuliani provided an object lesson in how to handle Saudi lucre with strings attached. And if even oilmen like George W. Bush and Dick Cheney show signs of getting right about Saudi Arabia, then so can the rest of us. □

> I will say this much for the nobility: that tyrannical, murderous, rapacious, and morally rotten as they were, they were deeply and enthusiastically religious.
>
> —Mark Twain, *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court* (1889)

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

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

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—William Wechsler

"TOO MANY Americans have simultaneously underestimated the Saudi problem and overestimated the potential near-term efficacy of American influence in regard to it."

—Adam Garfinkle

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